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Community Self-reliance Centre

Harawa- Charawa, the Bonded Laborers in Agriculture

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2020

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A Study of Three Municipalities of Dhanusha District in Eastern Terai.

Community Self-reliance Centre (CSRC)

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A Study
of Three
Municipalities
of Dhanusha
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Executive Summary

Harawa-Charawa (HC) as a form of an agricultural labor contract is historically rooted and culturally embedded, and usually tied up with indebtedness. HC as a form of bonded agricultural labour practice is historically linked with the land tenure system and social structure. Therefore, it requires a political-economic approach to understand and explain how the reproduction of such an exploitative system continued to survive.

In this study, a Harawa is defined as,

A person coerced to work in the landlord's field as a plowman or does any other assigned agricultural works for the interest of the loan received, or for grain or the small piece of land cultivated or for shelter in a bonded situation is Harawa. Likewise, a person who does not have the freedom of leaving the work or has no work choice does not have fixed working hours, receive insufficiently or no wage (i.e., either in cash or in-kind) for his labor is also called a Harawa.

A recent survey conducted in three municipalities of Dhanusha district in eastern Terai identified a total of 3636 households as HC households. Of which, 622 were from Dhanauji Rural Municipality, 1232 from Ganeshman-Charnath Municipality, and 1782 from Shahidnagar Municipality. This report presents the socio-demographic and socio-economic condition of those identified households in aggregate; and describes the work contract, wages, and working conditions of HCs in three municipalities. These three municipalities are expected to represent other municipalities as well in the districts and in the province where such a system of HC persists.

The study suggested that landlessness and a multi-dimensional poverty trap are the major causes that have perpetuated such a dyadic relationship between landlord and farm laborer, where a laborer is unfree and relation is based on exploitation.

Policy provisions, mainly the Constitution on Nepal (2015), National Land Policy (2019) and Land Use Policy (2015) and Land Use Act (2019), as well as, 7th, 8th and 18th amendments of land acts, along with the government's recent initiative of forming a High-level Land Issues Resolving Commission are initiatives that may address the age-old problems of HC. However, this depends on its implementation and impacts. Therefore, a thoughtful and strategic implementation is key in this context; for which a political commitment on the government's side is fundamental.

Key Findings

In aggregate 74.15 percent of HCs belong to Terai Dalits. This can be explained with the context of the landlessness among Terai Dalits. The second-largest group after Terai Dalits is Terai Janajati (8.58%). The survey found that people from all caste/ethnic backgrounds have been working as HCs. Even the hill Brahmin Chhetri (12 cases in total) are working as an HC, simply because they were landless, who moved to the southern plain to escape hardship and durable poverty in the hills; and started working as HC for their survival.

The survey revealed that out of the total HC households, 52.94 percent of HC households are in critically vulnerable situation and bondage. Landlessness is the major reason why they needed to work as bonded laborers. Only less than one-third of them (29%) have built a house in their land. This shows the land tenure situation of HCs.

However, in recent years, their access to basic facilities, mainly electricity and drinking water, has increased. This is due to governmental and non-governmental supports they received over the years. But no such intervention was made that had helped HCs to come out of chronic poverty and the debt trap. Nearly one-third (32%) of Terai Dalits continued to be HCs from an earlier generation. Such intergenerational bondage has forced them to live in continued poverty and debt.

Landlessness is manifested in its food sufficiency situation, as well. Nearly 40 percent do not have their production, only one percent could survive for the whole year with their production. Whatever they produced, they produced in the land they got as Laguwai or as a sharecropper. A few were cultivating in the guthi land. Their children and also the elderly ones work as Charawa, the cattle herders, but they cannot afford to raise their own; except a few who had a pair of oxen.

HCs work in an informal setting. They do not have any formal work contract. Some of them reported to have worked even without wages; such free labor is considered by the landlords or employer as a customary practice or tradition. According to the survey, 16 percent of respondents had worked without wage in the last year; however, the number of days or nature of the work were not accounted for.

A majority of them (89%) worked for the single landlords throughout the year. This, on one hand, strengthens the patron-client relationship between the HCs and their employers; on the other, they have to be dependent on a particular employer, and cannot move to a new employer as they wished. The majority of them feared that they would face bad consequences if they move to a new landlord.

The survey revealed that three-fourth of them cannot refuse any work their employer asked them to do. Hence, neither they have fixed working hours, nor they have the

freedom to choose their employers and have to work without a formal work contract and prior-negotiation about the wages. This empirical evidence suggests that they are still unfree and in a state of bondage.

Indebtedness is one of the major reasons that keep the HCs in bondage. The majority of them took the loan for medical treatment, and ritual expenses mainly expense for marriage and death rituals. Besides, many of them needed a loan to buy food. A very few have used the loan for the education of their children, and none of them could invest them in any income-generating activities. The majority of them do not know when they will be able to pay off the loan. In recent years, some of the HC has taken the loan to go abroad as labor migrants. To get such a loan, there should be someone in his/her family who could serve as HCs for the creditor. The high-interest rate of the loan they take turn them more vulnerable. In the past, they faced not only verbal abuse but physical violence, too, for not paying the loan on time. Therefore, they always feel insecure, and try to be loyal and dependable to their employer.

HCs received only limited support from the government in the past 12 months, so is in the previous years, too; usually as a member of 'poor' or 'Dalit' groups. The most critical aspect here was HCs' were not recognized as a distinct occupational group, and their special need, and livelihood security.

Due to their low presence in the collective forums, their access to the information is also limited, and consequently have to depend on landlords or their kinfolks for any information that can be useful for them. Thus, with less access to social capital, especially their less involvement in social networks, they were also deprived of government grants or any other supports.

The increasing number of HC families becoming interested in and gradually organizing in forums like Harawa-Charwa Forums and Land Rights Forums is the early indication that they gradually get organized around the movement that helps them to break the chain of an exploitative relationship. A cohesive collaboration between and among different levels of governments, CSOs, NGOs/INGOs towards eliminating such a system based on exploitative relation.

Key Recommendations:

Province and Federal Government

- Provincial and federal governments should strictly enforce the law it has adopted to eliminate all forms of bonded labor. They should remove any legal and policy barriers to eliminate any form of bonded-labors if there is any.
- The provincial and federal governments can provide technical and financial supports to the municipalities to rehabilitate and provide secure livelihood options to them.
- Since the prevalence of HC is dominantly a province 2 issue, therefore, the provincial government should take urgent action to eliminate the worse form of bonded labor from the province.

Local Governments

- Local governments should take initiatives in the spirit of the constitutions and other relevant policies to free the HC from the bondage and to rehabilitate them. For effective implementation, municipalities should categorize the HC according to the intensity of bondage and their vulnerability, and prioritize the intervention by reaching out to the most vulnerable and in the critical bondage first.
- Municipalities should prepare a three to five years strategic action plan to eliminate the system from their respective municipalities and declare them as a 'bonded-labor-free' municipality. Allocate the budget accordingly.
- Address issues relating to the informal money-lending that has kept HC in debt-bondage; take legal actions with the help of concerned authorities if it was not according to the existing law, and the loan is transacted beyond the legal practice. Free the HC from debt bondage. Local government can take support from the province and the federal governments if required.

Land Issue Resolving Commission (LIRC)

- LIRC should ensure that the concerned local governments collect data of all Dalit landless people while collecting the data of landless people.
- Collect details of landless people even if they do not have citizenship certificates or have less than 90 square meters of land
- All the necessary arrangements should be made to wave all the debt due to which they are serving as HC before distributing land to the HC.

NGO and Civil Societies

- NGO and CSO should develop evidence-based advocacy strategies and programs to address the bondage and poverty situation of HCs.
- Act as pressure groups and vigilantes to make sure the (local) governments' initiatives and activates are in the right direction.
- Develop strategies to work closely with the governments (local, provincial, or federal) towards eliminating the bonded laborers.
- Take necessary activism and action to ensure that all of them get the wage not less than the district rate; and, launch a campaign to free them from the debt with the exceptionally high-interest rate.

Donors and International Partners

- Support in capacity building of local governments and NGOs/CSOs for preparing strategic plans and programs to end the HCs systems founded in exploitative dyadic relationships.
- Work together with national/local partners in developing advocacy plans and capacity development of local/national partners to work towards freeing unfree HC.
- INGO and Donors can provide technical and financial support to secure and enhance the livelihood and income generation of HC.

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Acronyms and Abbreviation

CBS	Central Bureau of Statistics
CFUG	Community Forest Users Groups
CSO	Civil Social Organization
CSRC	Community Self Reliance Centre
FF	Freedom Fund
Fig	Figure
GoN	Government of Nepal
HC	Harawa-Charawa
HCF	Harawa-Charawa Forum
HH/hh	Household
ILO	International Labor Organization
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
LPG	Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MoLMCPA	Ministry of Land Management, Cooperative and Poverty Alleviation
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NHCRF	National Harawa-Charawa Rights Forum
NLRF	National Land Rights Forum

Chapter 1

Introduction



Harawa-Charawa as Bonded Laborers

Harawa-Charawa (HC) is a form of bonded labor in the agriculture sector prevalent in mid-eastern Terai (southern plain) of Nepal. This is a particular type of unequal social relations in the form of the labor contract between landlords and farm laborers. HCs are identified as 'bonded' labor like Kamaiyas by the policy of the Government of Nepal (GoN).

Harawa usually is live-in-servants or attached plowmen, whereas, Charawa is commonly understood as a cattle herder. HCs do not only plow the field or herd the cattle of the landlord but also do other household works living in the landlord's house; particularly when landlords are also creditors. An overwhelming majority of HC are Dalits, traditionally considered as 'untouchables', and historically marginalized. Almost all of them are landless, often the entire family is obliged to work as unpaid laborers to a landlord for whom the main male member of the family works as a Harawa. Harawa system is historically and culturally rooted in discriminatory political-economic and social policies of the state. HC is often tied up with indebtedness.

The GoN formally declared all forms of bonded labors as illegal when abolished the Kamaiya Labour System on 17 July 2000. The GoN promulgated the Kamaiya Labour (Prohibition) Act 2001 to prevent and rehabilitate bonded laborers under the Kamaiya system in agriculture. The same Act prohibited the other similar forms of 'bonded labor system' in agricultural sectors, including Haliya, Harawa, and Charawa along with "Kamaiya"¹. Further, the act clearly mentioned that 'all the debts obtained by a bonded labor' and 'all kinds of written and verbal agreement concluded between the creditor and the bonded laborer' are voided with the beginning of the act².

However, studies (for example, CSRC: 2006, Dhakal, 2007, NNDSWO & LWf, KC et. al., 2013, Burns et. Al., 2016)) and our recent survey indicated that the HC system is still prevalent in the mid-eastern Terai of Nepal, now Province 2.

Notwithstanding several constitutional and policy provisions, including the Constitution of Nepal 2015, the HC system still prevails in the country.

.....

- 1 The Kamaiya System Prohibition Act broadly defines Kamaiyas including Harawa /Charawa, Haliya. And declares that to keep Kamiya is an illegal act and therefore, punishable.
- 2 Kamaiya System Prohibition Act, 2001.

Constitutional and Policy Context

There are some constitutional provisions that 'prohibit' the HC system. Due to the weaker implementation of those constitutional and other policy provisions, the HC system continues to exist. Some of the Constitutional and other policy provisions are as follows.

Constitution of Nepal, 2015

Right to live with dignity (Article 16): Each person shall have the right to live with dignity.

Right to Freedom (Article 17): Every citizen shall have the freedom to engage in any occupation or be engaged in any employment, trade, or business in any part of Nepal.

Right to Equality (Article 18): All citizens shall be equal before the law. There shall be no discrimination based on caste, religion, race, sex, tribe, physical conditions, or any other such grounds.

Right against Exploitation (Article 29): Every person shall have the right against exploitation. No person shall be subjected to any kind of exploitation based on religion, custom practices, or others. No person shall be subjected to human trafficking or bonded labor, and such an act shall be punishable by law. No person shall be subjected to forced labor.

Right regarding Labor (Article 34): Every laborer shall have the right to proper work practices. Every laborer shall have the right to appropriate remuneration; facilities and contribution-based social security.

Likewise, **Part 4 of Directive Principles, Policies and Responsibilities of the State, Article 50 Directive Principles** explicitly maintains (j), policies regarding social justice and inclusion, line 6- the rehabilitation of Kamaiya (bonded laborers), Kamlari, Haruwa, Charuwa, Haliya, the landless and the squatters by identifying them, and making arrangements of housing or providing a small plot of land or house, employment or arable land for their livelihoods will be the responsibility of the state. Thus, all these constitutional arrangements have sufficiently provided the basis for the liberation of HC and their dignified rehabilitation.

The 7th, 8th and 18th amendments of the Land Act (1964) land for Dalits and landless people. To follow up of this, the **18th amendment of the Land Act** describes who gets how much land for what purpose. Hence, if all relevant policies are properly implemented the liberation and rehabilitation of HC can be achieved.

Objectives of the Study

This study was conducted with an objective of identifying and surveying the HCs in three municipalities and to explore the status of work contracts and the condition of HC. It also aimed to make some recommendations based on the findings to different actors and stakeholders in order to eliminate the HC system and their rehabilitation in the surveyed municipalities.

Organization of the Report

This report is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter describes a general context, related policy provisions, and the objectives of the study. The second chapter discusses the methods and process of the study. Third, fourth, fifth and sixth chapters present the findings of the survey, including general socio-economic profiles and living conditions of HCs, work contract and conditions, indebtedness, and the government support HCs received in the studied municipalities in the last 12 months.

The last chapter presents a summary of the study and the conclusions drawn from the survey findings, followed by some recommendations to the different stakeholders in eliminating the system based on the exploitative relationship.

Chapter 2

Methodology



The study was primarily a survey of the HC families in three municipalities of Dhanusha district. However, the process adopted a participatory approach.

In the beginning, a two-day workshop was conducted with the stakeholders to define HC in the given context; and also, to inform about the intended survey to the concerned stakeholders. Mayors and Deputy Mayors, Executive Officers, and Ward Chairpersons of the respective municipalities were also present in the workshop. Likewise, representatives of NGOs working in the area, representatives of HC Network, and the National Land Rights Forum also participated in the workshop.

The workshop developed an all-accepted working definition of HC, and prepared indicators to identify them. Such a definition was necessary as there was no such an all-accepted definition available, which could be adopted uncontested. More importantly, the definition would be equally acceptable to the local government, HC representatives, and CSOs, active in the rights movements. The same workshop also finalized the survey process and determined the contribution that the local government could make in the process.

Defining and Identifying Harawa-Charawa

The term Harawa is a derivate of Har, the plow; so Harawa literally means a plowman. Likewise, Charwa means a herder, a person who looks after somebody's livestock. During the workshop with stakeholders, the vernacular definition of HC was obtained. In the workshop, not merely as a meaning of HC was sought, but tired to comprehend HC as an institution. During the discussion, participants also shared how the meaning has been changed over the times, which could also reflect the changing relations of HC with their employers. Hence, an all accepted definition was established by the workshop as follows,

“A person coerced to work in landlord's field as a plowman or does any other assigned agricultural work for the interest of the loan received, or for grains or the small piece of land cultivated or for shelter in a bonded situation is Harawa Likewise, a person who does not have the freedom to leave the work or has no work choice, does not have fix working hour, receives insufficient or no wage (i.e. either in cash or in-kind) for his labor is also called a Harawa.”

This definition considered various factors, for example, occupation, state of land ownership, loan/indebtedness, and dependency over landlords, types of labor contract, nature of labor, wage, caste/ethnicity, and freedom to choose an occupation. Based on the above definition, further elaboration of the definition was made, particularly to identificatory the HC in general and HC in bondage.




Figure 1: Identification of Harawa-Charawa and Harawa- Charawa Households in bonded labor through the survey

Methods

Based on the definition and indicators, the survey process was designed. A detailed survey questionnaire was prepared for the data collection. The survey questionnaire was finalized after pre-testing it in the real context. The members of the National Harawa-Charawa Rights Forum (NHCRF) were also consulted for finalizing the questionnaire and overall methodology of the research.

All enumerators were local and spoke the language. The selected enumerators were provided with training for the survey. In addition to making them able to carry out the survey, the training-cum-orientation program also aimed to make sure that they also gain familiarity with the issues and the objectives of the study.

A constant field monitoring was done as well as required supports were provided to the enumerators. The process followed in the field is illustrated in the following diagram (Figure 2).




Figure 2: Research Methodology

Inception meeting at the ward level with community members in presence of ward chair, ward members, and ward secretary was the kickstart of the survey. It aimed to inform the community about the survey, and its objectives, and the process. Usually, in such meetings representatives of HC networks were also invited to observe and to make sure that no single households of HC were left out in the identification process. Social map, one of the participatory rural appraisal tools, was utilized to identify and see the spatial distribution of HC households.

Identified households were listed and published in the ward notice board so that everyone can see it, complain if wrong names were included or any HC household was left out. However, no one in any municipalities registered a single complaint. Then, municipalities themselves verified those identified households, only then the survey was started.

Once the survey was completed, the preliminary findings of each municipality were presented in the municipality offices, among the elected representatives and other stakeholders. In addition to the first round of the survey, a resurvey was done in five percent randomly selected households to check the validity of the survey. Only then, the data was submitted to the municipalities for their further use. This process was adopted primarily because the municipalities had shown their willingness to cooperate in the study process, own the data, and make the relevant policy and programs to support the HCs.

In this report, not all the data obtained through the survey is included, however, major aspects are presented and described. The data obtained from the survey is described and interpreted based on the observations, interviews, and informal conversations, group discussions, meeting with the representatives of local government during the study period.

Scope and Limitation of the Report

This report presents the numbers and types of HCs in three representative municipalities of the Dhanusha district. The report highlights the living conditions, available facilities, access to the land, indebtedness, and working condition of HCs; therefore, can be considered as a baseline study, which can be utilized by the respective municipalities and other stakeholders.

This report indicates the areas where interventions are needed and recommend to different stakeholders the possible areas of interventions. This is merely based on the data collected through the survey; however, this hints at the need and scope of further studies to understand the changing nature and patterns, and their complexities in depth.

This report is based on the survey data collected in three municipalities, but in most of the cases, they are aggregated into one. Gender aspects were not very distinct in the survey data therefore gender analysis is missing in this report. Charawas were in small number, and no separate data of Charawa were collected, therefore, most of the discussion represents the Harawas. The required qualitative information to describe and interpret the data were missing, therefore, the report is more descriptive than analytical or interpretive.

Chapter 3

Socio-Economic Profiles of Harawa-Charawa



Harawa-Charawa, the Bonded Labourers in Agriculture

A total of 3636 households were identified and surveyed as Harawa-Charwa households in three municipalities. Out of the total surveyed HC households, 1925 were further identified as HC households in extreme vulnerability and in critical condition. This is further elaborated in the following section.

Socio-Demographic Context

The caste-ethnic distribution and the age-sex structure of HC families are presented to provide a broader context. In addition, a general living condition and availability of basic physical facilities are described in the following sections

Out of the total 3636 households identified as HC households, 622 were from Dhanauji Rural Municipality, 1232 from Ganeshman-Charnath Municipality, and 1782 were from Shahidnagar Municipality (Table 1). However, in the subsequent sections, they are presented in cumulative, aggregating all in one.

Table 1: Caste/Ethnic Distribution of Harawa-Charwa

Municipality/Caste-Ethnicity	Dhanauji	Ganeshman	Shahid Nagar	Total	In %
Hill Brahmin/Chhetri		9	3	12	0.33
Hill Dalit	4	17	5	26	0.72
Hill Janjati	3	82	5	90	2.48
Muslim	47	88	32	167	4.59
Terai Brahmin/Chhetri		1	3	4	0.11
Terai Dalit	453	836	1407	2696	74.15
Terai Janjati	77	114	121	312	8.58
Others	38	85	206	329	9.05
Total HC identified	622	1232	1782	3636	100.00
Total HH of Municipality	3717	7037	8671	19425	
In %	16.73	17.51	20.55	18.72	

In aggregate 74.15 percent of HCs belong to Terai Dalits. This can be explained by the landlessness among them. The largest group after Terai Dalis is Terai Janajati (8.58%). The number varies, but the survey found that people from all caste/ethnic backgrounds have been working as HCs.

The survey revealed that people belonging to all caste-ethnic groups have been working as HCs. For example, 12 households of hill Brahmin Cheetri, were also have been found working as HCs, who were landless and migrated to the southern plain to escape hardship and durable poverty in the hills.

Harawa-Charawa in Critical Condition

Table 1 presented a caste/ethnic distribution of HCs in three different municipalities. Of them, some were working as in bondage, in much vulnerable and critical condition.

In the methodology section, it was described how HCs in general and HC in critical bonded labor were identified. HC in general and HC in critical bonded labor were distinguished based on the level of indebtedness, relative freedom to leave or change the landlords, degree of physical and verbal abuses, and possession of assets.

This distinction was made to explain that all HCs were downtrodden and in a bonded situation of some degree, but some are in extremely poor condition and cannot escape the trap of the poverty without government's dedicated interventions.

Methodologically, HC with the following features and conditions are identified as HC in bonded labor.

HC, who have, in general,

- one or more of the HH members are agricultural laborer, and also serve as house-servants
- the household has a landlord
- the household has a debt and they work for the person they owe some of all of the debt

In addition, other conditions make their situation more critical and bonded, for example, if they left their employer one or more of the following would happen,

- lose their present house or place of residence
- lose their land
- lose wage or share crops
- lose valuable goods
- a threat to themselves or family members
- risk physical violence
- not able to refuse their landlords request for work
- have had to work without a wage in the past 12 months
- not able to negotiate a wage before starting work with their current employer.

Hence, there prevail certain structural conditions that made some HCs more vulnerable and critical.

The survey showed that out of total HC households, 52.94 percent of HC households are in critically bonded labor relationships. The following table (Table 2) presents the number of HC in bonded labor in all HC households.

Table 2: Harawa Charawa in More Critical Condition

Caste/Ethnicity	Harawa-Charwa Households			
	Total	In %*	In bonded labor	% of HC in bonded labor**
Hill Brahmin/Chhetri	12	0.33	11	91.67
Hill Dalit	26	0.72	12	46.15
Hill Janjati	90	2.48	69	76.67
Muslim	167	4.59	65	38.92
Terai Brahmin/Chhetri	4	0.11	1	25.00
Terai Dalit	2696	74.15	1434	53.19
Terai Janjati	312	8.58	154	49.36
Others	329	9.05	179	54.41
Total	3636	100.00	1925	52.94

*Percentage of the total number (3636) of HC households

** percentage within each social category.

Hence, in Table 2, more than half HCs (53.19 %) of Terai Dalit was in critical condition. Statistically, 91% of Hill Brahmin/Chhetri HC households were in a more critical situation; but their total number was only 11, thus this may sound misleading. The reality is, the total number of HC in critical situation among Terai Dalits was 1434, whereas, the number of Hill Brahmin/Chhetri was only 11. Terai Dalits HC. In aggregate, Terai Dalit constituted 74.15 percent of total HC households.

Intergenerational HCs

Since HC was often tied with indebtedness, they could not come out of the trap of bonded relationship with their landlords and be obliged to inherit this. The survey revealed that intergenerational HCs, which used to be common in the past, still prevail. According to the survey, 32 percent of Terai Dalits inherited this occupation from their fathers and were forced to work as HC for generations. Often, Hill Brahmin/Chhetri, Muslims, and even a few Hill Dalits were able to escape this and were able to free themselves. Most of the intergenerational HC were indebted, for which they had no other option than to serve as HC, often to the same landlords as their fathers used to work for.

Age and Sex Composition, Birth Registration and Citizenship

The average family size of HC family during the survey period was 4.98. The following table (Table 3) presents the sex-disaggregated age structure of the HC population in aggregate form (population of three municipalities together).

Table 3: Age Structure and Sex Composition of the Population

SN.	Age categories / Population	Male	Female	Total	In %
1	Less than 1 year	77	58	135	0.75
2	Less than 5 yr	837	726	1563	8.63
3	5 — 14 years	1750	1739	3289	18.16
4	15 — 59 years	6286	5288	11574	63.90
5	60 years and above	802	551	1353	7.47
	Total	9752 (53.84%)	8362 (46.16%)	18114	100.00

Unlike national statistics, the male population is higher (53.84%) than female (46.16%), such a disproportionate sex composition needs further exploration and explanation.

Among the total population of 16 years or below, 4.63 percent still did not have birth registration, whereas 21.5 percent of adults age 16 or above did not have citizenship certificates with them (Figure 3).




Figure 3: Birth Registration and Citizenship Certificate

Not having birth registration is explained as, either they never needed the birth registration certificate, or they did not know about this, or some of them will do it later when their child grows old enough to go to school. A birth certificate is mandatory for the registration in the school. Children of early-age marriage (child marriage) were unregistered, as the parents needed to produce a marriage certificate to get the birth registered of their children. The local authorities did not register the under-age marriage. Hence, due to the unavailability of marriage certificates, children were deprived of birther certificates.

The survey revealed that the average age of marriage was 16 and 14 for boys and girls respectively. Hence, early child-marriage used to be common in the past and practice today, as well. Many non-HC families also had a similar problem.

Similarly, many of the aged HC does not have citizenship certificates. In the past, usually, a citizenship certificate is required to own the property, particularly the land, or to get a formal job, or to make passports to travel. In the past, Harawa, particularly those in the extremely vulnerable situation did not require all those, therefore, some of them did not have citizenship certificate. Even a few young people, aged 16 years or above, had not yet acquired the citizenship certificates.

Living Condition and Access to the Facilities



HCs are identified with poor living conditions with limited access to basic facilities, like electricity, safe drinking water, toilets, and so on. However, in recent years some improvements were observed.

Still, HC houses and settlements are easily recognized as the majority (88%) of them are one-roomed house, with thatch roofs and wattle-daub walls. See Table 4.

Table 4: Types of Houses.

Types of House	Permanent	Semi-Permanent	Temporary/Makeshift	Total
Caste/Ethnic				
Hill Brahmin/Chhetri	0	1	11	12
Hill Dalit	0	1	25	26
Hill Janjati	0	0	90	90
Muslim	2	5	160	167
Others	17	24	288	329
Terai Brahmin/Chhetri	0	0	4	4
Terai Dalit	80	257	2359	2696
Terai Janjati	12	36	264	312
Total	111	324	3201	3636
In %	3	9	88	100

Only 3 percent of them had the permanent (pakki) house structure. Likewise, 9 percent of them had a semi-permanent (kacchi-pakki) house. Semi-permanent houses either have

a permanent wall of bricks, stones or wooden planks, and thatched roofs; or they have mud-and-daub walls but have roofs of corrugated zinc or tiles. But, an overwhelming majority of them (88%) had temporary types (kachhi) structures, which have wattle-daub walls, and thatched roofs.

Access to Safe Drinking Water

Even if 88 percent of houses were temporary (kachhi), 60.6 percent of them had access to tube-well for drinking water. According to the survey, 60.6 percent of them had their private tube-well, 19.2 percent fetched water from neighbors' tube-well, and 9.6 percent went to the public tube-well for drinking water. However, 9.4 percent of them still drank water from dug-hole. See Table 5 for the details.

Table 5: Source of Drinking Water

Municipality/ Municipality/ Caste/Ethnicity	Ownership of Tube-wells				
	Private	Neighbors	Public	Dughole	Others
Hill Brahmin/Chhetri	1	8	0	3	0
Hill Dalit	6	5	2	13	0
Hill Janjati	20	3	9	57	1
Muslim	137	14	10	5	1
Others	231	79	13	1	5
Terai Brahmin/Chhetri	3	1	0	0	0
Terai Dalit	1566	527	310	258	35
Terai Janjati	238	60	4	4	6
Total	2202	697	348	340	49
Percentage	60.6	19.2	9.6	9.4	1.3

Nearly 60 percent of Terai Dalits HC families had their tube-well. This was a recent development, which was possible by the development support of the governmental and non-governmental organizations.

Access to Electricity and Cooking Fuel

The survey found that 89 percent of HC households had access to electricity as a source of light, and another 11 percent used kerosene as a source of light. It was observed that some households were accessing the electricity by hooking wire to the main grid, which was as explained by the locals is 'illegal'. But, in the survey, it was not discriminated against, rather asked whether they had access to electricity. Out of 36367 identified HC families, 4

families reported that they used bio-gas for light; and, 3 households used solar energy.

Even if 89 percent of HC families had access to electricity as a source of light, no family was using electricity as cooking fuel. According to the survey, 68.3 percent of HC households used firewood as a source of cooking fuel, and 29.8 percent of households used dried cow-dung as cooking fuel, among the Terai Dalits, 67 percent were using dried cow-dung as cooking fuel. Out of 3636 households, only 7 families were using LPG for cooking and two families had bio-gas

Ownership of House-Built Land



Landless is the major problem of HCs, most of them are landless. As showed in the previous section, 88 percent of the houses were of temporary types, usually thatched roofs and walls with wattle and daub. For a number of them, even those thatched huts were not built on their land. The following figure (Fig 4) illustrates the land ownership over the land where their households were built.





Figure 4: Ownership of House-Built Land

Hence, only 29 percent of them had their ownership over the land where their houses were built. 27 percent of HC houses are in the village blocks. Likewise, 24 percent of them had been living in the unregistered land, that is, they did not have tenure security of the land where they were living. However, as they claimed they had their houses built there for decades, therefore, should be registered in their names. Another 2 percent of houses were built on government or public land, and they feared that they would be evicted any time from the place. 5 percent of houses were built in guthi land and were paying the paying land tax to the concerned guthi authorities.

Tenure of Cultivated Land

Landlessness was the major reason that forced them to work as HCs, this was so evident in the case of Terai Dalits. However, other castes/ethnic groups also had to work as HC for survival as they were landless and had no other better options available for them. The majority of them did not have tenure security of the land they were cultivating. The following figure (Fig 5) shows the different kinds of tenure arrangements through which an HC family accessed the land.



■ Tenant ■ Sharecropping ■ On-lease ■ Laguwai ■ Guthi and other

Figure 5: Land Ownership and Tenure

Hence, 44 percent of HC families had Laguwai, in which an HC family was provided with a piece of land, often degraded one to cultivate, usually until they serve as HC to the respective landlord. During discussions, it was told that the land provided for Laguwai is not sufficient and productive to produce enough to support their families. By this, a landlord can keep an HC tied to him.

Another 35 percent of them were sharecroppers. Usually, they did share-cropping in the same landlord's land for whom they served as HC. Only 2 percent of cultivated land was under tenancy contact, which is relatively secure than other forms of the contract an HC can have. Similarly, 18 percent of HC families were cultivating Guthi land, unregistered land, and a few of them were also cultivating on Thekka contract. In the Thekka contract, an HC family cultivates somebody's land for which he pays a certain amount of grains to the owner, irrespective of the total production in that land. Such a contract is renewed every year, and the cultivators cannot claim any tenancy rights over such land.

Food Sufficiency

Hardly one percent of HC families produced enough food for the whole year. About 40 percent of HC families did not have their production. The statistics showed that 99 percent of the HC families did not have food security for the whole year. The following table (Table 6) presents the food security situation from their production.

Table 6: Food Sufficiency from own production

Months	Do not have their own production	Less than 3 months	Less than 6 months	Less than 9 months	For a whole year	Total
Caste/Ethnicity						
Hill Brahmin/Chhetri	7	4	1	0	0	12
Hill Dalit	19	7	0	0	0	26
Hill Janjati	39	29	19	1	2	90
Muslim	51	44	62	6	4	167
Others	97	83	114	30	5	329
Terai Brahmin/Chhetri	2	1	1	0	0	4
Terai Dalit	1107	713	650	208	18	2696
Terai Janjati	110	87	89	17	9	312
Total	1432	968	936	262	38	3636
In Percentage	39.4	26.6	25.7	7.2	1.0	

According to Table 6, a little more than 39 percent of HC families did not have their production; and, depended entirely on Harawai-Charawai and other sources of income. Among the total families of HC, 26.6 percent produced sufficient for less than 3 months, likewise, another 25.7 percent survived for 6 months with their production. Only 7.2 percent of them could survive up to 9 months, and, only 1 percent produced enough for the whole year. Such an insecure situation made them more dependent on their landlords for their survival.

Livestock Ownership

The majority of HC did not or could not keep livestock, simply because they could not afford them, and they did not have space to keep them. Only 20 percent of HC families kept livestock, either owned by themselves or were raising on a share basis.

Most of the HC families were rearing livestock on a share basis. For example, 394 HC families had sheep and goats, 77 families had cows, but all on a share basis. In such a contract, they brought calves or lambs, usually, the female ones, from another family, raised them till they give birth to new calves or lambs after they became mature, and then those calves or lambs were shared on a 50:50 basis between the one who owned and the one who raised them. Interesting to note, 98 of HC families had kept oxen, where 97 of them had their own. Those who had their pair of oxen could be in a better position to negotiate on wage or working conditions.

Conclusion

Landlessness is the major reason why they needed to work as bonded laborers. They even did not have the land to build their houses. Less than one-third of them (29%) had built a house on their land. This shows the land tenure situation and such unequal land ownership created an unequal relationship.

In recent years, their access to basic facilities, mainly electricity and drinking water, has been increased. This was mainly due to governmental and non-governmental supports they received over the years. However, no such intervention or support was found to have helped HCs to come out of the chronic poverty and debt trap. Nearly one-third (32%) of Terai Dalits continued to be HCs from an earlier generation. Such intergenerational bonded labor relations have forced them to live in continued poverty and debt.

Nearly 40 percent did not have their production and only one percent could survive for the whole year with their production was an outcome of landlessness. Whatever they produced, they produced in the land they got as Laguwai or cultivated as a sharecropper. A few were cultivating guthi land.

Their children worked as Charawa, the cattle herders, but they could not afford to raise their cattle; except a few who had a pair of oxen.

Due to the lack of access to productive resources or any other means of production, HCs families were living in poverty and forced to work as bonded laborers. Development interventions might have made their livings a bit easier, with the facilities like electricity and drinking water; but to come out of the poverty and vulnerability, they needed to access to and ownership over the productive resources, principally the land.

Chapter 4

Work Contract and Working Conditions



Work contract and working conditions of HC are not defined and clear, but they were working in an inferior condition. The nature of the work contract and working conditions were the defining factors of bondedness and exploitation of HCs. The debt was the instrument that kept one in bondage. Not having any work contract led them to a subordinate and inferior position in the negotiation where they could not bargain for the wage.

Work and Wage

HCs were receiving well below the district rate, and often in kind. Evidence showed that HCs were obliged to work without any fixed wages for their work. Some HC reported that they had not received any wage for months. It was a customary practice that an HC receives a fixed amount of grain at the end of the year as wage, generally after the main harvest. Out of 3636 families surveyed, 588 (16%) of total HCs families reported the incidences of work without wage in the last one year.

Among those who had to work without wages, 72 percent were Terai Dalits. However, the days they had to work without any wage varied. Many HCs from Terai Dalits groups had to work without wage also indicates their traditional dependency on landlords for their survival. The majority of them were landless or were marginal landowners.

Table 7 presents the caste/ethnic distribution of HC who worked without wage in the last 12 months.

Table 7: Worked Without Wage

Caste/Ethnicity	Work Without Wage		Total
	Yes	No	
Hill Brahmin/Chhetri	4	8	12
Hill Dalit	3	23	26
Hill Janjati	37	53	90
Muslim	27	140	167
Others	33	296	329
Terai Brahmin/Chhetri	1	3	4
Terai Dalit	424	2272	2696
Terai Janjati	59	253	312
Total	588	3048	3636
Percentage	16.17	83.82	100

When one was working for a particular landlord for long, he/she might have to work without wages on several occasions. Particularly those HCs who were working like house-servants did not get wages for their work.

The survey showed that 87 percent of them worked for fixed landlords throughout the year. This revealed how HCs were tied with their landlords and had little or no choice to work with multiple landlords. This also indicated that the majority of them were unfree agricultural laborers, and were in bondage. Among Terai Dalits HCS, 87 percent of them worked for the fixed landlords, in such a case, HC had to depend on particular landlords, either indebted to or not.

Table 8: Working for Fixed Landlords.

Caste/Ethnicity	Grand Total		
	Yes	No	Total
Hill Brahmin/Chhetri	12	0	12
Hill Dalit	25	1	26
Hill Janjati	86	4	90
Muslim	156	11	167
Others	308	21	329
Terai Brahmin/Chhetri	2	2	4
Terai Dalit	2356	340	2696
Terai Janjati	280	32	312
Total	3225	411	3636
Percentage	88.69	11.30	100

In most of the cases, if one was working for a particular landlord; he hardly could move to a new landlord or employer. Figure 6 illustrated that 72 percent of HC were not free to work for another landlord even if they got better wages or opportunities.




Figure 6: Freedom to change the Employer for Better Wage

Various reasons kept HCs unfree to change their landlords. The two prominent reasons were, either they were indebted, or they were landless and living in the space provided by their landlords. Thus, in some cases, the wage was an issue of secondary priority.

The following figure (Fig 7) presents the consequences if they change and move to work for another landlord.



Figure 7: Consequences of Changing the Employer

Figure 7 illustrated that 63 percent of them feared that if they moved to new landlords to get a better wage, they would suffer bad consequences. 4 percent of them told that they had to lose the shelter provided by the employer, whereas 19 percent feared that they would lose the land they had been cultivating. For another 10 percent, they would not get the due wage from the previous landlords.

Similarly, some of them fear that they or any of their family members would receive threat (12%), and even the risk of physical violence (16%) if they moved to new employers. However, 37 percent of them told that they were free to choose their employers, and nothing would happen if they changed their employer.

In such a condition, no HC could deny or refuse any work asked by the landlord, even if the work was indecent. Table 8 shows that 75 percent of them could not refuse to do any work their landlords asked them to do.

Table 9: Refusal to Work Asked by the Employers.

Caste/Ethnicity	Yes	No	Total
	Hill Brahmin/Chhetri	5	7
Hill Dalit	10	16	26
Hill Janjati	59	31	90
Muslim	47	120	167
Others	46	283	329
Terai Brahmin/Chhetri	0	4	4
Terai Dalit	654	2042	2696
Terai Janjati	84	228	312
Total	905	2731	3636
Percentage	24.9	75.1	100.0

One of the reasons why they were exploited or did not get their wage could be explained by the fact that they could not negotiate wages before they started work. Hence, the landlords or employer got their upper hand.

The survey showed that 53 percent of HCs were not able to negotiate a wage before they started work (See Fig 8).




Figure 8: Wage Negotiation before the Work

Among Terai Dalits, 58 percent of HCs did not negotiate the wage before they started to work with their recent employer. Such a situation allowed the exploitation and vulnerability of HCs.

Agreement with Employer

No single case of formal deeds or contract except for the loan they incurred were recorded. A verbal agreement was the most common customary practice. Only 41 percent of HCs had made some kind of verbal agreement with their employers, whereas 59 percent of them did not have any agreement.

Generally, an HC working for a permanent landlord, often in debt, who could not negotiate on a wage, and living in space/land provided by the landlords, did not make any kind of formal agreement with their employer.




Figure 9: Written or Verbal Agreement with Employers.

Figure 9 showed that 59 percent of HC did not have any written or verbal agreement before they started to work as HCs.

Work and Working Hours

Even if the term Harawa meant a plowman, he was supposed to look after all the agricultural work. In addition, they were also obliged to support other works in the landlord's house. Hence, neither their work nor the working hours were limited to them. According to the survey, 62 percent of them did not have fixed working hours. The survey revealed that Terai Dalits were in a more vulnerable condition, those who reported that they did not have fixed working hours, 76 percent of them were Terai Dalits, which was 63 percent of total Terai Dalit HCs. Even if the number was small, 74 percent of total HCs from Hill Janatati (hill ethnic) groups also did not have fixed working hours.

Even though they did not get additional wages for the additional works, except occasional meals; 15 percent of them told that their landlords deducted their wage without their




Figure 10: Working Hours

prior consent for different reasons. For example, sometimes they could have been a couple of hours late to reach the work or had to take a longer break, or needed to leave the work a bit earlier.

Usually, the landlords provided a one-time meal for HCs, however, 7 percent of them did not get even a one-time meal during the working days. According to the survey, 87 percent of them were getting a daily meal during the working days, whereas 6 percent of them got two times meal in landlords' house.

In addition, 55 HC families (1.5%) were staying at the accommodation provided by the landlords. In such a case, usually, a Harawa's wife or their children were obliged to support the landlord's family. 2 percent of them received clothes, usually used ones, but occasionally new ones, too. Some generous landlords provided loans to Harawas at the time of need, that is, too, without interest. Instead, they worked additional hours or his wife did household works in the landlord's house. Only 22 of them, including 7 Terai Dalits had reported that they borrowed money from their landlords at the time of need without interest. 73 (2%) of them also receive medical care for minor ailments or accidents during the work. Not a significant number, though, 14 families of HC reported that they were getting educational support for their children.

Conclusion

HC worked in an informal setting. They did not have any formal work contract, neither written nor verbal. Some of them had worked even without wages; such free labor was considered by the landlords or employer as a customary tradition.

According to the survey, 16 percent of respondents had worked without wage in the last one year; whereas, it was so common in the past. A majority of them (89%) worked for a single landlord throughout the year. This, on one hand, strengthened the patron-client relationship between the HCs and their employers; on the other, HCs had to depend on particular employers, and could not move to a new employer even if they wished. The majority of them feared that they would face bad consequences if they moved to a new landlord. The three-fourth of them could not refuse any work their employer asked them to do. Hence, neither they had fixed working hours, nor they were free to choose their employers. They worked without a formal work contract and prior-negotiation about the wages. These empirical evidence suggested that they were still unfree and bonded, and worked in an inferior working condition.

Chapter 5

Indebtedness and Harawa-Charawa



Indebtedness

Indebtedness was one of the instruments that attached HC to their landlords. Indebtedness tied one to a particular creditor, made unfree, and forced to work as a bondsman for the creditor. By working for a creditor like a bonded labor, one expected to wave some portion of interest of the money he had borrowed. It was learned that the debt was used as an instrument to keep HC in bondage.

The survey showed that 43 percent of them across all social categories had debt, many received advance wages, hence indented to their landlords. Those 43 percents were currently working to pay off the loans. However, only 55 percent of them were working for creditors, whereas another 45 percent were working as HC to pay off the loan, but they were working for other than the creditors. Out of those 55 percent who were working for the creditors, 78 percent belonged to Terai Dalits.

Reasons for Taking a Loan

Various reasons for taking a loan were recorded. Among the total indebted HCs, 64 percent of them borrowed money for medical treatment for themselves or one of their family members. Likewise, another major reason for taking a loan was the marriage expenses of their sons or daughters; in some cases of their own, as 29 percent of them had borrowed to meet the marriage expenses. The following figure (Fig 11) illustrates the various reasons for taking a loan. Some of the households have borrowed loans for more than one reason.




Figure 11: Reasons for Taking Loan

According to Figure 11, the third major reason reported was the expenses for foods. Since only 1 percent of them could survive the whole years with their production; for 99 percent, either they depended on the wage received in the form of food grain, or bought from the market. The survey revealed that 26 percent of them took a loan to buy the foods.

Another major ritual expense after marriage was the death ritual, for which many of them had to take the loan. The study showed that 8 percent of them borrowed money to perform the death ritual. Another 8 percent of them had taken loan for house construction or repair. A significant change observed in recent years is a growing trend among HC to go abroad as labor migrants. However, the majority of them still cannot afford to send their family members abroad. From these three municipalities, 20 percent of HC family members had gone abroad.

Others took the loan for religious ceremonies/pilgrimage (2%), to buy livestock (1%), to buy land (1%), and for the education of their children (3%).

Some of them took loans for more than one reason; and, in some cases, from more than one creditor.

Repayment of the Loan

The interest rate of such a loan was set usually very high. But HCs did not have any options other than to accept that and the repayment condition. During a series of discussions, it was learned that the moneylenders usually charged 36 to 60 percent of an interest rate for the loan they gave.

Usually, those who did not have assets to mortgage were charged with a high-interest rate. But, to keep this low in the bond paper, the money lenders usually tripled the principal amount, and mention the interest rate one-third only. For example, if one borrowed 10 thousand at the interest rate of 36 percent, in the paper, the principal amount was mentioned as 30 thousand, whereas the interest rate was mentioned as only 12 percent. This was done so that the creditors could be on the safer side, just in case, they had some disagreement with the borrowers. If the high-interest rate was stated in such a paper, that would be considered as 'illegal' or 'unethical'. Even though such informal money lending is an illegal practice as a law of the land, the practice of informal money lending prevails everywhere.

With such an agreement signed, HCs, the borrowers are kept into an inescapable trap of debt. However, no single case was recalled when a creditor had claimed three times more of the principal amount as mentioned in the paper. But the interest rate was already so high, one could hardly repay the loan on time.

These days the money lenders find it safe to give a loan to the one whose family member is going abroad to work. A father was found working as a Harawa for the loan he took to send his son abroad as a labor migrant.

How long does it take to pay back the loan is so uncertain, neither the borrower nor the creditor could tell this in a certain way. The survey showed that 84 percent of them did not know by when they could repay all the loans they had taken. Only 2 percent of them were optimistic to pay the loan within a year. Another 5 percent expected to pay the loan by the next year. Likewise, 8 percent of them were thinking to pay back all the loans within the next three years. See Fig 12.




Figure 12: Expected time of Repayment of the Loan.

When one was indebted, he always found him in an inferior position. They always lived in fear that if they could not pay back the loan on time, they would suffer.

The survey showed that 56 percent of HCs feared that they or any of their family members would be threatened if they could not pay the loan on time. Similarly, 3 percent of them also feared that the money lenders would confiscate their valuables, namely jewelry, cattle, and they would surely lose the land if they had any or mortgaged.

Another 5 percent of them had already experienced some physical violence, for example, they were on some occasions punched, kicked, or beaten up. According to the survey, 16 percent of the HC families said that they had to do any work that they found degrading. But whatever bad things happened to them, 72 percent of them told that they could not move to a new landlord or employer. They were unfree to do so.

Conclusion

Indebtedness was one of the instruments that kept one trapped and bondage in the exploitative system of HC. The major reasons to take the loan were medical treatment, and ritual expenses, mainly marriage expenses and death rituals. In addition, many of them needed a loan to buy food. A very few have used the loan for the education of their children, and none of them invested them in any income-generating activities. At the same time, the majority of them did not know when they would be able to repay the loan. Hence, a conclusion can be drawn that due to the landlessness, lack of access to the asset and productive resources; and absence of the social securities from the state, one had to take the loan. Some of the cultural aspects were also responsible as they could have reduced the ritual expenses. Above all, an ungoverned informal money lending has kept them in the debt trap.

A recent trend to take the loan to go abroad for earning had also several adverse consequences. For example, one could send his son to Qatar by spending nearly a hundred thousand rupees, most of which was borrowed from more than one creditor, but instead of sending the money back he came back home wounded. All hopes of the family were shattered, and they were pushed even to a worse situation.

To get such a loan, there should be someone in his/her family who could serve as HCs to work for the creditor. But not all the HCs who took the loan needed to be working for the same creditors.

Hence, first, indebtedness led one to a boded situation; second, the high-interest rate kept them more vulnerable and trapped. In the past, they faced not only verbal abuse but physical violence, too, for not paying the loan on time. Therefore, they always felt insecure and tried to be loyal and good to their employer, so that they could avoid the insulting behavior of their employers.

Chapter 6

Government Support and Social Securities for Harawa-Charawa



The majority of HC did not have any verbal or written contracts that described the working conditions, nature of the works, working hours, and wages. Statistics and incidences illustrated that in no way they had a decent working condition.

From the observations and series of discussions with the local governments' representatives, it was found that HC's issues were not visible or in priority of the governments for any immediate actions. They were considered as a group of 'poor', but their specific situation and need were not considered. For many, they did not exist as a distinct occupational group working as bonded laborers.

In such a context, the early indication shown by three local governments and the initiative taken to survey to identify the HCs in their respective municipalities should be taken as a promising beginning. Such a process of identification and documentation recognize and realize, at least, on the local government's level for further government support. Such an initiative expected to result in the intervention for an improved working condition of HCs in the short run, and the elimination of such an exploitative system in the long run.

The following paragraphs present the types of government supports received by the HCs in the last 12 months.

Government Support

The survey revealed that there was no single targeted support program or services from federal, provincial, or local governments to HCs, in particular.

Out of 3636 HC families, 84 percent reported that they did not receive any kind of specific support from any governments in the last 12 months. This was also because even the local governments had not recognized and identified HCs as a distinct or a particular group who might have their specific needs. Consequently, there was no targeted support designed and delivered to them. Nevertheless, they were able to receive some supports being a member of 'poor' or 'Dalits' groups.

Only 98 (3%) HCs families reported that they received cash grants from the government in the last 12 months. And, out of those 98 families, 92 belonged to the Terai Dalits group.

Likewise, 194 (6%) families reported that they received a scholarship for their children. In three municipalities, 170 HC families received support for the toilet construction; whereas, only 53 HC families got support for the drinking water, and another 23 families for electricity. Only 8 of them received support for the house construction. A few households received some supports in the form of agricultural inputs, like seeds and pesticides, and so on.

The survey recorded only those supports or grants they received in the last 12 months. Some of them have received such supports in the previous years, too, but not specifically targeted to HC families.

Thus, evidence suggested that HC families were still largely excluded from any of the government's support system. As most of them were landless, they were dependent on

landlords for their survival. It was revealed during several discussion in the field that they even did not have access to proper information if there were any support they could expect from the government.

There were some apparent reasons why they lacked access to the information. First, their less involved in any social or collective forums or groups from where they could access the information. They usually depended on landlords for external information; many of them did not have access to other sources of information.


Only a few of them had been members of such collectives or forums. According to the survey 83 percent of HCs were not members of any groups, be it cooperatives, saving-credit groups, users groups, or any such forum.

Only 102 (3%) of HC families had been members of cooperatives and saving credit groups. It was worth noting that 170 HC families were organized in Harawa-Charawa Forums (HCF), similarly, 86 HC families in the Land Rights Forums. These are the forums formed to demand security for an HC and landless peoples’ rights to live dignified lives. However, this was only 5 and 2 percent only of the total HCs from these three municipalities.

A few HC families were the members of Community Forest Users Groups (CFUGs), and a few others in other similar groups, but in a very insignificant number, less than 1 percent. Hence, such a lack of engagement in collective forums did not only deprived them of accumulating social capital, access information, and capacity to claim or negotiate for their collective rights but any support and services such forums/groups could have provided.

The following figure (Fig 13) illustrates HCs presence in the social/collective groups/forums.

Figure 13: Involvement of Harawa-Charawa in collective groups.



Hence, the majority of HCs were not able to receive government supports; as their specific needs were not recognized by any levels of governments at the moment. At the same time, their low involvement in collectives has kept them excluded in several incidences.

Conclusions

HCs received only limited support from the government in the past 12 months, so was the case in the previous years, too. Whatever they received they received it as a member of 'poor' or 'Dalit' groups, but not as a member of HC groups. The most critical aspect here was HCs' were not recognized as a distinct occupational group, and their special needs, let alone the issues of liberating them from the exploitative relationship and secure their livelihoods.

Their access to social capital was also very much limited. But this was understandable as they had to depend much on their landlords, and hardly could get any time to involve in such groups. Due to their low presence in such collective forums, their access to the information was also limited, and consequently had to depend on landlords or their kinfolks for any information that could be useful for them. Thus, with less access to the social capital, especially their less involvement in social networks, they were also deprived of the government grants or any other supports.

The increasing number of HC families becoming interested in and gradually organizing in forums like Harawa-Charwa Forums and Land Rights Forums is the early indication that they gradually get organized around the movement that helps them to break the age-long silence and the chain of exploitative relationship with the employers. Had their voice been heard, probably the government would have paid attention to their issues.

Chapter 7

Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations



Summary

This study was based on surveys conducted in three municipalities, namely, Dhanauji Rural Municipality, Ganeshman Charnath, and Shahidnagar Municipalities of Dhanusha district of Province 2, during July-August 2019.

A total of 3636 households were identified as HC households, of which 622 were from Dhanauji Rural Municipality, 1232 from Ganeshman-Charnath Municipality, and 1782 were from Shahidnagar Municipality

The study was carried out to explore and understand the prevalence, types of the work contract, and working conditions of Harawa-Charawa, and to understand the changing nature of the practice. Since these three municipalities took an interest, it also intended to develop the capacity of local government to collect data, recognize Harawa-Charawa as a distinct group of agricultural labor, and develop a strategy to take action to eliminate this form of bonded labor in the respective municipalities.

The survey revealed that the prevalence of HC is still common and apparent despite the law of the country has already banned it. In three studied municipalities, 3636 households were identified as HCs, which was 18.72 percent of total households in three municipalities. Of the total identified HCs households, 1925, that is 52.94 percent were found to be living in extreme vulnerability and critical bonded labor situation. Nearly one-third of them inherited this job from their fathers/forefathers.

In aggregate, 74.15 percent of HCs belonged to Terai Dalits. This can be explained by the landlessness among them, and more than half of them (53.19 %) were in critical condition.

Among the HC family member of 16 years or below, 4.63 percent still did not have birth registration, whereas 21.5 percent of adults age 16 or above did not have citizenship certificates with them. The average age of marriage was 16 and 14 for boys and girls respectively. Hence, early child-marriage used to be common in the past and practice today, as well. Many non-HC families also had a similar problem.

Only 3 percent of HCs had the permanent (pakki) house structure. Likewise, 9 percent of them had semi-permanent (kacchi-pakki) house, but, an overwhelming majority of them (88%) had temporary types (kachhi) structures.

In terms of access to physical facilities, nearly 60 percent of Terai Dalits HC families had their tube-well. The survey found that 89 percent of HC households had access to electricity as a source of light, and another 11 percent used kerosene as a source of light. 68.3 percent of HC households used firewood as a source of cooking fuel, and 29.8 percent of households used dried cow-dung as cooking fuel, among the Terai Dalits, 67 percent were using dried cow-dungs as cooking fuel. Out of 3636 households, only 7 families were using LPG for cooking and two families had bio-gas

Only 29 percent of them had their ownership over the land where their houses were built. 27 percent of HC houses are in the village blocks. Likewise, 24 percent of them had been living in the unregistered land

Less than a half of HC families (44%) had Laguwai, in which an HC family was provided with a piece of land, often degraded one to cultivate, usually until they serve as HC to the respective landlord. During discussions, it was told that the land provided for Laguwai is not sufficient and productive to produce enough to support their families. By this, a landlord can keep an HC tied to him.

Another 35 percent of them were sharecroppers. Usually, they did share-cropping in the same landlord's land for whom they served as HC. Only 2 percent of cultivated land was under tenancy contact, which is relatively secure than other forms of the contract an HC can have. Similarly, 18 percent of HC families were cultivating guthi land

A little more than 39 percent of HC families did not have their production; and, depended entirely on Harawai-Charawai and other sources of income. Among the total families of HC, 26.6 percent produced sufficient for less than 3 months, likewise, another 25.7 percent survived for 6 months with their production. Only 7.2 percent of them could survive up to 9 months, and, only 1 percent produced enough for the whole year. Such an insecure situation made them more dependent on their landlords for their survival.

The survey showed that 87 percent of them worked for fixed landlords throughout the year, where 72 percent of HC were not free to work for another landlord even if they were offered a better wage or opportunity. Further, 53 percent of HCs were not able to negotiate a wage before they started work, and that 59 percent of HC did not have any written or verbal agreement before they started to work as HCs.

According to the survey, 43 percent of them across all social categories had debt, many received advance wages, hence indented to their landlords. Those 43 percents were currently working to pay off the loans. However, only 55 percent of them were working for creditors, whereas another 45 percent were working as HC to pay off the loan, but they were working for other than the creditors. Out of those 55 percent who were working for the creditors, 78 percent belonged to Terai Dalits. The moneylenders usually charged 36 to 60 percent of the interest rate for the loan they gave.

Such informal lending with a high-interest rate led to the debt trap, which eventually led one to a boded situation. In the past, they faced not only verbal abuse but physical violence, too, for not paying the loan on time. Therefore, they always felt insecure while working for their landlords who are also creditors.

Out of 3636 HC families, 84 percent did not receive any kind of specific support from any governments in the last 12 months.

The study indicated that the shrinking opportunities even in the agricultural sector, and unavailability of the opportunities outside it pushed some of the vulnerable HC families into more critical condition. They were forced to accept to work as HCs in any given contract and condition.

Conclusions

Harawa-Charawa as a form of agricultural labor contract was historically rooted and culturally embedded, and usually tied up with indebtedness. HC as a form of bonded agricultural labor practice was historically linked with the land tenure system and social structure. Therefore, it requires a political-economic approach to understand and explain how the reproduction of such an exploitative system continued to survive.

Landlessness and a multi-dimensional poverty trap were the major causes that perpetuated such a dyadic relationship between landlord and farm laborer, where a laborer was unfree and the relation was based on exploitation.

Policy provisions, mainly the Constitution on Nepal (2015), National Land Policy (2019) and Land Use Policy (2015) and Land Use Act (2019), as well as, 7th 8th and 18th amendments of land acts, along with the government's recent initiative of forming a High-level Land Issues Resolving Commission can be taken as sources of hopes in addressing the age-old problems of HC. But yet to see the implementation and impacts. A mere policy intervention may not be enough to eliminate such an embedded system that is based on an exploitative relationship, there should be a thoughtful and strategic implementation. Political commitment to the government's side is fundamental here.

Evidence suggested that the majority of HC belonged to Dalit communities, which are socially, economically, and politically marginalized. More than half of them is indebted, and working to repay the loan. The interest rate is comparatively very high, three to five times more (36-60% and even more) than an ordinary interest rate in practice. In such a context, the majority of the indebted HC are uncertain about when they are going to repay the loan they had taken. Since they are in debt, they are obliged to work as HC, mostly for their creditors. Hence, indebtedness has been one of the instruments to keep one as a bonded farm laborer. This debt trap has made it almost impossible for them to get out of poverty.

Furthermore, the traditional patron-client relationship, based on inter-dependency, mutual trust, and benefits, is in its foundation. The system bears several attributes of traditional patron-client relationships. Historically internalized relationship of reciprocal dependency gradually declined to one of indebtedness and 'moral bondage' for HC. Such a 'moral bondage', coupled with the indebtedness traps one into lifelong bondage. Hence, such a historical-cultural aspect also complicates the issues of HC, by pushing it beyond the mere issue of economy and poverty.

Once an HC is dependent, indebted, he/she can accumulate neither the financial nor the social capital. They even did not get a basic wage for their work. Their presence in collective forums is very low, be that a community organization or cooperatives and so on. This has restricted the upward mobility of HC in different ways.

HC as a form of bonded labor, their issues, concerns, special needs, and the complexities are still not fully understood and recognized. Had their voices been heard, the government would have paid attention to implement the existing laws that considered HC practice as illegal.

The recent initiatives by three municipalities to recognize HC as a distinct category of agricultural labor. If there will be a follow-up, the concerned municipalities develop a plan to address the special needs of HC in their respective municipalities. This also necessitates a more cohesive partnership with non-governmental organizations.

Had the government implemented Kamaiya System Prohibition Act 9001) properly, the issues of HC would have resolved years ago. Even today, the same act provides legal basis for the government to free and resettle the HC. Now, the provincial and federal government should take initiatives to eliminate all forms of bonded labor in agriculture and other sectors. As discussed earlier, 7th, 8th, 18th amendments of the Land Acts, if implemented properly can be considered as a ground-breaking step towards the rehabilitation of HCs. An established model (see, mukta kamaiya punsthapan niti niyam sangao, 2075) can be adopted and modified to the specific given context.

Recommendations

Based on the findings and the conclusions are drawn, some recommendations are offered to different stakeholders. Considering the complexities, and needs of HCs, in addition to the particular contribution one can make, a comprehensive collaboration between the governments, NGOs/CSO, and INGOs and donors is also equally important. Recommendations are grouped into four clusters of stakeholders: recommendations to local governments, recommendations to NGO/CSOs working in the field, and to the donors and international partners.

Province and Federal Government

- Provincial and federal governments should strictly enforce the law it has adopted to eliminate all forms of bonded labor. They should remove any legal and policy barriers to eliminate any form of bonded-labors if there is any. Kamaiya System Prohibition Act (2001) can be taken as a reference.
- The provincial and federal governments can provide technical and financial supports to the municipalities to rehabilitate and provide secure livelihood options to them.

- Since the prevalence of HC is dominantly a province 2 issue, therefore, the provincial government should take urgent action to eliminate the worse form of bonded labor from the province.

Local Governments

- Local governments should take initiatives in the spirit of the constitutions and other relevant policies to free the HC from the bondage and to rehabilitate them. For effective implementation, municipalities should categorize the HC according to the intensity of bondage and their vulnerability, and prioritize the intervention by reaching out to the most vulnerable and in the critical bondage first.
- Municipalities should prepare a three to five years strategic action plan to eliminate the system from their respective municipalities and declare them as a 'bonded-labor-free' municipality. Municipalities should allocate and coordinate with province and federal government for the required budget accordingly.
- Address issues relating to the informal money-lending; take legal actions with the help of concerned authorities if it was not according to the existing law, and the loan is transacted beyond the legal practice. Free the HC from debt bondage. Local government can take support from the province and the federal governments if required.
- Local governments now can ensure that no one in their municipalities is landless. The 8th amendment of the Land Act provides a sufficient legal basis for that.
- Local government should have livelihood supports programs for HC families, now and after their rehabilitation.
- Local governments at the worst can ensure that all agricultural labor get the district wage rate for their work.

Land Issue Resolving Commission (LIRC)

- LIRC should ensure that the concerned local governments collect data of all Dalit landless people while collecting the data of landless people.
- Collect details of landless people even if they do not have citizenship certificates or have less than 90 square meters of land
- All the necessary arrangements should be made to wave all the debt due to which they are serving as HC before distributing land to the HC.

NGO and Civil Societies

- NGO and CSO should develop evidence-based advocacy strategies and programs to address the bondage and poverty situation of HCs.
- Act as pressure groups and vigilantes to make sure the (local) governments' initiatives and activates are in the right direction.
- Develop strategies to work closely with the governments (local, provincial, or federal) towards eliminating the bonded laborers.
- Work and engage with HC communities and their networks, help them develop leaders from within; with consistent engagement and capacity development.
- Take necessary activism and action to ensure that all of them get the wage not less than the district rate; and, launch a campaign to free them from the debt with the exceptionally high-interest rate.

Donors and International Partners

- Support in capacity building of local governments and NGOs/CSOs for preparing strategic plans and programs to end the HCs systems founded in exploitative dyadic relationships.
- Work together with national/local partners in developing advocacy plans and capacity development of local/national partners to work towards freeing unfree HC.
- INGOs and funding agencies can work with and provide financial and technical support to the local governments to eliminate such a bonded labor practice and rehabilitate freed HC.
- INGO and Donors can provide technical and financial support to secure and enhance the livelihood and income generation of HC.

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- 1 Dhur is the smallest unit of land in Terai, which is equal to 1821 sq ft.
- 2 Ghur is a type of bonfire usually of hay, twigs, and unwanted things which poor people usually make it to keep them warm during the cold winter nights.

Annex 1. Questionnaire

Harwa Charwa Household Survey Form

This household survey is initiated by Dhanauji Rural Municipality, Shahid Nagar Municipality and Ganesh Man Charnath Municipality of Dhanusha District, in support of Community Improvement Centre (CIC) and Dalit Society Welfare Committee Nepal (DSWCN) to collect data of Harwa-Charwa in respective rural/municipality.

A. Administrative Information:

Full Name of Respondent:

Caste/Ethnicity*:

A1. District: Dhanusha.	A4. Former VDC/Municipality:
A2. Rural Municipality/ Municipality:	A5. Village/Tole (Settlement):
A3. Ward No:	A6. Name of Enumerator:

I am well aware about the objectives and goals of this household survey. I believe that the findings of this survey will be utilized for upliftment of the Harwa-Charwa community. Hence, I agree to participate, and provide all the information required for the survey. All the information, I provide to my knowledge is true.

A7. Do you agree to participate in this survey? 1 - Yes , 2 - No

A8. Date of interview (dd/mm/yyyy):

A9. Start time of interview (24-hour format):

*Ethnicity: 1-Hill Brahmin/Chhetri, 2-Terai Brahmin/Chhetri, 3-Hill Janjati, 4-Terai Janjati, 5-Hill Dalit, 6-Terai Dalit, 7-Muslim, 8. Others (Specify)

B. Family Information: (please encircle the appropriate number.)

B1. Are you currently a Harwa-Charwa?	1 - Yes , 2 - No
B2. Do you consider yourself a former Harwa-Charwa?	1 - Yes , 2 - No

[If B1 = Yes or B2 = Yes] B3. Causes to become a Harwa-Charwa? (More than one can be selected if applies)	1 - Because of loan/ Indebtedness 2 - For a shelter 3 - For land to Cultivate 4 - Harwa-Charwa for Generations	5 - Because other family members were Harwa- Charwa 6-In hope of receiving a piece of land 7 - Others (please specify)
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SN	B4. Name of Family Members	B5. Relationship with family head*	B6. Gender	B7. Age (completed years)	B8. Marital status (If B7 is above 10 yrs)	B9. Age at marriage	B10. Currently attending school [If B7 is more than 3 yrs and below 18 yrs]	B11. Education Status*	B12. Birth Registration	B13. Citizenship	B14. Current living place*	B.15 Major occupation*	B16. Number of months worked in past year [0 to 12]
1		n/a, as main respondent is family head	1 - Female 2 - Male 3 - Other		0-less than 10 yrs 1 - Unmarried 2 - Married 3 - Widowed 4 - Divorced 5-Separated 6 - Other		1 - Yes 2 - No		1 - Yes 2 - No	1 - Yes 2 - No			
2													
3													
4													
5	(In nepali format there are 12 boxes.)												

*B5. Relationship with Family head: 1-Spouse, 2-Mother/Father, 3-Son/Daughter, 4-Daughter in Law/ Son in law, 5-Brother/Sister, 6-Nephew/Niece, 7- Grand Son/Grand Daughter, 8-Others (Specify)

*B.11.Education: 1-Educated, 2-Primary level (1-8 Grade), 3-Secondary level (9&10 Grade), 4-S.L.C, 5- Higher Secondary (Till 12 grade), 6-Bachelor and higher level, 7-Uneducated, 8-Vocational training certified,

* B.14 Current Living place 1-Own home, 2-Landlords house, 3-Outside Village, 4-Outside District, 5-India, 6-Abroad, 7-Other specify (.....)

* B.15 Major Occupation: 1.Harawa/Charawa, 2-Farming in own land, 3-House-worker,

4- Agriculture Laborer, 5-Factory worker, 6-Construction Worker, 7-Government Job-holder, 8-I/NGO Job-holder, 9-Employed in India, 10-Migrant Worker, 11-Rikshaw driver, 12-Student, 13-Other specify (.....)

C. Property Details:

C1. Types of the House and other facilities (please encircle the correct ONE)

A	Type of House	1. Permanent ¹	2. Semi-permanent ²	3. Temporary ³			
B	Drinking Water Source	1. Own tube-well	2. Neighbour's tube-well	3. Public tube-well	4. Well/ Dughole		5. Other (Please Specify)
C	Fuel Source	1. Firewood	2. Cow Dung	3. Kerosene	4. L.P.G	5. Bio-Gas	6. Other (Please Specify)
D	Source of light	1. Kerosene	2. Electricity	3. Bio-Gas	4. Solar Energy	5. Others (Please Specify)	
E	Latrine	1. Yes	2. No	3. Under-Construction			
F	If E=Yes, Type of Latrine	1. Pit-latrine	2. Permanent (latrine with pan)				

C.2. Settlement Details: Please (v) tick the correct settlement status of the Harwa-Charwa community (i.e. the land in which their house is built)

Type of land	Own land		Tenancy land		Village block		Owner's land		Laguwai ⁴		Unregistered land		Government land,		Public land		Guthi		Others (Please Specify)	
	Katha	Dhur	Katha	Dhur	Katha	Dhur	Katha	Dhur	Katha	Dhur	Katha	Dhur	Katha	Dhur	Katha	Dhur	Katha	Dhur	Katha	Dhur

C.3 Land Details: (Type of Land owned besides the house of Harwa-Charwa)

Type of land	Land registered in own or Family's name			Village block			Government land, unregistered land or public land			Guthi			Owner's land			Others (Please Specify)		
	Bigha	Katha	Dhur	Bigha	Katha	Dhur	Bigha	Katha	Dhur	Bigha	Katha	Dhur	Bigha	Katha	Dhur	Bigha	Katha	Dhur
Area of land																		

C.4 Types of Land Tenure:

Tenure typology/ terms of tenancy	Tenant			Share cropping			On-Lease			Guthi			Laguwai5			Other		
Please tick the correct type (v)																		
Years of tenancy																		
Area of land	Bigha	Katha	Dhur	Bigha	Katha	Dhur	Bigha	Katha	Dhur	Bigha	Katha	Dhur	Bigha	Katha	Dhur	Bigha	Katha	Dhur

C5. How many months does your Agricultural Production lasts for? Please tick the correct box.

Do not have own production	Less than 3 months	Less than 6 months	Less than 9 months	For a whole year

C6. Do you own or share the following livestock:

Cow		Oxen		Buffalo		Sheep/ Goat		Pig		Duck, Chicken		Pigeons		Goat		Others (please specify)	
Own	Share Basis	Own	Share Basis	Own	Share Basis	Own	Share Basis	Own	Share Basis	Own	Share Basis	Own	Share Basis	Own	Share Basis	Own	Share Basis

D. Details of Labor: (please encircle the appropriate number.)

D1. In the past 12 months, have you or any of your family members worked without wage?	1 - Yes , 2 - No	
D2. Normally, how many days a week do you work?	_____ days per week	
D3. Normally, how many hours a day do you work?	_____ hours per day	
D4. Do you have a landlord?	1 - Yes , 2 - No	
D5, What is the Caste/Ethnicity of your landlord?		
D6. If members of your family had an offer of work that pays better, are you all free to go work for someone else?	1 - Yes , 2 - No	
D7. What would happen if all members of your family decide to move away and work for someone else?	1 - Nothing would happen 2 - Lose the house where we live 3 - Lose the land where we grow our food 4 - Loss of wages or share of crops from work already performed 5 - Loss of valuable goods that we own (eg, livestock, jewellery)	6 - Threat to me/my family 7 - Risk of physical violence (eg, being punched, kicked, threatened with a weapon) 8 - Other (please specify)
[If D4=yes then only proceed]		
D8. Can you or your family refuse your landlord's request to work, if you wanted to?	1 - Yes , 2 - No	

E. Details of Income and Debt: (please encircle the appropriate number.)

E1. With your current or most recent employer, were you able to negotiate a wage before you started work?	1 - Yes , 2 - No
E2. Have you done any kind of written or verbal agreement with your employer?	1 - Yes , 2 - No
E3. Do you have a fixed working hour?	1 - Yes , 2 - No
E4. Did your employer make any deduction from your wage without your prior consent?	1 - Yes , 2 - No
Generally, in a day	
E5... how much does your family earn in cash?	_____ Nepalese rupees per day

E5... how much does your family earn in kind?	kind #1 description _____, approximate amount in kg _____ kind #2 description _____, approximate amount in kg _____												
E6. As part of your work, does your employer provide the following? (select more than one if applies)	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>1 - Accommodation for you/your family</td> <td>5 - Medical care</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2 - Food once per day for you/your family</td> <td>6 - Clothes</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3 - Food more than twice per day for you/your family</td> <td>7 - Loan without interest</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4 - Support in education for children</td> <td>8 - Other (please specify)</td> </tr> </table>	1 - Accommodation for you/your family	5 - Medical care	2 - Food once per day for you/your family	6 - Clothes	3 - Food more than twice per day for you/your family	7 - Loan without interest	4 - Support in education for children	8 - Other (please specify)				
1 - Accommodation for you/your family	5 - Medical care												
2 - Food once per day for you/your family	6 - Clothes												
3 - Food more than twice per day for you/your family	7 - Loan without interest												
4 - Support in education for children	8 - Other (please specify)												
E7. Are you currently working to pay off a loan or an advance wage?	1 - Yes , 2 - No												
E8. [If E7. = Yes] How many other family members are working to pay off this loan	—												
E9. Do you work for the person you owe some or all of the debt to?	1 - Yes , 2 - No												
E10. When did you take the loan or advance wage?	_____ months (round to nearest)												
E11. How much was the original loan or the advance wage?	_____ Nepalese rupees												
E12. What is the annual interest rate of the loan?	_____ % per annum												
E13. Why did you take the loan? (select more than one if applies)	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>1 - Medical treatment</td> <td>7 - To buy livestock, business equipment or other productive assets</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2 - Food</td> <td>8 - Education</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3 - Family wedding</td> <td>9 - To buy land</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4 - Religious Ceremony</td> <td>10 - To go abroad</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5 - Death Rituals</td> <td>11 - Other (please specify)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>6 - Home repair/ construction of house</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	1 - Medical treatment	7 - To buy livestock, business equipment or other productive assets	2 - Food	8 - Education	3 - Family wedding	9 - To buy land	4 - Religious Ceremony	10 - To go abroad	5 - Death Rituals	11 - Other (please specify)	6 - Home repair/ construction of house	
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5 - Death Rituals	11 - Other (please specify)												
6 - Home repair/ construction of house													
E14. When do you think you will pay off the loan	1 – This year 2 – Next year 3 – Within 3 years 4 – Don't know												

F. Experiences of violence

In the past 12 months, did you experience any of the following violence from your landlord?	
F1. Threatened to hurt you or your family	1 - Yes , 2 - No
F2. Smashed things to intimidate you	1 - Yes , 2 - No
F3. Confiscated valuable things from you (eg, livestock, jewellery)	1 - Yes , 2 - No
F4. Punched, kicked, dragged or beaten you up	1 - Yes , 2 - No
F5. Forced you to do things that you found degrading	1 - Yes , 2 - No
F6. You mentioned some of these bad things happened to you. Could you have moved to a new landlord if you wanted to?	1 - Yes, 2 - No

G. Government Services and support:

G.1 In the past 12 months, have you or any of your family members received any kind of support, grant or service from the federal, provincial or local government? 1-Yes, 2-No

[If G.1 =Yes], then G.2 Which kind of Support? (select more than one if applies)	1-Pesticide, Seed and other agriculture inputs	5-House reconstruction	9-Scholarship for children
	2-Grant for house construction	6-Government Cash Grant	10-Ration Grant
	3-Janta Awas (People's Residence Programme)	7-Provided land for housing	11-Drinking water facility
	4-Electricity	8-Support for latrine	12-Other (Please Specify)

H. Membership in the Groups/Co-operatives:

H.1 Are you a member of any Groups or Co-operative? 1-Yes, 2-No

[If H1=Yes] H2. Which groups or co-operatives are you currently a member in? (select more than one if applies)	1-Co-operative	4-Land Rights Forum
	2-Community Forest User group	5-Harwa-Charwa Rights Forum
	3-Trade Union/Workers Group	6-Other specify (.....)

I. End of Interview

This is the end of the survey. Thank you very much for taking the time to participate in this study. Further, If you have any questions related to this study, please feel free to ask us?

I.1. End time of interview (24-hour format):

I.2 Signature of Interviewer:

I.3 Checked Date (DD/MM/YY):

I.4 Checked By:



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