

DR JAMES COCKAYNE
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Unshackling Development

Why we need a
global partnership
to end modern slavery



UNITED NATIONS
UNIVERSITY



Cover: A weaver works on a handloom at a sari workshop in Kardhana Village in Varanasi district of Uttar Pradesh, India. The weavers work for 10 hours a day and get an average of INR 300-INR 350 (\$4.8 - \$5.6) for weaving a Banarasi silk saree - it takes an average of 3 days to complete one sari.

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AU	African Union
CEACR	ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations
CEB	UN Chief Executives Board for Coordination
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPRK	Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
ECOSOC	UN Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
GAVI	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization
GFATM	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
GFTEs	Global Fund to End Slavery
GPEMS	Proposed new Global Partnership to End Modern Slavery
GPEVAC	Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children
IACHR	Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICAT	Inter-Agency Coordination Group Against Trafficking in Persons (ICAT)
ICC TFV	International Criminal Court Trust Fund for Victims
ICPO-Interpol	International Criminal Police Organization
ILCS	International Conference of Labour Statisticians
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOE	International Organization of Employers
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ITUC	International Trade Union Confederation
NCP	National Contact Point, for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Business Enterprises
OAS	Organization of American States
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHCHR	United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SE4All	Sustainable Energy for All partnership
SRSg CAC	Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict
SRSg SVC	Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict
STOP-Slavery	Proposed new UN System Taskforce on Programming against Slavery
SWA	Sanitation and Water for All initiative
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UN.GIFT	UN Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UN Human Trafficking Fund	UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Victims of Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UN Slavery Fund	UN Voluntary Trust Fund on Contemporary Forms of Slavery
UNTOC	UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime
UN Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WTO	World Trade Organization

Executive Summary

Isn't slavery a thing of the past?

Slavery is often assumed to be a thing of the past. Recent estimates from the International Labour Organization and the Global Slavery Index, however, suggest that between 20.9 and 35.8 million people are currently trapped in a situation in which one or more other people exercise powers of ownership over them—a situation of slavery. Five and a half million of these people are children.

Wherever you are, there are slaves—because there are, the best available evidence suggests, slaves in every country. We unwittingly feel the touch of slavery in our smartphones, the palm oil in our cosmetics and shampoo, the seafood we buy at supermarkets, our rice bowls, and in our beef. It is woven into our clothes, forged into the steel in some of our buildings, dusted into the mica sparkles on our cars, and it helps to lay the foundations of mega-sporting stadiums. It pervades the global sex industry and provides domestic labour in many countries around the world. Today, evidence shows that there are slaves working in British industry and American fields. In some countries, forced labour and enslavement are organized by the state, viewed as a cheap way to access cotton revenues, remittances or infrastructure development—in other words, a short-cut to national development. United Nations bodies have repeatedly expressed concern that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea engages in enslavement and forces its citizens to labour on overseas construction sites, confiscating up to 90 per cent of their salaries. And in other countries, the global norm against slavery is under direct attack from non-state armed groups. Over 3,000 Yazidi women and girls are thought to be currently enslaved by ISIS, which has organized contract registries and markets, published 'how-to' manuals and openly advocates slavery. So, too, does Boko Haram.

Slavery exists where the costs of slavery are externalized onto victims, families and communities (and their environments), who cannot protect themselves, because governance is weak and the rule of law diluted. The evidence discussed in this report shows that these conditions may be met in surprising places: not only in ISIS-run slave markets, Congolese mines, South Asian brick kilns or the Brazilian charcoal industry, for example, but also in global garment supply chains, British bed-making

factories, or American agriculture. The development challenges posed by slavery are, like the rest of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development agreed recently at the United Nations, universal ones.

Anti-slavery is smart development policy

The idea that slavery offers a short-cut to national wealth is increasingly challenged by evidence of slavery's true costs. Slavery seems to create a long-term drag on development. It appears to drive down whole communities' wages and productivity, suppress tax revenues and remove valuable human capital from the economy. Slaves are, as one researcher put it, unwitting agents of economic stagnation—which lasts across generations. Accepting slavery means foregoing human, business and national development; tolerating increased physical and mental harms, and resulting public health burdens; and often also acquiescing in major environmental harm. In other words, we all bear the costs of slavery.

This also means, however, that anti-slavery is a smart development strategy. Recognizing this, in September 2015 world leaders vowed, in adopting the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, to "Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms." (Sustainable Development Goal 8.7) But how is that going to happen?

Anti-slavery as a collective action problem

The good news, this report suggests, is that we already know quite a bit about what drives slavery—and which keys unlock which shackles. Slavery emerges not only in wholly illegal sectors, but often where legitimate industry intersects with informal work. It is a product of vulnerability arising from social exclusion, income shocks, illiteracy, low educational levels, state instability, conflict, high corruption levels, or insecure immigration status. It is a form of extreme inequality, sustained by a range of vested interests—unscrupulous business actors, corrupt police and officials. We know more and more about the keys that address slavery, unlock this trapped human potential, and

unshackle development. These keys take many forms, and not only disrupt, but also prevent slavery by improving access to education, credit, food, health care, land, wage regulation, women's rights, safe migration and recruitment, and rehabilitation services. The keys to meeting SDG 8.7 are thus also likely to help us meet a range of other goals and targets in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The challenge now is to scale up the availability of these keys and get them to where they need to be. Only around 0.2 per cent of slavery cases are investigated and prosecuted annually. And while forced labour generates \$150 billion in profits annually, just 0.08 per cent of this amount is spent by OECD countries annually on anti-slavery development assistance. New sources of funding—such as the The Freedom Fund, which has mobilized \$50 million in two years, and the nascent US-backed Global Fund to End Slavery, which would aim to spend \$1.5 billion in its first seven years—can help. But research in this field suggests that neither public nor private action will, on its own, be able to address the drivers of slavery. Instead, a global framework for collective action is needed, to mobilize resources, co-ordinate strategy, learn what works—and sustain reforms, world-wide, in the face of resistance from vested interests.

Multilateral action against slavery

Part 2 of this report reviews existing global action against slavery, focusing on the activities of the UN system. We explore the history of efforts against slavery, forced labour and trafficking by the full range of multilateral actors involved: the League of Nations; the International Labour Organization; the UN Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Human Rights, and its Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery; the UN Human Rights Council, treaty bodies, and special procedures; the UN Security Council and various relevant Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General; UN entities, including UNODC and UNICEF; development actors including the World Bank; and the private sector. This part also considers the important role of regional organizations, including the AU, ECOWAS, EU, OAS and OSCE.

Multilateral action initially treated slavery, human trafficking and forced labour as related phenomena requiring integrated responses involving technical assistance, support for economic transformation, and political engagement. The tendency to build wholly separate policy responses and institutional architectures for slavery, trafficking and forced labour is a fairly recent one—and is by no means inevitable. What started out as integrated action against slavery a century ago has become fragmented and poorly co-ordinated, weakening the effectiveness of multilateral efforts.

As a result the global community faces four specific challenges in meeting SDG 8.7:

1. *Limited political leadership* to manage the risk of erosion of anti-slavery norms, as a result of overt support for slavery by ISIS and Boko Haram, weak respect for anti-slavery norms by corporate actors, and indifference to slavery by some governments;
2. *Fragmented and poorly co-ordinated engagement by the UN system*, creating unclear entry points for Member States, business and civil society, and a failure to involve significant development and peace and security actors in the fight against slavery;
3. *Poorly funded, inefficient, inexpert and competing multilateral trust funds* that reach around 0.1 per cent of slavery victims, operating in the shadow of private and private-public start-up trust funds that are mobilizing resources hundreds of times larger; and
4. *Patchy data, weakly used* to drive strategic innovation, especially in tackling global supply chains.



Towards a global partnership

Part 3 of the report considers how more effective collective action against slavery might be organized, to unshackle development. It argues that what is required is not a radical reinvention of the wheel, but a strategic initiative designed to bring the wheels together, so they all work together—a Global Partnership to End Modern Slavery. Many actors—from the General Assembly to the ILO—are already talking about the need for global partnership in this field. Such a partnership could help to:

1. *Renew* our commitment to anti-slavery, particularly by facilitating engagement at the highest levels of business and politics with anti-slavery efforts;
2. *Reframe* anti-slavery as smart development policy, requiring co-ordinated investment;
3. *Reorganize* anti-slavery efforts, so that they are more strategically co-ordinated;
4. *Resource* anti-slavery efforts better, through helping to mobilize and leverage new funding sources; and
5. *Research* needs and use the resulting data, metrics and knowledge to drive smart policy and programming.

Part 3 considers several existing global multi-stakeholder partnerships—developed in global struggles against AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, to provide access to energy, sanitation and water for all, and to end violence against children. It suggests that two different models emerge—a strategic co-ordination model, and a pooled funding model. Whichever model is adopted, by pooling and co-ordinating capabilities (including, but not limited to finance), a Global Partnership to End Modern Slavery could:

- Lower the transaction costs for communities, countries and companies looking for anti-slavery assistance;
- Facilitate co-ordinated efforts to reform global supply chains, creating roadmaps to help states and global brands and retailers undertake reforms without losing market share; and
- Foster innovation through pooled investment in data, research, development, demonstration and dissemination.

How do we get there?

There is a clear opportunity for political leadership by both UN Member States and the UN Secretary-General. The final part of the report outlines ten steps they could take to improve co-ordination and effectiveness across the multilateral system, help accelerate progress towards SDG 8.7, and help to unshackle development. These are briefly summarized in the Recommendations below.

1. Make modern slavery a focus of integrated multilateral action

The UN Secretary-General and the UN's intergovernmental organs should make integrated action against modern slavery a central focus of their work, to unshackle development and ensure that no one is left behind in implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The UN General Assembly should adopt a resolution on ending modern slavery, picking up on some of the recommendations below.

2. UN Special Envoy and STOP-Slavery

The Secretary-General, possibly at the invitation of the General Assembly, and after consultation with the UN Chief Executives Board for Coordination, should appoint a UN Special Envoy on Modern Slavery. The Special Envoy should be tasked to work with Member States, mainstream UN system-wide action against modern slavery and chair a System-wide Taskforce on Programming Against Slavery (STOP-Slavery). STOP-Slavery should build on the existing Inter-agency Coordination Group Against Trafficking in Persons (ICAT).

3. Member States' Group of Friends or High Level Review

Member States should form an open-ended Group of Friends to End Modern Slavery, building on the work of the existing Group of Friends United Against Human Trafficking and the Group of Friends on Decent Work—or, alternatively, initiate a Member-State-led, but time-bound, High Level Review of Multilateral Action to End Modern Slavery.

4. Global Partnership to End Modern Slavery

By 2017, the Special Envoy on Modern Slavery should, working closely with Member States and all other key stakeholders, develop a proposal for a Global Partnership to End Modern Slavery, possibly incorporating a pooled funding component.

5. Private sector and civil society task forces

The private sector and civil society groups should form their own task forces to end modern slavery, to engage with the Special Envoy and the UN's STOP-Slavery, and to help facilitate negotiation of a Global Partnership to End Modern Slavery.

6. Secretary-General's thematic guidance note

The Secretary-General should task the Special Envoy on Modern Slavery to work with STOP-Slavery to develop, by 2016, a UN system-wide thematic guidance note on effective UN action against modern slavery.

7. Take action in ECOSOC

ECOSOC should use its dormant mandate under the 1956 United Nations Supplementary Convention on Slavery (Article 8(3)) to invite biennial reporting by the Secretary-General, with the support of STOP-Slavery, on system-wide efforts against modern slavery, including efforts undertaken in the development, trade, and humanitarian contexts.

8. Take action in the Security Council

The Security Council should consider an open thematic debate, or an Arria-formula meeting, considering the links between modern slavery, enslavement, sexual slavery and threats to international peace and security.

9. Develop more robust indicators for SDG 8.7

The Inter-Agency and Expert Group on the SDGs and the UN Statistical Commission should review and strengthen the proposed indicators for SDG 8.7 to ensure they extend beyond child labour, and that there is scope for them to be aligned with the new International Labour Conference official statistic on slavery and forced labour once it is approved in 2018.

10. Engage regional organizations

Member States and the Special Envoy should actively engage with regional organizations to explore co-ordinated action to end modern slavery.

Introduction

Slavery is often assumed to be a thing of the past. Recent estimates, however, suggest that between 20.9 and 35.8 million people are currently trapped in a situation in which another person exercises powers of ownership over them—a situation of slavery.ⁱⁱ In other words, one in every 206 to 353 people currently alive is a victim of slavery, human trafficking or forced labour. Five and a half million of these people are children.

The problem of slavery leaves no country untouched. Wherever you are, there are slaves – because, evidence suggests, there are slaves in every country. We unwittingly feel the touch of slavery in our smartphones, whose almost magical powers are generated by computer chips made from materials extracted by children forced to labour in dangerous mines.ⁱⁱⁱ We adorn our faces and wash our hair with products made from palm oil harvested with forced and illegal child labour.^{iv} Modern slavery taints the seafood in Western supermarkets, harvested by destitute men and boys forced to work on floating fishing factories in South-East Asia,^v the rice in many of Asia’s lunch-bowls, the beef on dinner-plates across South America and the chocolates given as signs of love worldwide on Valentine’s Day.^{vi} It is woven into our cotton clothes, forged into the steel in some of our buildings, and dusted into the mica-based paints used to make our cars sparkle.^{vii} Modern slavery exists in the sex industry from Bangkok to Berlin,^{viii} is laying the foundations of many of the stadiums being built today for tomorrow’s mega sporting events,^{ix} and supports households in many countries around the world. Today, evidence suggests, there are slaves working in British industry and American fields.^{xi}

“Humanity is born free, and everywhere it is in chains”

Jean-Jacques Rousseauⁱ

Modern slavery is a tragedy and crime, but it is not just an underground criminal enterprise. It is woven into the fabric of the global economy. It is what happens when the most vulnerable, marginalized and unequal have to bargain for work, credit or protection. It is what happens when consumers are unaware of the true human costs of the goods they benefit from, when societies dismiss bonded labour, forced marriage or chattel slavery as a traditional cultural phenomenon, when governments treat forced labour as a short-cut to national development. That idea—that slavery is a short-cut to development—is increasingly challenged by the recognition of the true costs of slavery. As this report explores, slavery appears in fact to drive down communities’ wages and productivity, suppress tax revenues and remove valuable human capital from the economy. Accepting slavery means foregoing human, business and national development; tolerating increased public health burdens; and acquiescing in major ecological costs. In other words, we all bear the costs of slavery.

Slavery is a problem of sustainable development, on a global scale. This also means, however, that anti-slavery is smart development strategy. Recognizing this, in September 2015 world leaders vowed, in adopting the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, to “[t]ake immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms.”^{xii} (Sustainable Development Goal 8.7) But how is that going to happen? Given that slavery persists, some 200 years after the first international treaty designed to eradicate it,^{xiii} what makes us think that we can take effective measures to end modern slavery now?

This policy report seeks to answer these questions. It begins in Part 1 with a review of what we know about modern slavery and how to fight it, and explains why anti-slavery is increasingly seen as smart development policy. The good news is that we already know quite a bit about which keys unlock which shackles—but the challenge is to scale up their availability and deliver them to where they need to be. In Part 2 we review existing multilateral action against slavery, focusing on the activities of the UN system. This reveals that what started out as integrated action against slavery a century ago has become fragmented and

poorly co-ordinated at a strategic level. This section of the report also identifies four specific challenges the global community faces in meeting SDG 8.7, as a result of this fragmentation of multilateral effort:

1. Limited political leadership to manage the risk of erosion of anti-slavery norms, as a result of overt support for slavery by ISIS and Boko Haram, weak respect for anti-slavery norms by unscrupulous business actors, and indifference to, or worse, acquiescence in slavery by some governments;
2. Fragmented and poorly co-ordinated engagement by the multilateral system, creating unclear entry points for Member States, business and civil society, and a failure to involve significant development, trade regulation, and peace and security actors in the fight against slavery;
3. Poorly funded, inefficient, inexperienced and competing multilateral trust funds that reach around 0.1 per cent of slavery victims, operating in the shadow of private and private-public start-up trust funds that are mobilizing resources hundreds of times larger; and
4. Patchy data, weakly used to drive strategic innovation, especially in tackling global supply chains.

Part 3 of the report considers how more effective collective action against slavery might be organized, to unshackle development. It argues that what is required is not a radical reinvention of the wheel, but a strategic initiative designed to build a Global Partnership to End Modern Slavery. This partnership would:

1. *Renew* our commitment to anti-slavery;
2. *Reframe* anti-slavery as smart development policy;
3. *Reorganize* anti-slavery efforts;
4. *Resource* anti-slavery efforts better, through co-ordinated—but not necessarily centralized—action by public and private donors;
5. *Research* needs and use that knowledge to drive smart policy.

Part 3 considers several existing global multi-stakeholder partnerships, and suggests that two different models emerge—a strategic co-ordination model, and a pooled funding model—which could guide efforts to build a global partnership to end modern slavery. It suggests that extensive further consultation, led by an independent actor—a UN Special Envoy on Modern Slavery—will be needed to develop a specific partnership proposal in collaboration with UN Member States and other relevant stakeholders. And it closes with ten recommendations designed to achieve a stronger multilateral contribution to the global fight against slavery, through action in the UN General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, Security Council, by regional organizations, and by business and civil society.



1. Rethinking modern slavery

"The work done by free men comes cheaper in the end than the work performed by slaves."

Adam Smith^{xiv}

Isn't slavery a thing of the past?

Many people, indeed many governments, believe that slavery today exists only in the history books.^{xv} As we explore in a companion report published alongside this one—*Fighting Modern Slavery: What Role for International Criminal Justice?*—the prohibition on slavery is, on paper, one of the strongest prohibitions in international law.^{xvi} Slavery not only involves violation of a panoply of human rights^{xvii} but can also entail domestic, or even international, criminal liability. Yet the best available evidence in fact suggests that slavery exists—right now—in every country on earth.

Measuring slavery is—as we explain in Boxes 1 and 2 below—difficult. But the best estimates, from the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Global Slavery Index (GSI), suggest that between 20.9 million and 35.8 million people—or between one in every 206 and one in every 353 people currently alive—are trapped in a situation in which one person has the powers of ownership exercised over them by one or more other persons—a situation of slavery.^{xviii} As Box 1, “Slavery today” shows, roughly a quarter of these people are children. A little more than half appear to be female. The ILO estimates that 90 per cent of those in forced labour are exploited in the private economy, two thirds working in economic activities such as agriculture, fishing, construction, manufacturing, or domestic work, and around a quarter in the sex industry. Analysis by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) suggests, however, that exploitation in the sex industry accounts for about half of the victims trafficked into exploitation.^{xix} This suggests that much contemporary slavery remains quite localized, not involving such movement.

‘Modern slavery’ is a term that encompasses a variety of situations in which one person is forcibly controlled by one or more others for the purpose of exploitation, including human trafficking and forced labour.^{xx} It takes many forms: debt bondage, sexual slavery and forced marriage, and illegal exploitation of children, including during conflict and through prostitution.^{xxi} The legal distinctions between these different practices, all encompassed within the umbrella advocacy term ‘modern slavery’, are explored further in the companion report to this one, *Fighting Modern Slavery: What Role for International Criminal Justice?*^{xxii} Distinctions between these practices enable

legal precision and tailored programming responses, but can also lead to unhelpful competition for attention and resources and—as we explore both in the companion report and in Part 2 of this report—often overlap in application. The move by world leaders, in adopting Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 8.7, to focus not only on human trafficking, but also forced labour and modern slavery, makes clear the need to consider these related phenomena together.

This report consequently uses the term ‘modern slavery’ to encompass those practices outlawed as:

1. Slavery and slavery-like practices (including serfdom, debt bondage, forced marriage, and child exploitation) under the 1926 Slavery Convention and the 1956 Supplementary Convention;
2. Human trafficking under the 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime;
3. Forced labour under the 1930 ILO Forced Labour Convention (No. 29) and 1957 ILO Forced Labour Convention (No. 105); and
4. Enslavement, sexual slavery and forced marriage under the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.^{xxiii}

What all these practices have in common is that the victim is exploited, for another person’s economic gain, through arrangements that involve powers analogous to those of ownership.^{xxiv} This characterization of slavery—and the fact that it overlaps with trafficking and forced labour—was recognised by the UN Secretary-General as long ago as 1953.^{xxv} In fact, as we shall see in Part 2, multilateral action initially treated slavery, human trafficking and forced labour as related phenomena requiring integrated response; the tendency to build wholly separate policy responses and institutional architectures is a fairly recent one, and is by no means inevitable.

Modern slaves are often not physically shackled, but instead prevented from exiting situations of extreme exploitation by coercion, threats of destitution, physical or sexual abuse, or legal jeopardy.^{xxvi} They are trapped in slavery not necessarily by literal chains, but by fraudulent ‘contracts’, unpaid wages, unconscionable and un-repayable debts, withheld passports, and physical violence. Money may even change hands—but on terms that make exit unfeasible.^{xxvii} As David Weissbrodt and

Anti-Slavery International have noted in summarizing the law of modern slavery, "all have the element of choice and control of their lives taken from them... and passed to a third party".^{xxviii} And unlike traditional slavery, modern slavery is often distinguished by slaves being treated not as long-term investments, but disposable parts, to be thrown away and replaced as soon as they become cost centres.

Modern slaves are often not physically shackled, but instead prevented from exiting situations of extreme exploitation by coercion, threats of destitution, physical or sexual abuse, or legal jeopardy






Box 1 - Slavery today

GLOBAL VICTIM POPULATION




WHERE ARE THEY?




WHERE ARE MOST SLAVES FOUND?



ARE THEY MOVED?



WHAT DO SLAVES DO?



ANNUAL PROFIT PER VICTIM BY REGION



Sources: ILO, 2012 Global Estimate of Forced Labour (ILO: Geneva, 2012); The Walk Free Foundation, The Global Slavery Index 2014 (Perth: Walk Free Foundation, November 2014).

Box 2 - Measuring modern slavery

Measuring modern slavery is hard. Even if we can agree what a 'slave' is, finding them is difficult, since most of them are deliberately hidden from view. But without good data on where slaves are, how they become slaves, and what happens to them, anti-slavery policy will remain guesswork.^{xxx} Yet there has been significant innovation in this field recently, both in counting-based methodologies and in inferential or estimation methodologies.^{xxxi} Key innovations include:

- The US State Department's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons has developed detailed comparative data on trafficking investigations, prosecutions, convictions, and sentences.^{xxxii} It has also funded and helped to disseminate research into new estimation methodologies.^{xxxiii}
- The UK Home Office has developed a pioneering methodology based on Multiple Systems Evaluation to estimate the "dark figure" of hidden slaves, placing the number in the UK at 10,000 to 13,000.^{xxxiv}
- The International Labour Organization (ILO) has produced two global forced labour estimates, both based on extrapolations from a small (n=8,000) core survey sample (covering four countries), supplemented by secondary (i.e. previously reported) data.^{xxxv} This estimates forced labour prevalence for five global regions, and by sector. ILO has also piloted survey methodologies to estimate the prevalence of forced labour in targeted areas or within targeted populations.^{xxxvi}
- An Australian NGO, the Walk Free Foundation, working with the University of Hull, has begun to publish an annual [Global Slavery Index](#), ranking 167 countries in terms of the prevalence of modern slavery. The GSI methodology is similar to that used by the ILO in its global forced labour estimate, but applied at the country level. Country estimates combine analysis of public reports of slavery in 58 countries with random sample surveys in a subset of 19 countries (total n=8,061), which are then used to estimate prevalence in countries with similar 'vulnerability' profiles.^{xxxvii}
- Other actors, such as NGO Free the Slaves, are paying increased attention to [longitudinal tracking](#) of freed slaves, to identify the impacts of different interventions.^{xxxviii}

Nonetheless, as the ILO itself recognizes, "we still have a long way to go" before we have robust data.^{xxxix} The adoption of SDG 8.7 is forcing renewed attention to measurement—both of the global slave population and of intervention impacts. An Inter-Agency and Expert Group (IAEG-SDGs) is currently developing indicators for measuring progress against the SDGs, which will be adopted by the United Nations Statistical Commission, an intergovernmental body, in March 2016. The current proposal for an indicator for SDG 8.7 focuses, unhelpfully, exclusively on child labour.^{xl} This reflects limitations on existing data, and points to the need for accelerated global action in this area.

Fortunately, the 2013 International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) initiated an effort to develop more robust national data. ICLS adopted a roadmap leading to 2018, when an official proposal will be presented to the International Labour Conference for a new official statistic for slavery and forced labour, which will be collected nationally.^{xli} The ILO will also produce a new global estimate of child labour in 2017, just prior to an International Conference on Child Labour in Argentina.

Why does slavery persist?

The world has been taking action against slavery for two centuries, beginning with the 1815 *Declaration Relative to the Universal Abolition of the Slave Trade*.^{xlii} Since then some 12 global conventions and 300 bilateral treaties have been agreed to try to eradicate slavery. Yet it persists. Why?

The short answer is that we have proven better at speaking out against slavery than taking the coordinated steps we must to eradicate it as a cultural, social, economic and ultimately political phenomenon. In fact, we have arguably become so complacent about slavery at the international level that today the strength of the norm against slavery is eroding—as a result of unscrupulous business conduct, state indifference and acquiescence and, perhaps most disturbingly, direct frontal assault by violent Islamist extremists.

The eroding taboo against slavery

The global slavery taboo is today facing a major challenge from Boko Haram and ISIS, both active sponsors and promoters of chattel slavery. Over 3,000 Yazidi women and girls are thought to be currently enslaved by ISIS, which is organizing slave contract registries and markets, advocating for the revival of slavery through official policy and media outlets, and even issuing official ‘how-to’ manuals.^{xliii} UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict Zainab Bangura recently warned that ISIS has institutionalized slavery and sexual violence to increase recruitment by promising male fighters access to women and girls, to populate a new “caliphate” through forced pregnancy, to terrorize communities into compliance, displace populations from strategic areas and generate revenue through trafficking, slave trade and ransoms.^{xliii} The ‘emir’ of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, has publicly stated that Boko Haram intends to “enslave” civilian populations that it attacks, and to “sell” women and girls—perhaps several thousand women and girls have been kidnapped to date.^{xliii} The US State Department 2014 *Trafficking in Persons* Report suggests that some of these women have been “subjected to domestic servitude, forced labour, and sex slavery through forced marriages to its militants”.^{xliii}

This frontal assault on the global prohibition of slavery is made possible by states’ own reluctance to tackle the slavery, forced labour and human trafficking that does exist, and even their willingness to tolerate—or benefit—from it.^{xliii} No state formally sanctions slavery today—but several tolerate it in practice. While its forced labour conventions (Nos. 29 and 105) are the ILO’s most-ratified instruments, the ILO estimates that almost 10 per cent of forced labour is imposed by states or politically-motivated armed groups.^{xliii} UN bodies have repeatedly expressed concern that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) may be engaged in enslavement or trafficking, and forces its citizens to labour in prisons and on overseas construction sites, confiscating up to 90 per cent of their salaries.^{xlix} Some courts in West Africa continue to sanction traditional, quasi-feudal forms of servitude that amount to illegal servitude and slavery.ⁱ Human rights organizations continue to sound the alarm about the role of forced labour in stadium constructionⁱⁱ and domestic workⁱⁱⁱ in the Middle East, and in state support to the cotton industry in Central Asia. In Mauritania and Uzbekistan, one estimate puts the portion of the population that may be victims of modern slavery at a staggering 1 in every 25 people, while debt bondage remains widespread in parts of South Asia.^{liii} Even in highly developed countries, increased attention is revealing startling levels of slavery; the UK government estimates there are between 10,000 and 13,000 slaves in that country, and has recently initiated a salutary prosecution against a British firm supplying beds to major retailers that allegedly used Hungarian nationals as slave workers.^{liv}

Over 3,000 Yazidi women and girls are thought to be currently enslaved by ISIS

Slavery as extreme inequality

Why are slavery, forced labour and human trafficking tolerated, even as they are decried? Answering that question requires reflection on the role modern slavery plays in the global economy, and the resulting business, economic, social—and political—barriers to disposing with it.

The economic attraction of slavery remains a powerful one. The ILO has estimated that forced labour, alone, generates some *\$150 billion* annually in profits, to those who use it.^{lv} Some of this is the product of what we think of as organized crime: hidden organizations engaged in wholly illegal trades, such as child prostitution. But research increasingly suggests that modern slavery is also what happens when the legitimate global economy encounters people rendered vulnerable by a range of factors: social exclusion, household vulnerability to income shocks, illiteracy, low educational levels, state instability, conflict, high corruption levels, or insecure immigration status.^{lvi} This understanding is reflected in the UN General Assembly's Plan of Action on human trafficking—but has not yet been recognized at the global level in relation to the broader concept of modern slavery.^{lvii}

Slavery is not driven by absolute poverty, but rather by vulnerability, marginalization and inequality.^{lviii} Caste continues to be a major correlate of vulnerability to slavery in South Asia and West Africa.^{lix} There is a clear connection between inequality, ethnic marginalization and conflict, on the one hand, and vulnerability to human trafficking, as the current case of the Rohingya in South-East Asia—trafficked into prostitution and slavery aboard fishing vessels—makes tragically clear.^{lx}

Modern slavery emerges not only in wholly illegal sectors but often where legitimate industry intersects with informal work.^{lxi} Demand for cheap labour in industries subject to global competition creates perverse profit incentives, encouraging producers to use coercion to extract value while keeping their own enterprise costs down.^{lxii} ILO research suggests that forced labour is common not only in the sex industry, but also in other sectors and industries that attract low- or unskilled workers, where labour demand fluctuates and where working conditions are poor—agriculture, fishing and forestry, construction, lower-end manufacturing, artisanal mining, utilities and domestic work.^{lxiii} The transnationality of global supply chains in

these industries, operating through multiple layers of intermediaries, hides from consumers, investors and markets the human costs that these workers, their families and communities suffer to produce the fish, cosmetics, cotton, steel and stadiums we all enjoy. This is particularly feasible where a few major upper-tier firms are fed by a highly competitive market of lower-tier suppliers in weakly regulated jurisdictions. These asymmetrical market conditions allow upper-tier firms—big global buyers like the major supermarket or garment retail chains—to displace production and market condition risks down the value chain, and accrue profit at the top.^{lxiv} In plain language, this means that risk is displaced onto bottom-level suppliers, who have to deal with rapid changes in order specifications and turn-around times—and, ultimately, onto workers, who are forced to deal with highly flexible working conditions. Poor and vulnerable workers, explains Professor Nicola Phillips, are in these circumstances “obliged to prioritize the short-term goals of survival, which renders them vulnerable to insecure and exploitative conditions of work, including forced labour”. This forces them to trade off long-term growth, development—and rights—in favour of short-term survival. And this creates a circular dynamic: “poverty generates a range of vulnerabilities among workers, which facilitate their exploitation, including in the form of forced labour; their exploitation in turn serves as the key mechanism of impoverishment.”^{lxv}

Modern slavery is thus not confined to low-income countries; it is also a feature of middle- and even high-income countries, not only because of their consumption of goods produced by slavery overseas, but also because – as the earlier UK bed-making case shows – they are also susceptible to hidden slavery at home. It is, like the rest of the sustainable development agenda, a universal concern. And it is not so much a problem of illicit globalization, as of unintended consequences: the global economy is functioning as it has been built to function.^{lxvi} “The more research that is conducted”, notes Roger Plant, the former head of the ILO’s Special Action Programme Against Forced Labour, “the more it is realized that it is not only irregular workers in the underground economy who are exposed to labour trafficking. Temporary or contract workers with perfectly lawful contracts of employment can also be at risk” where circumstances render them vulnerable.^{lxvii} Slavery is not simply a problem of exclusion from decent work or global labour markets, but equally a

problem of extreme inequality within global labour markets.^{lxviii}

This is not a marginal or radical view, but rather one shared even by responsible officials in the high-income countries in which many of these upper-tier, global brands and retail buyers are domiciled. For example, the UK's first independent anti-slavery commissioner, Kevin Hyland, has put it this way:

"Slavery in its modern manifestation cannot be banned by treaty. It is not a trade route that can be cut off. It is integrated, embedded and even institutionalized in our society. It is a cog in our economic machine, manifesting itself in a hidden underworld but interacting with the legitimate economy and intrinsically linked to global supply chains."^{lxix}

What this makes clear is that while armed non-state actors like ISIS and Boko Haram may be exceptional in openly flouting the global ban on slavery, both states and global business are involved in the persistence of modern slavery. As Professor Richard M. Locke of the Watson Institute at Brown University puts it, "Until ... practices among key actors within global supply chains are reformed", slavery will persist. Corporate due diligence to identify risks of slavery and human trafficking in global supply chains is taking a new prominence in international anti-slavery efforts, whether through the UK *Modern Slavery Act*, changes to the US Federal Acquisition Regulations, efforts in the EU, Malaysia and Germany, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, or even UN Security Council due diligence initiatives relating to Democratic Republic of Congo and Eritrea.^{lxxi} Other initiatives seek to reduce workers' vulnerability through improving transnational regulation, for example through encouraging safe migration and fair recruitment practices.^{lxxii} (See further Box 3 below.) But states cannot lay all the blame for the persistence of slavery at the feet of private actors: until states move away from national development models based on the use of forced labour—as we see today in the DPRK,^{lxxiii} Myanmar,^{lxxiv} and some Middle Eastern countries^{lxxv}—slavery will persist.

Slavery is not driven by absolute poverty, but rather by vulnerability, marginalization and inequality

Box 3 - Modern slavery, irregular migration and development

The recent dramatic rise in irregular migration into Europe and within South-East Asia has led to growing alarm about the role of organized criminal enterprises in migrant smuggling and human trafficking. In October 2015, the UN Security Council even authorized states and international organizations to use force to interrupt such activities in the Mediterranean, and to confiscate vessels suspected on reasonable grounds of involvement in these activities.^{lxxvi}

International law differentiates between human smuggling and human trafficking.^{lxxvii} The latter occurs only when individuals are being transported for the purpose of exploitation. There is thus a considerable overlap between human trafficking and modern slavery. In practice, however, it can be difficult for intervening authorities to know before intercepting a vessel or vehicle whether the people it carries are being transported for the purpose of exploitation – that is, whether they are being voluntarily ‘smuggled’ or involuntarily ‘trafficked’. In fact, even if individuals set out on what they believe is voluntary migration, they may discover, along the way or upon arrival, that they are subject to illegal exploitation—and are thus the victims of human trafficking.^{lxxviii} Even apparently safe migration routes can ultimately turn out to be slavery traps.

Yet overly restrictive approaches to migration actually risk exacerbating modern slavery, by pushing refugees and other migrants towards clandestine transportation options, and excluding them from the protections of the law.^{lxxix} Safe, regular migration routes protect not only migrants but also the state’s interests, because they ensure predictability and improve efficient labour market management.^{lxxx} Moreover, safe, regulated migration appears likely to be a faster way to stem migration crises, because it increases remittances back to source communities, helping to address the structural drivers of migration.^{lxxxi} Ensuring safe and regular migration is not only a question of effective regulation of migration routes and recruiting networks, but also entails effective regulation of the workplaces in which migrants labour – including in household and domestic labour.

Anti-slavery is smart development policy

In adopting SDG 8.7, states have committed to a development model that eschews reliance on modern slavery. (See further Box 4 below.) Getting states to live up to this commitment in practice will be a challenge, not least because some government officials appear to believe that forced labour remains a valid short-cut to national development. This may in part be due to the long-standing—but mistaken—belief that slavery was the source of the development of the trans-Atlantic^{lxxxii} and Western colonial^{lxxxiii} economies. Slavery was undoubtedly not only a source of labour inputs, but also, in the US, an important factor in financial markets, providing an important form of rent-creating capital against which banks and distant financiers could lend, borrow and speculate.^{lxxxiv} Yet there

is increasing scholarly evidence that slavery is today—and in fact always has been—a *drag* on development, including on both sides of the Atlantic.^{lxxxv} Indeed, in the US, slavery proved to be such an extreme and divisive form of inequality that a civil war was fought over it, at huge cost to that country's physical, human and financial capital stocks. It was arguably only when the southern states' political economies were liberated from dependence on slave-holding that the full power of the American consumer and capital markets was unleashed. Slavery was, it turns out, a drag on US economic development, while fighting slavery proved a boon. The economic logic that drives slavery holds only if we do not factor in the long-term costs of slavery at the enterprise, community and national economic level.^{lxxxvi}



Box 4 – The Sustainable Development Goals and modern slavery

On 25 September 2015, world leaders met at the UN Headquarters and adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, a far-reaching plan of action to promote a peaceful and prosperous planet.^{lxxxvii} The 2030 Agenda includes 17 Sustainable Development Goals, several of which relate to modern slavery.

The Preamble of the 2030 Agenda states clearly that “no one will be left behind”. In target 7 of Sustainable Development Goal 8 (SDG 8.7), states committed to:

Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms.

Several other Sustainable Development Goals also relate directly or indirectly to anti-slavery efforts, including:

- SDG 1.4, expanding social protection programmes
- SDG 4.1, committing to universal primary and secondary education
- SDG 5.2, committing to eliminate human trafficking and sexual and other exploitation
- SDG 5.3, committing to eliminate child, early and forced marriage
- SDG 8.3, encouraging formalization of informal work, including through improved access to financial services
- SDG 8.5, committing to decent work for all
- SDG 8.8, committing to promote labour rights and safe and secure working environments
- SDG 10, on reducing inequality, especially 10.7 on safe, regular, and responsible migration
- SDG 14.4, on ending illegal fishing
- SDG 16.2, on ending abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children
- SDG 16.3, committing to ensure equal access to justice for all
- SDG 16.4, aiming to combat all forms of organized crime
- SDG 16.9, on providing legal identity for all, including birth registration
- SDG 16.10, committing to protect fundamental freedoms.

And Goal 17 commits States to “enhance policy coherence”, to supporting “multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in all countries, in particular developing countries”, and to “[e]ncourage and promote effective public, public-private and civil society partnerships”.

That \$150 billion that the ILO estimates is generated by way of annual profits from forced labour is, in effect, stolen from workers: were it to pass to them instead, it would contribute to larger net consumer spending and saving, public tax revenues, increased productivity, and higher economic growth. The presence of slaves actually seems to pull down other workers' wages and productivity.^{lxxxviii} Slaves are, as Datta and Bales put it, "unwilling agents of economic stagnation".^{lxxxix} There are signs that the incidence of slavery is negatively correlated with both economic growth and human development.^{xc} As a 2009 paper commissioned by the World Bank's Social Protection & Labour area explains, modern slavery creates a critical obstacle to development because the monopsony (single labour purchaser) power of employers leads to wages being set below the marginal value product of labour and to an inefficient allocation of labour.^{xcii} If slaves were fairly employed in decent work, everyone would be better off.

Research is also revealing how slavery creates other social and indirect economic costs. Slavery imposes significant physical and mental health costs on its victims.^{xcii} Survivors appear to suffer disproportionately from depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder, reducing productivity and increasing health-care burdens and vulnerability to being re-trafficked.^{xciii} Children who are exploited, and consequently excluded from education, have poorer future earning—and spending—potential. Evidence suggests that in many countries, the majority of children in illegal domestic work situations were children of mothers who had been in the same situation, which might imply that child exploitation—and the resulting social harms—is an inter-generational phenomenon.^{xciv} In other words, as many African and Latin American states can appreciate, it is not only current slavery, but the legacy of historical slavery, that can impact current economic performance.

There is also growing attention to the correlation between the use of forced labour and slavery, on the one hand, and environmental destruction, on the other. Pope Francis has drawn attention to the connections between the global economy's disregard for the well-being of the natural environment and the well-being of workers, explicitly calling for collective action against modern slavery.^{xcv} In a forthcoming book, Professor Kevin Bales points out that

weak regulation in the mining, logging and fishery sectors generates violations of both environmental and labour standards, and argues that industries relying on modern slavery have carbon emissions on the scale of those of the US and China.^{xcvi}

Put simply: we all bear the costs of slavery. As the General Assembly periodically acknowledges in the opening paragraph of its resolutions on human trafficking, trafficking not only "constitutes an offence and a serious threat to human dignity and physical integrity" and human rights, but also "to development".^{xcvii} As long ago as 2000, the ILO argued that "Elimination of forced labour is part of sustainable development."^{xcviii}

Anti-slavery is, in other words, smart development policy. Victims benefit; law-abiding businesses and employers escape the unfair competition that slavery implies; and governments and societies get access to increased spending power, tax income, and reduced negative health and environmental externalities.^{xcix}

Anti-slavery as a collective action problem

If everyone benefits from anti-slavery, that only deepens the mystery as to why slavery persists. The answer is ultimately not an economic, but a political one: slavery is a manifestation of inequality, sustained by a range of vested bureaucratic, political and business interests—unscrupulous business profiteering, police corruption, rentier behaviour—that have in some cases become entrenched in extractive political and social institutions.^c Those vested interests are hard to challenge, and even harder to displace.

The US State Department estimates there are only around 10,000 prosecutions for human trafficking-related offences (including sex trafficking) worldwide, annually—and this appears to dwarf the number of prosecutions for other types of slavery.^{ci} In other words, even if we take the (lower) estimate of 20.9 million slaves worldwide, and assume, generously, that each prosecution addresses five victims, only around 0.2 per cent of all slavery cases worldwide lead to prosecutions annually. A recent case involving the arrest of a US-Belgian businessman for trial in Belgium for enslavement during the Sierra Leone civil war appears to be the first national prosecution of enslavement since World War Two.^{cii} And state

sovereignty limits the reach of international supervisory mechanisms, such as the UN Human Rights Council and the International Labour Organization, discussed further in Part 2.

The economic and socio-political factors driving slavery are thus reinforcing. Slavery exists where the costs of slavery are externalized onto victims, families and communities (and their environments), who cannot protect themselves, because governance is weak and the rule of law diluted, if present at all.^{ciii} These conditions may be met in surprising places: not only in ISIS-run slave markets, Congolese mines, South Asian brick kilns or the Brazilian charcoal industry, for example, but also, as we saw earlier, in global garment supply-chains, transnational domestic worker recruiting networks, British bed-making factories, or American agriculture. The development challenges posed by slavery are, like the rest of the 2030 Agenda, universal ones.

Unshackling development through anti-slavery efforts is thus a complex global collective action problem. The challenge is to identify, organize and allocate the payoffs at the individual, enterprise, community, national and global levels to be reaped from ending slavery in ways that convince those with vested interests to bear the short-term costs they will incur. As Nick Grono, the CEO of The Freedom Fund, a global anti-slavery philanthropy (and supporter of this report) has put it, “Tackling slavery means not only stripping the criminals of their illegal profits, but persuading governments that an investment in ending slavery will return massive dividends.”^{civ}

Slavery is a drag on development

We have the keys to unshackle development

The initial costs of a global partnership to end slavery will thus be substantial. They are not only the costs of intervention programmes themselves, but also potentially the costs of compensation for those who lose out in the short-term from the transformation (i.e. the vested interests), the costs of rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors, and the costs of structural adjustment (such as capital reallocation and changes in labour and capital productivity). Kevin Bales, for example, has calculated that an effective compensation programme in Mauritania—one of the poorest countries on earth, but also one of the countries with the largest per capita slavery population—would cost around \$176 million, or 16 per cent of GDP.^{cv} (Still, this likely offers an upper bound, in terms of the impact of the end of slavery on a national economy.) This points to a need to take anti-slavery seriously as a large-scale *development* project—a central part of the Sustainable Development Agenda—involving development actors such as public and private donors, multilateral development banks and development finance agencies.^{cvi}

Yet, as we shall see in Part 2, to date development actors have been all but absent from anti-slavery efforts. OECD countries appear to spend just \$124 million annually—less than 1 per cent of their development spending, and less than 0.08 per cent of the \$150 billion that the ILO estimates forced labour generates in annual profits—on development-related anti-slavery efforts. And roughly 75 per cent of this amount appears to come from just three donors—Japan, Norway and the US.^{cvi} There are exceptions to this traditional separation of development and anti-slavery efforts. In Pakistan, the ILO has co-operated with the government to incorporate action against bonded labour into development and poverty reduction programmes.^{cvi} In India, the “convergence approach” developed by the ILO and Indian government in Tamil Nadu aims to facilitate access by informal brick kiln and rice mill workers to social security schemes, lifting them permanently out of the cycle of poverty and indebtedness. In Brazil, a ‘National Pact for the Eradication of Slave Labour’ was launched in 2005, which involves, amongst other things, joint action by the government, the ILO, several think-tanks and civil society organizations, and Brazilian and multinational companies to maintain slavery-free supply chains and develop communities

affected by slavery. But these exceptions prove the rule: most development work is not designed with anti-slavery in mind.

Fortunately, however, existing anti-slavery efforts have already revealed a great deal about what kinds of strategic interventions can transform incentive structures to make the payoffs from abandoning slavery outstrip the perceived benefits from keeping it. We have the keys to unshackle development. These include community-based resilience and prevention models;^{cxix} behavioural change models;^{cx} demand-side interventions;^{cxii} and national action plans.^{cxiii} Extensive work has been done in each of these areas, which it is beyond the scope of this report to cover. We know that a range of policy interventions have the potential not only to disrupt slavery, but also to prevent it, for example by improving access to: education; credit; food security; health care (to protect against sudden household income shocks); land; wage regulation; women's rights; safe migration and recruitment; and rehabilitation services.^{cxiii} The keys to SDG 8.7 are thus closely related to—or in some cases the same as—the keys to meeting a range of other goals and targets in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. (See Box 4 above.)

We know, too, that neither government regulation nor private compliance initiatives will on their own ensure effective protection of workers' rights in an era of decentralized, globalized production. Instead what is needed is effective *partnership*.^{cxiv} Private initiatives are, empirically, more effective in contexts where public law is respected and strongly enforced; public regulation is more effective when it is amplified through private resources and leverage.^{cxv} The challenge, as Professor Richard Locke points out, is to ensure that public and private efforts are complementary.^{cxvi}

National-level programming seems likely to be more effective if embedded in initiatives that involve global brands and retailers in changing incentives for suppliers. In Cambodia, for example, where government regulation of labour standards remains spotty, increased compliance with ILO standards in recent years appears to have been driven by reputation-conscious global buyers operating in the context of a partnership framework enabled by co-operation amongst the Cambodian government, foreign governments, and the ILO.^{cxvii} In the Dominican Republic, private auditors and state labour regulators have reinforced each other's efforts through sharing data and reinforcing each other's authority, even as they have delineated different areas of regulatory jurisdiction.^{cxviii} In Brazil, labour inspectors and public prosecutors have worked with individual firms, banks, trade associations and local governments to pull multiple regulatory levers.^{cxix} And in Bangladesh, as explored in Box 5, below, global garment brands and unions worked together with political support from the OECD and its Member States, to develop effective fire and safety regulation in the wake of the Rana Plaza tragedy. These examples all point to an important role for multilateral actors in brokering and catalyzing effective international action, through meaningful, values-based partnerships.

The development challenges posed by slavery are, like the rest of the 2030 Agenda, universal ones

Box 5 - Brokering partnership after the Rana Plaza tragedy

One example of how multilateral institutions can use their convening power to broker effective partnerships to protect workers is the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh. The Accord was negotiated in the immediate aftermath of the Rana Plaza building collapse that led to the death of 1,134 people and injured more than 2,000. It is a legally binding five-year agreement between global garment brands and retailers and trade unions, designed to build a safe and healthy working environment in Bangladesh's garment industry, through independent inspections, public disclosures, buyer-supported remediation, free association and worker empowerment initiatives.

The Accord built on negotiations that were already under way between local and global unions and global buyers, in which the German development agency, GIZ, had been involved. Once the Accord was reached, the OECD provided important political support. The Rana Plaza disaster had such a profound effect in Europe that OECD Member State governments were looking for a way to encourage global brands to organize effective workplace safety arrangements. Against that political backdrop, the OECD signalled its support for the Accord, and its willingness proactively to use its existing complaints mechanisms (a system of National Contact Points) to encourage OECD Member States to look at their own companies' due diligence in this area, in line with existing OECD guidance, itself based on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. While OECD engagement did not lead directly to signatures of the Accord, it helped to create political momentum behind the Accord. The Belgian, Canadian, Dutch, French, Italian and UK NCPs all took unusually proactive steps to analyze challenges in their textile and garment supply chains and promote due diligence by global buyers operating in this industry; the Belgian NCP published a 2-page document that suggested an expectation for Belgian companies sourcing from Bangladesh to sign up to the Accord. The OECD's Global Forum on Responsible Business Conduct also provided a forum for discussion amongst Accord signatories and stakeholders. States, the ILO and other actors then put pressure on the relevant companies to provide compensation—which led to serious company engagement—and the establishment of a Trust Fund, chaired by the ILO, with some \$30 million under management.^{cxiii}

Again, fortunately, there are also growing signs of mobilization in both the public and private sectors. A growing number of governments have adopted national action plans against human trafficking, in part in response to mobilization through the UN General Assembly.^{cxv} In Brazil, major inroads have been made against forced labour over the last decade through a concerted programme of labour inspections, blacklisting, and social protection efforts—though this has not been without resistance from vested interests.^{cxvi} In 2014, the UK government adopted a *Modern Slavery Act* and published a Modern Slavery Strategy that sets out a whole-of-government approach to tackling slavery.^{cxvii} The UK government has just issued guidance on transparency in supply chains and requires all UK businesses with a turnover of more than £36 million to issue annual statements relating to their steps to address slavery and human trafficking.^{cxviii} In the US a bipartisan initiative in Congress is establishing a public-private Global Fund to End Modern Slavery, which aims to raise and spend at least \$1.5 billion by 2022 (discussed further below). At the ILO, in June 2014 states adopted a new Protocol to and Recommendation on Forced Labour focused on prevention, protection of victims, and remedy, extending due diligence expectations to the supply-chain, and a campaign has been launched to achieve 50 ratifications by 2018. Niger recently became the first party to the Protocol. Slavery issues are also receiving growing attention in human rights bodies and international criminal tribunals.^{cxix} And on 2 December 2014, religious leaders representing Anglican, Buddhist, Catholic, Hindu, Islamic, Jewish and Orthodox faiths issued an historic *Declaration of Religious Leaders against Modern Slavery* at the Vatican.

The challenge in all of this, however, is one of international organization: mobilizing and strategically allocating the resources, including political leverage, needed to sustain this complex transformation. Sustained leadership will be needed to ensure political and business actors invest the energy and financing needed to unlock the development pay-offs from anti-slavery, and to sustain reforms in the face of vested interests and market resistance. And effective partnership is needed to join up the dispersed leverage that can ensure strategic interaction with spoilers. In the DRC, for example, effective action against forced labour in the artisanal mining sector has required the involvement not only of actors on the ground, but also

foreign development actors, the UN Security Council, and even the US Securities Commission.^{cxix}

All of this points to a key role for multilateral actors— notably the UN—in driving systemic change, by providing a political framework for collaboration, and by providing access to know-how, resources and delivery mechanisms. In Part 2 we consider whether the multilateral system is well organized to play this role, and in Part 3 we consider how a more effective global partnership to end modern slavery could be organized.



2. Multilateral action against slavery

“Like apartheid and poverty, slavery is not natural. It is man-made and it can be overcome and eradicated by the actions of human beings.”

Nelson Mandela^{cxix}

From integrated action to fragmentation

Multilateral action against slavery, forced labour and human trafficking was, at the outset, quite integrated. It is only in recent decades that it has been split into three distinct tracks: human rights, labour standards and criminal justice. That process happened organically—more by accident than by design.^{cxvxi} But as we see in this Part, the result is that multilateral efforts against slavery are now highly fragmented, with little effort made at strategic coordination, let alone integration. Anti-slavery considerations are largely absent from mainstream development programming, peace and security initiatives, trade regulation and, as we explore in a companion report, international criminal justice. Each silo within the multilateral system has its own focus, governance arrangements, resources and political coalitions. As a result, the UN system's anti-slavery efforts are not systematic: they are, on the contrary, fragmented, at times overlapping, and at times perhaps even competing.^{cxvxi}

Anti-slavery as a problem of international organization

Intergovernmental action against slavery began in 1815 with the adoption of a *Declaration Relative to the Universal Abolition of the Slave Trade* in the wake of Napoleon's second defeat.^{cxviii} The Declaration provided the basis for the creation of international admiralty courts backed by the UK, France, The Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and the United States, sitting in Freetown (Sierra Leone), Luanda (now in Angola), Cape Town (now in South Africa), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), Paramaribo (Suriname), Kingston (Jamaica) and even New York (USA), to adjudicate cases of alleged slave trading.^{cxviii} As we explore further in the companion report to this one, *Fighting Modern Slavery: What Role for International Criminal Justice?*, this experience has been followed by a succession of efforts to enforce anti-slavery norms through international courts, notably in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and, most recently, the International Criminal Court.^{cxv} But the formal abolition of slavery in international law was never matched in practice, and always sat uneasily alongside widespread colonial use of indentured and forced labour.^{cxvii}

In the wake of the First World War, the problem of slavery and forced labour was handled primarily through the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League

of Nations in Geneva. This group of experts—most of them former senior colonial administrators—was tasked with supervising the rule of territories 'mandated' to the victorious powers. The Commission proved an unexpectedly diligent interrogator of the mandate powers' use of slavery and forced labour, monitoring their behaviour and publicizing shortcomings.^{cxvii} This led, in turn, to the creation in 1924 of a special Temporary Slavery Commission to inquire into slavery, a group of seven independent experts (one representing the new International Labour Organization) that took a number of ground-breaking steps against slavery.^{cxviii} The Temporary Slavery Commission recommended that nations not be permitted to join the League unless they took steps against slavery, and suggested sending a League commission to inquire into the facts regarding a League member that appeared to be tolerating slavery. It also took an integrated approach to slavery, addressing slavery, debt bondage, forced labour, servile marriage and child exploitation. And it was upon the Temporary Slavery Commission's recommendation that the League of Nations adopted—in 1926—the first global Slavery Convention. Drafts of the Slavery Convention initially took strong action not only against chattel slavery, but also against forced labour. But by the end of the negotiation, after interventions by Portugal and other colonial powers, this had been watered down to a commitment to "endeavour progressively and as soon as possible" to end forced labour.^{cxvix} Instead, the question of forced labour was broken off and directed towards the new International Labour Organization (ILO).

The ILO, also established in Geneva, was likewise a product of the Treaty of Versailles that followed the First World War, and was closely affiliated to the League, even funded from the same budget. The ILO was, in a sense, the first global multi-stakeholder partnership, since it included representatives not only from national governments, but also employer and worker interests, gathering in an annual International Labour Conference (ILC). To this day, the ILO provides a powerful forum for negotiating international labour standards and conventions. Between 1927 and 1930, at the invitation of the League, an ILC-appointed committee of experts explored the problems of forced and indentured labour—the first examination by the ILO of labour protection in the colonial, as opposed to industrialized, context. This led to the first Forced Labour Convention (No. 29) of 1930, and two complementary

Recommendations, which aimed to immediately prohibit private forced labour and phase out public forced labour, with exceptions related to military service, minor community services, normal civic obligations, emergencies and prison labour under certain conditions.^{cxl}

The Forced Labour Convention is today amongst the most-ratified of all ILO Conventions, and the elimination of forced labour is one of four fundamental principles and rights at work that states have, since 1998, recognized as universally applicable, regardless of ratification.^{cxli} The ILO Forced Labour Convention defines “forced and compulsory labour” as “all work or service that is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.” It is thus technically wider than—but may include—slavery as defined in the 1926 Slavery Convention, since it does not necessarily *require* the victim to be treated as an object of ownership. As we explore in our companion report on international criminal justice, slavery is however increasingly understood to arise even where only some ‘powers’ of ownership are exercised, and even if they are exercised only temporarily. As a result, the difference between slavery, forced labour and human trafficking is often slight in practice, while important in law.

The same trend—pulling back towards an integrated understanding of slavery and forced labour, as originally conceived in the League of Nations—is also evident in the practice of the ILO itself, particularly through the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR).^{cxlii} The CEACR, established in 1926, supervises conventions through regular dialogue with states—similar in some ways to the processes developed later in the UN human rights context.^{cxliii} It comprises 20 independent jurists appointed for a three-year term. They make detailed comments on progress in countries through published observations or unpublished direct requests, which can be discussed by the tripartite (state, employer, worker) ILC committee devoted to this purpose. CEACR also occasionally conducts General Surveys—beginning, for forced labour, in 1962, and most recently in 2012. Until the 1970s, CEACR attention focused on forced labour levied by public authorities in colonial contexts. But steadily it began to expand its focus to include private forced and bonded labour, beginning with Liberia, India and Pakistan in the mid-1970s.^{cxliiv} A related ILO Commission of Inquiry in the

1980s explored public and private actors’ violations arising from the recruitment of Haitian workers for the sugar cane harvest in the Dominican Republic.^{cxliv} And starting with an examination of Mauritania in 1982, the CEACR began to treat allegations of slavery as allegations of forced labour within its purview.^{cxlvi} In the 1980s it considered “slave labour” in Brazil, *restavek* forced child domestic labour in Haiti, trafficking and prostitution of children in Thailand, and the imposition of slavery by African rebel groups.^{cxlvii}

The ILO also remains a forceful promoter of respect for anti-forced-labour and anti-slavery norms in other ways. The ILO Special Action Programme on Forced Labour, established in 2002, works with 15 countries, and through regional programmes, to develop national strategies against forced labour in the informal economy and trafficking in human beings within countries or across borders. This includes capacity-building for labour inspectorates and labour dispute settlement systems, and developing interventions adapted to specific economic sectors known to be vulnerable to forced labour, with priority given to agriculture and food processing, fishing, manufacturing and domestic work.^{cxlviii} In its first decade it received about \$16 million in core funding, mainly from western donors, and undertook almost \$37 million of programming over 59 projects.^{cxlix} For the 2014–2015 biennium, the ILO budget for work on forced labour was \$11.5 million, while the budget for work on child labour was around \$90.5 million.^{cl}

A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour initiated by the ILO in 2005 in partnership with the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) and International Organization of Employers (IOE) led to the creation of a network of more than 150 trade union focal-points, and links to other key civil society organizations, such as Anti-Slavery International. That in turn led to increased attention by trade unions to forced labour issues, with responses ranging from court action to outreach to union representation.^{cli} For its part, the IOE, which comprises 150 national employers’ organizations, developed Ten Principles for Business Leaders to Combat Forced Labour and Trafficking, and became active on the issue through codes of conduct and engagement at the national and company level. This initiative also proved important in the development of the newly adopted 2014 Protocol to and Recommendation on the 1930 Forced Labour Convention, which emphasizes prevention, protection, remedies, and

Member State encouragement of corporate due diligence, deliberately aligned with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Niger recently became the first party to this Protocol.

Perhaps the most forceful action taken by the ILO in relation to slavery, however, was the appointment in the mid-1990s of another Commission of Inquiry to examine the compliance of Myanmar with the forced labour conventions.^{cliii} The Commission found violations and affirmed that these gave rise to individual criminal liability.^{cliiii} Myanmar, which did not respond positively, was suspended by the International Labour Conference the following year.

The problem of supervision

For some fifty years, until the mid-1970s, the ILO's CEACR was the only effective global supervisory mechanism able to call governments out for tolerance of slavery. The 1926 Slavery Convention did not include a monitoring mechanism, a factor that is frequently cited as a constraint on UN anti-slavery efforts.^{cliv} The League of Nations created two different advisory Committees of Experts (including an ILO expert) to examine implementation of the Convention, the first of which even discussed financial and development assistance from the League to Member States struggling to implement the Convention, notably Ethiopia. But these supervisory exercises were watered down, and ultimately nobbled, by interference from colonial states.^{clv} Suzanne Miers, the preeminent historian of multilateral action against slavery, concludes that the League struggled to effectively co-ordinate anti-slavery efforts, missing opportunities to take advantage of the other available supervisory instruments, for example by failing to capitalize on evidence its health section developed about child labour in Chinese mines.^{clvi}

In the lead up to, during and after the Second World War, the commitment of Member States to the abolition of forced labour was shaken. Forced labour was a feature of Nazi German penal practice and military occupation, and also became prevalent in *gulags* across the Soviet Union. Efforts to eradicate slavery through the UN became, as much else in that period, battlefronts in larger Cold War campaigns.^{clvii} In 1949, the Western and Soviet blocs agreed to set up a joint UN-ILO *ad hoc* committee to investigate forced labour, under the leadership of the Indian diplomat Ramaswami Mudaliar, which was expected

to focus on penal labour in the Eastern bloc countries, but instead reopened the debate on forced labour in colonial territories.^{clviii} This led in time to the ILO's second Forced Labour Convention, of 1957, focused on the use of forced labour for political and development purposes. In parallel, the UN set up an *ad hoc* committee on slavery, which led in 1953 to the UN 'taking over' the League of Nations 1926 Slavery Convention, a Secretary-General's report^{clix} and, in 1956, despite Cold War antagonisms, the adoption of a new, supplementary Convention addressing debt bondage, serfdom, forced marriage and child exploitation.

The 1956 United Nations Supplementary Convention explicitly acknowledges the possibility that the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) may discuss country situations and make "further recommendations for the eradication of slavery".^{clx} In 1963 ECOSOC appointed a Special Rapporteur, Dr Mohammed Awad, an Egyptian academic, who produced an important global analysis.^{clxi} Awad pointed out a fact that remains largely true fifty years later: UN agencies were not integrating anti-slavery considerations into their work.^{clxii} He proposed the creation of a permanent committee to encourage Member State action, promote best practices, and integrate anti-slavery into the work of UN agencies. Although the proposal found support from the UK, it was opposed by both the US and USSR, and was defeated when representatives of Algeria, Gabon, Iraq and Tanzania suggested that slavery instead be referred to ECOSOC's Commission on Human Rights, and studied together with the "slavery-like" practices of apartheid and colonialism.^{clxiii} ECOSOC, in turn, delegated the matter to a Sub-Commission of independent experts which met for only a few weeks each year, had only advisory power, and considered allegations against governments only in private. In 1968, acting on recommendations from the Sub-Commission, ECOSOC encouraged UN specialized agencies to consider how to assist women and girls freed from slavery, specifically designating human trafficking as a form of slavery.^{clxiv}

This theme was further developed by Awad, who had been appointed as a Special Rapporteur on slavery by the Sub-Commission. He explored potential action by UNESCO, ILO, the World Health Organization and even Interpol, but found all of them resistant to applying their resources and methods to the problem of slavery.^{clxv} Awad recognized that many states were reluctant to admit their own problems in tackling slavery, and suggested that this

dynamic would only change if they were offered financial and technical assistance. Foreshadowing more recent proposals for a global partnership and pooled funding facilities, Awad suggested that the UN solicit proposals from states and then prepare a five-year technical co-operation programme to assist Member States. He was, in other words, proposing to treat anti-slavery as a development assistance problem.

External actors such as the non-governmental Anti-Slavery Society continued to complain that there was nobody in the UN to look to for action, or even to collect information on slavery.^{clxvi} Eventually in 1974, ECOSOC agreed to appoint a Working Group on Slavery, which later became the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, which met for three days every other year.^{clxvii} It was made up of five members, one from each of the UN's regional voting blocs, without an investigative role and with purely advisory powers.^{clxviii} Its constant turn-over in personnel hampered its work, but from the outset the group made clear its intent to consider slavery, human trafficking and forced labour issues together, and soon also began considering child labour and exploitation issues.^{clxix} In 1977, the UN Secretariat appointed an official to support the Working Group—the first time since 1939 that there had been an international official with such a mandate. But the terms of the appointment were symbolic of the UN's commitment: it was a part-time role.^{clxx}

In the 1980s the Working Group came to be seen both as a place where challenges in addressing slavery could be discussed and explored, and as largely ineffectual in promoting solutions to those challenges, notably because it continued to lack a formal mandate to implement the key anti-slavery conventions, even through the kind of dialectic approach used in the ILO's CEACR.^{clxxi} Multiple proposals to create a Special Rapporteur position, an emergency procedures position, or to otherwise reform the Working Group's working methods all came and went.^{clxxii} As the Cold War wound down, however, room for entrepreneurial manoeuvre at the UN grew, and the Working Group began to explore more expansive themes. One such initiative encouraging the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practices during armed conflict paved the way for important subsequent action on these topics in the International Criminal Court and the UN Security

Council.^{clxxiii} The Working Group's Programmes of Action, on topics including the exploitation of child labour and the prevention of trafficking in persons, proved, however, to be paper-chases, as they often took several years to pass through the UN approval processes, on to states for comment, and back to the Working Group for consideration.^{clxxiv}

The human rights track has nonetheless remained an important forum for continued international monitoring and discussion of slavery issues. Numerous UN human rights treaty bodies have considered aspects of modern slavery. The Human Rights Committee—which oversees states' compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—has considered matters relating to forced or compulsory labour^{clxxv} and prison labour.^{clxxvi} It has touched on matters relating to slavery in making numerous country observations.^{clxxvii} The Committee Against Torture has considered slavery, sexual slavery, trafficking and forced labour issues in the context of discussions on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Italy, Japan, Mauritania and Peru. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women has considered trafficking and sexual slavery in several different General Recommendations, and in country examinations. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has raised slavery and forced labour issues in considering Bolivia, Ghana, Mauritania and Venezuela's compliance with their treaty obligations. And similar issues have also been raised by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Committee on the Rights of the Child, which has also paid particular attention to forced marriage and child labour concerns.^{clxxviii} Recently the Human Rights Council itself moved to condemn child, early, and forced marriage.^{clxxix}

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) plays a key role in the UN human rights machinery, supporting intergovernmental human rights bodies and special procedures dealing with slavery, trafficking, child prostitution and the broader question of business and human rights.^{clxxx} But its limited resources constrain its ability to monitor slavery hotspots and to sustain engagement, even in those places with which the UN's human rights machinery has engaged. The intergovernmental processes it has supported have, however, promoted discussions of anti-slavery issues that

engaged not only Member States and civil society organizations, but also, increasingly, UN agencies themselves. Development-oriented agencies, in particular, became more involved, including the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (which began to focus more on rural debt bondage), WHO (which engaged on questions of the health of servile populations, in particular in relation to the spread of AIDS), UNESCO (on human trafficking) and UNICEF (on child labour).^{clxxxix}

Numerous UN entities play awareness-raising, normative and operational roles relating to certain aspects of modern slavery. UNICEF has played a prominent role in fighting child labour by supporting the 2010 Roadmap for achieving the elimination of the worst forms of child labour by 2016,^{clxxxii} and its follow-up 2013 Brasilia Declaration on Child Labour,^{clxxxiii} which provides guidance for an integrated response to child labour. It is deeply involved in efforts to strengthen understanding of child labour, and to promote efforts by the private sector to eliminate child labour.^{clxxxiv} It works closely with ILO to develop harmonized survey modules for use in the UNICEF-supported Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) and the surveys carried out by the ILO Statistical Information and Monitoring Programme on Child Labour (SIMPOC). It is also launching a new Global Partnership to End Violence against Children, discussed further in Part 3. GPEVAC aims to seize the opportunity presented by the commitment in Agenda 2030 to end violence against children in all its forms, including abuse, exploitation, trafficking and torture. GPEVAC aims to bring together actors from different sectors such as health, education and child protection, providing a platform for information and practice sharing. This will include some actors working directly on child slavery.

Action against slavery, forced labour and human trafficking was, at the outset, quite integrated

The International Office for Migration (IOM), not formally part of the UN system, has conducted a range of counter-trafficking activities, ranging from prevention campaigns to government and civil-society capacity-building. It conducts quantitative and qualitative research on human trafficking and increasingly focuses on collecting and analyzing data on human trafficking from a regional perspective to better support co-operation between states. The IOM Global Human Trafficking Database is a standardized counter-trafficking data management tool, the largest global database with primary data on victims of trafficking.^{clxxxv} The IOM is also pioneering a Global Migration Data Analysis Centre in Berlin tasked with using big data to study migration patterns and issues.



From human rights to criminal justice

In September 2007 the UN Human Rights Council decided to appoint a Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and its consequences, to replace the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery.^{clxxxvi} This followed a recommendation to this effect in 2002 in an influential document commissioned from David Weissbrodt and Anti-Slavery International.^{clxxxvii} The first mandate-holder was Ms Gulnara Shahinian (Armenia), who held the mandate until 2014, when she was replaced by Ms Urmila Bhoola (South Africa), who has indicated her intent to focus primarily on human rights abuses in the labour context, reflecting the tradition of the UN understanding slavery in a holistic context. Shahinian's reports focused on forced labour, domestic servitude, child slavery, servile marriage and lessons from combatting contemporary forms of slavery.^{clxxxviii} Bhoola has to date focused on eradicating slavery from supply chains.^{clxxxix} Between them, the two holders of the post have so far mounted visits to ten countries,^{cx} and engaged in correspondence on specific cases of concern with five.^{cxci}

When the first Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery was appointed, she was asked to “[f]ocus principally on aspects of contemporary forms of slavery which are not covered by existing mandates of the Human Rights Council”.^{cxcii} The resolution also stressed the importance of co-ordinating with other human rights mandates and mechanisms. This reflected the fact that there was already, since 1990, a Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography,^{cxciiii} and since 2004, a Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons.^{cxciiv} The anti-trafficking role has been held by Ms Sigma Huda (Bangladesh), Ms Joy Ezeilo (Nigeria) and Ms Maria-Grazia Giammarinari (Italy, since 2014). While the mandates of the three Special Rapporteurs might appear to overlap, the continued maintenance of the different roles reflects the fact that each receives support from a number of Member States. It also reflects the extent to which a distinct discourse, set of practices, institutions and interests have sprung up around human trafficking over the last two decades, separate from—and often over-shadowing—broader anti-slavery concerns.

Both the ECOSOC and ILO-based actions against slavery in the twentieth century responded to intergovernmental conventions designed to address systemic practices and institutions of slavery, rather than address individual criminal cases.^{ccv} They had focused on regulation and prevention, rather than prosecution or victim protection, although they did signal that penal sanctions should flow from slavery or forced labour. In 2000, however, motivated in part by concerns over the rise in irregular migration and organized crime following the fall of the Iron Curtain, the General Assembly adopted a UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), and two separate protocols intended to facilitate international criminal co-operation to repress human smuggling (i.e. organized, international, irregular migration) and human trafficking (movement for the purpose of exploitation, including slavery, practices similar to slavery, forced labour and servitude, the exploitation of the prostitution of others and other forms of sexual exploitation as well as the removal of organs). UNTOC and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN Trafficking Protocol) focus on responding to organized crime, rather than dealing with vulnerabilities in the licit, globalized economy, or addressing slavery in the context of development.

Promotion and implementation of the UN Trafficking Protocol is led primarily by UNODC, which has emerged as a major source of innovation, knowledge and capacity-building assistance for Member States. A Conference of States Parties to UNTOC is also increasingly involved in treaty interpretation and discussion.^{ccvi} UNODC engages with Member States and working-level practitioners to provide legislative assistance, strategic planning and policy development, and technical assistance for strengthened criminal justice responses. Its projected budget for work in this area in 2014–2015 was \$22.89 million, roughly double the ILO's budget for work on forced labour.^{ccvii}

The upswing in resources for anti-trafficking activities has also pulled other actors in this direction. For example in 2002, the High Commissioner for Human Rights issued *Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking*,^{ccviii} effectively endorsed by the Human Rights Council in June 2010.^{ccix} In 2010 the UN General Assembly adopted a United Nations Global Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons.^{cc} This

aims to promote universal ratification of UNTOC and the Trafficking Protocol, help Member States “reinforce their political commitments and legal obligations” to prevent and combat human trafficking, promote effective and human-rights based response, raise awareness and foster co-operation. The Plan of Action focuses particularly on the role of the criminal justice sector in preventing and combating human trafficking, but is not limited to criminal justice responses. It tasked UNODC to publish a biennial *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons* summarizing information received from States about cases of trafficking in persons reported in their territory, and created a new UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Victims of Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, parallel to an existing UN trust fund assisting victims of slavery (both discussed below).

Is slavery a problem of international peace and security?

Most cases of modern slavery will not be handled through the UN Security Council. The Security Council tends to deal with organized crime and trafficking issues only where: 1) the issue relates to an item already on the Security Council's agenda (usually an already war-torn state); that state lacks both 2) law enforcement capacity and 3) political patrons on the Council who would prevent Council action; and 4) the interests of the five Permanent Members of the Council are activated, but 5) do not conflict. Most instances of modern slavery fall well short of meeting these tests.^{cci}

However, some cases do meet these tests. In recent years, the Council has several times tasked experts with developing corporate due diligence obligations to remove conflict resources—often produced by forced labour—from global supply chains. It has taken this approach in DRC in 2010,^{ccii} Eritrea in 2011,^{cciii} and Somalia in 2012.^{cciv} More recently, in October 2015 the Security Council adopted Resolution 2240, authorizing member states and international organizations to disrupt migrant smuggling and “human trafficking” by organized criminal enterprises off the coast of Libya, and even to confiscate vessels suspected on “reasonable grounds” of involvement in such activities.^{ccv}

The Security Council has also come close to taking action against enslavement in the case of the DPRK. In February 2014, a Commission of Inquiry (CoI) appointed by the UN Human Rights Council found reasonable grounds

to believe that “crimes against humanity have been committed in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, pursuant to policies established at the highest level of the State,” and that these crimes, including enslavement, were on-going inside the DPRK.^{ccvii} The General Assembly subsequently recognized that the allegations pointed to the DPRK’s Responsibility to Protect.^{ccviii} On 17 April 2014, Australia, France and the US convened an Arria-formula meeting of the UN Security Council with the Commission of Inquiry, and later produced a non-paper summarizing the discussions that was circulated as a UN Security Council document.^{ccviii}

The General Assembly subsequently formally referred the matter to the Security Council, encouraging it to consider “referral of the situation ... to the International Criminal Court” and to adopt “effective targeted sanctions against those who appear to be most responsible for acts that the Commission has said may constitute crimes against humanity”. On 22 December 2014, following a request from ten of its members, the UN Security Council voted 11 for, two against, with two abstentions, to add a new item to its agenda on the situation in the DPRK. The Council did not consider the possibility of sanctions or ICC referral, but is anticipated to receive future briefings on the situation in the DPRK.

Most of the time and attention devoted by the Security Council to slavery-related issues comes, however, through thematic processes, particularly working with the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict (SRSV SVC) and the Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict (SRSV CAC). As noted above, the role of the SRSV SVC grew in part out of a position of Special Rapporteur created by the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery. The SRSV SVC works to end impunity for sexual violence in conflict by assisting national authorities to strengthen criminal accountability, responsiveness to survivors and judicial capacity; by mobilizing political ownership; and by strengthening action within the UN system on these issues by leading a network of focal-points from across UN agencies.^{ccix} The current SRSV SVC, Zainab Hawa Bangura (Sierra Leone), has drawn particular attention to sexual slavery by ISIS, and through annual reports to the Security Council.^{ccxi} The SRSV SVC is also a leading force in ‘Stop Rape Now’, a co-ordinated action by 13 UN entities aimed to provide stronger, more co-ordinated efforts against sexual violence in armed conflict.

The role of the SRSV CAC is also relevant to anti-slavery efforts because of the close practical and legal links between forced recruitment of children by armed groups and modern slavery.^{ccxii} A 1996 report by Graça Machel on the *Impact of Armed Conflict on Children*^{ccxiii} led the General Assembly to create the mandate to strengthen protection, raise awareness, collect information and foster international co-operation.^{ccxiv} The SRSV CAC reports annually to the General Assembly and Human Rights Council, and also works with a Working Group established by the Security Council. The Security Council has identified five grave violations affecting children, involvement in which can serve as triggers for sanctions listing. Currently the Security Council has sanctions against 16 individuals (2 in Cote d’Ivoire and 14 in DRC) for such grave violations, and identifies 27 other “persistent violator” groups who may be eligible for sanctions. The SRSV CAC works with listed governments and armed groups to develop action plans to halt and prevent violations against children, and the Secretary-General reports annually to the Council on progress in their implementation. These Action Plans could provide an important model for action against slavery even in other, non-Security Council, contexts. They are written, signed commitments between the United Nations and parties to conflict listed in the Secretary-General’s report, outlining concrete, time-bound measures to end the violations, release and reunify children with their families, and put in place legislation, tools and mechanisms to prevent future violations and hold perpetrators accountable.^{ccxv}

All of this suggests a potential, if limited, role for the Security Council in highlighting the threat posed by slavery and enslavement to international peace and security, particularly in the context of the open advocacy of slavery by non-state armed groups such as ISIS and Boko Haram. The Security Council could discuss slavery and enslavement in the context of an open thematic debate, or in an Arria-formula meeting (an informal meeting of its members with external actors). It could even consider more forceful action relating to due diligence or a monitoring mechanism.

Where are the multilateral economic and development actors?

As Roger Plant, former head of the ILO Special Action Programme Against Forced Labour has pointed out, “[t]he main strategic policies that tackled the slavery-like practices that pervaded rural areas of so much of the world in the twentieth century were” not legislative and justice sector interventions, but “land tenure and redistributive agrarian reforms, and the extension of labour rights including minimum wages to those who had previously been deprived of them”.^{ccxvi} Since slavery is a development problem, anti-slavery is often likely to take on development programming contours. This begs the question: where are the multilateral economic and development actors in this discussion?

In the mid-1990s, major debates emerged over the role of labour standards in the new multilateral trade organization that was being established, the World Trade Organization (WTO). Efforts to ensure that the WTO incorporated strong labour protections and social clauses failed in Singapore in 1996, but one result was an agreement on a Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, approved in the ILO in 1998. This specifies four issues on which ILO conventions are to be considered binding on Member States, whether they have ratified the conventions or not, including forced labour and child labour. As a consequence of this agreement, between 2000 and 2011 ILO published three ‘global reports’ on forced labour. This arguably represents the furthest that global multilateral trade, commerce and development actors have been pulled into anti-slavery discussions—despite the central role of global supply chains, labour markets and migrant worker remittances in both contemporary slavery discussions and contemporary development discussions.^{ccxvii} This stands in contrast to the regional level: in the EU, as discussed in Box 6, trade instruments are increasingly being used to achieve anti-slavery goals.



Box 6 - Regional organizations and modern slavery

The European Union's new trade strategy, *Trade for All: Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy*, commits the Union to greater integration of human rights in trade decisions.^{ccxviii} It explicitly states that “[h]uman rights breaches that may be found in global supply chains such as the worst forms of child labour, forced prison labour, forced labour as a result of trafficking in human beings and land grabbing deserve particular attention”.^{ccxix} It commits the European Commission to the promotion of implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights—and other relevant, OECD, ILO and Global Compact instruments—in the Union's trade relationships. Currently, the EU is considering imposing trade restrictions to address slavery in the Thai seafood industry, having issued a “yellow card” over concerns about ongoing violations.

^{ccxx}

In the Western Hemisphere, the Organization of American States is also moving in a direction that will see it increasingly involved in anti-slavery efforts. In 2014, for example, the OAS General Assembly committed to support and promote the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.^{ccxxi} In both Latin America and Europe, regional human rights bodies have also played an important role in promoting and enforcing anti-slavery norms. In the signal case of *Pereira v. Brazil* in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, a settlement was reached to resolve a complaint arising from the serious injury of a man attempting to escape horrendous forced labour conditions.^{ccxxii} The result was a package of significant regulatory reforms that now serve as a model for other jurisdictions. Litigation in the European Court of Human Rights has also had a singularly important effect on states' understandings of their obligations to protect against slavery.^{ccxxiii} This trend is also now visible in Africa, with the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice recently deciding an important case in favor of a victim of a traditional form of slavery, helping to trigger significant anti-slavery efforts in Niger. Also in Africa, the African Union has, since 2010, had in place an Action Plan to combat human trafficking, providing a framework for the AU Commission to work with its Member States to address the issue throughout the continent.^{ccxxv}

In Europe and Central Asia, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) plays a significant role, with field presences in Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kyrgyzstan, Montenegro, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.^{ccxxvi} The OSCE also provides a model for strategic coordination and norm promotion. Its Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combat Trafficking in Human Beings leads work across the organization, and promotes Member State efforts to address it. Amb. Madina Jarbussynova, the current incumbent, has placed a strong emphasis in fighting human trafficking in supply chains.^{ccxxvii} Each year, the OSCE Special Representative convenes an ‘Alliance against Trafficking in Persons’, bringing together a diverse group of stakeholders from Anti-Slavery International to NATO, from EUROPOL to UNODC.^{ccxxviii}

Perhaps the most obvious pieces missing from this story, however, are the major development actors of the multilateral system. While the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization has been involved in some land and agricultural reform projects intended to address bonded labour, other UN development agencies only occasionally focused on forced labour and anti-human-trafficking programming. Anti-slavery concerns are not, for example, a regular feature in UN Development Assistance Frameworks. The World Bank, likewise, is not a major player in the multilateral anti-slavery effort. While its lending arguably addresses drivers of slavery through programming in the social protection and labour market areas, it has been resistant to tackle modern slavery and forced labour directly. Staff are explicitly instructed that respect for core labour standards is *not* a condition for Bank lending.^{ccxxxix} But the Bank's allergy to action on these issues has recently begun to create reputational risks. In 2013 and 2014, a World Bank Inspection Panel considered allegations that Bank support was linked to government-sponsored forced labour in the Uzbek cotton industry.^{ccxxx} The Inspection Panel ultimately declined to mount a full investigation on the basis of steps taken by the government and the World Bank to improve monitoring of the situation, including involvement of ILO.^{ccxxxi} The Bank's Board supported the outcome, but unsurprisingly the decision met with consternation in civil society quarters.

The World Bank justifies its active disinterest in investing in anti-slavery transformations on the basis that it has no role in human rights issues, since it is barred by its Articles from getting involved in a state's political affairs.^{ccxxxiii} Yet as the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Philip Alston, has recently pointed out, this stands in marked contrast to the Bank's willingness to engage on criminal justice issues.^{ccxxxiv} In fact, closer examination of the Bank's work over the last decade reveals an increasing willingness to engage with questions of human trafficking, particularly through the lens of gender. And given the Bank's founding Articles give it a mandate to assist in "raising productivity, the standard of living and the conditions of labour", the question of the Bank's involvement in addressing modern slavery should be even easier to resolve in the affirmative. With states committing in SDG 8.7 to treat the fight to end modern slavery as a part of the effort to achieve sustainable development, the case for World Bank involvement in multilateral efforts to end modern slavery is clearer than ever.

The Bank's reluctance also stands in marked contrast to the approach taken by the World Bank Group's International Finance Corporation (IFC), which lends to the private sector—and the willingness of the private sector itself to engage with these issues. In 2012 the IFC revised its Environmental and Social Performance Standards, which define clients' responsibilities for managing their environmental and social risks, to align them with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.^{ccxxxv} The UN Guiding Principles are sometimes known as the "Ruggie Principles" after the Harvard academic, John Ruggie, who developed them with Member States and the private sector at the request of the UN Human Rights Council and the UN Secretary-General. They restate states' Duty to Protect human rights, identify a corporate Responsibility to Respect, and explain both states' and business' roles in remedying human rights abuses. Endorsed in mid-2011, in under five years the Ruggie Principles have had a significant effect in shaping private sector efforts against slavery, both through direct action and through statutory and state-led policy and standards uptake, for example in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ISO 26000, the European Commission Communication on Corporate Social Responsibility, and various national action plans.^{ccxxxvi} At the multilateral level, the Guiding Principles have been picked up by the UN Global Compact—a UN-based voluntary initiative for private sector leaders—and in the UN Principles for Responsible Investment.^{ccxxxvii} In adopting the SDGs, the General Assembly specifically referred to the UN Guiding Principles, and major international business groupings, including the International Chamber of Commerce and the International Organization of Employers, have recently affirmed their commitment to implementing the Guiding Principles as a means to achieve sustainable development in line with the SDGs.^{ccxxxviii}

The reluctance of the World Bank to engage with modern slavery concerns thus stands in contrast to—and well behind—engagement by the private sector. Its absence from global efforts to tackle slavery has, however, largely gone unremarked in multilateral circles, which have become accustomed to treating slavery, forced labour and human trafficking as niche concerns, to be tackled separately by distinct institutions and actors. The common themes of slavery, forced labour and trafficking—extreme inequality, manifested through exploitation resulting from marginalization and vulnerability—have been lost, and with

them the opportunity to bring multiple forms of leverage to bear on these complex problems. Multilateral efforts have in stead become fragmented, creating a recurring challenge: strategic co-ordination.

The challenge of strategic co-ordination

For almost fifty years, between the mid-1950s and the early twenty-first century, there was no attempt made in the UN system to co-ordinate anti-slavery efforts across its development, peace and security, trade regulation, and human rights pillars. However the upswing of interest in efforts to tackle human trafficking did lead, around a decade ago, to two important efforts to improve co-ordination of the UN's human trafficking efforts (though not its slavery and forced labour efforts, *per se*). While they contributed in important ways to fighting human trafficking, these two initiatives reveal the weakness of strategic co-ordination across the global multilateral system on these, and broader slavery, issues.

The first, the Inter-Agency Coordination Group Against Trafficking in Persons (ICAT), brought together 16 agencies involved in anti-trafficking efforts, including not only UN-system entities (including the World Bank) but also IOM.^{ccxxxix} ICAT was initially set up as an informal inter-agency cooperation mechanism, through the UN Chief Executives Board for Coordination. In 2006-2007 it was formalized by interventions by the UN General Assembly and ECOSOC.^{ccxli} UNODC serves as its Secretariat, while the Chair rotates among members. Still operational, it aims to provide both a policy forum and a co-ordination mechanism amongst these agencies, focusing since 2012 on identifying areas for potential joint action to make effective use of scarce resources.^{ccxlii}

An independent evaluation of ICAT commissioned by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2012 found that "There is no overall strategic co-ordination", and "the multilateral response to trafficking is weak and fragmented", with scarce "financial and human resources", and "none of the [major] agencies devot[ing] any significant share of core resources to" work in this area. Individual agencies, it concluded, do not plan their work in this area on the basis of "any expectation of synergetic effects of working together". ICAT had "been rather passive" and did not provide strategic direction to its members' activities. Five years after its establishment,

the review called for ICAT to define its "scope and function" and clarify its "mission and mandate".^{ccxlili}

Since 2012 ICAT has published three papers that aim to "serve as a catalyst for the promotion of common strategic priorities and greater policy and programmatic coherence", the international legal framework, and trafficking prevention.^{ccxliv}



These papers are in no way binding, and ICAT's lack of access to—let alone control over—resources additional to those of its members gives it extremely limited power to catalyze harmonization of its member agencies' strategies or programming. The absence of a strong leading actor also stands in stark contrast to other recent, analogous UN initiatives, such as 'Stop Rape Now', in which the SRSG SVC has played an important leadership role, helping to create



momentum and attract the new resources that incentivize effective co-ordination within a taskforce or committee structure.

Indeed, one of the reasons that ICAT has struggled is precisely that it has been overshadowed by another group, with very similar membership, which *does* have access to such resources—the UN Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UN.GIFT). UN.GIFT grew out of an initiative by the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, which approached the Secretary-General in 2006 to hold an international conference on human trafficking. This led to the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi committing \$15 million towards a larger 'Global Initiative' in this area, launched in March 2007 as a UNODC project, in co-operation with a Steering Committee including ILO, IOM, UNICEF, OHCHR, OSCE and the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. The UN.GIFT Steering Committee controlled grants made to joint projects by two or more Steering Committee members. UN.GIFT initially set out to focus on awareness raising and action mobilization, through ten regional conferences and one global conference. This programming expanded over the course of the project, which was ultimately completed in 2014. Serbia, Bolivia, Rwanda, Pakistan, Egypt and Central Asia all became particular focuses of UN.GIFT programming.

A 2011 evaluation by the UNODC Independent Evaluation Unit argued that UN.GIFT had "filled an important gap as a platform for facilitating inter-agency co-operation in [anti-trafficking] efforts at the global level, within and outside the United Nations system".^{ccxlv} But the Swedish-organized independent evaluation of ICAT found that UN.GIFT had effectively crowded out ICAT, creating confusion over the two bodies' roles and competition for resources.^{ccxlv} In fact, in its final three years, UN.GIFT set as one of its four strategic goals "Ensuring Inter-Agency Co-ordination and Co-operation"—despite that role formally being given by the UN's intergovernmental bodies to ICAT.^{ccxlvii} What is more, UN.GIFT grant-making appears to have been driven not by a strategic assessment of global needs (as is common in the vertical funds discussed further in Part 3 below), but by opportunities that presented themselves to Steering Committee members. And as the Swedish-commissioned evaluation of ICAT points out diplomatically, "it is uncertain how much co-ordination a project run by one organization", as UN.GIFT was run by UNODC, "can expect from other agencies".^{ccxlviii}

There is little reason to believe that strategic co-ordination has improved substantially since 2012, notwithstanding the General Assembly's periodic resolutions on "Improving the co-ordination of efforts against trafficking in persons", since there has been no major revision of ICAT's structure, modalities or resources, and its primary outputs have been three policy papers.^{ccxlix} The story is, however, marginally happier in terms of programmatic co-ordination at the regional level. A UN inter-agency project on human trafficking in the Mekong sub-region—UNIAP—that ran between 2000 and 2011 was identified by the same independent evaluator that criticized ICAT as having "proven very effective in working directly with the governments in the region for policy development and capacity building". This occurred, she concluded, primarily through intergovernmental co-ordination—rather than inter-agency co-ordination within the UN.^{cccl} Another recent study has also pointed to the importance and impact of multi-country partnerships, led by the UK Department for International Development (the Work in Freedom programme), and the Australia-Asia Program to Combat Trafficking in Persons (AAPTIP). Yet even in those cases—and in others studied by anti-trafficking experts such as Professor Anne Gallagher—analysis suggests a notable absence of overall strategic co-ordination in anti-slavery and anti-trafficking efforts.^{cccli}

Competing trust funds?

The absence of effective strategic co-ordination is most starkly borne out in the context of resource mobilization and allocation. There are currently two entirely distinct funds in the UN system offering small grants related to 1) anti-slavery and 2) anti-human trafficking efforts, and their work also overlaps with 3) an ICC Trust Fund. These three may soon have to compete with two more UN trust funds: 4) a fund being considered for implementation efforts to do with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights; and 5) a fund to do with implementation of the SDGs. None of these trust funds has any formal relationship with the others, and there is no effort to co-ordinate their work or fund-raising, let alone share costs. What is more all five of these funds, put together, are dwarfed by two *further*, privately initiated funding initiatives with which they have no formal relationship: 6) the Freedom Fund (which sponsored this report); and 7) a new Global Fund to End Slavery initiated by private sector actors and being stood up by US Congress, aiming to mobilize \$1.5 *billion* in anti-slavery funding (half of it from the private sector), and to reduce slavery in target countries by 50 per cent by 2022. In this section we consider how all these different funding mechanisms inter-relate.


The UN Voluntary Trust Fund on Contemporary Forms of Slavery (UN Slavery Fund) was established by the General Assembly in 1991, and is now administered by OHCHR.^{cclii} It supports, through small grants, projects offering direct humanitarian, medical, psychological, legal and financial assistance to victims of contemporary forms of slavery. It has supported more than 400 organizations in 95 countries since 1991. It has thus played important humanitarian and awareness-raising roles, not only supporting victims but also getting their testimony into the public domain and making slavery denial more difficult.^{ccliii} But the UN Slavery Fund is not set up in a way that suggests it will have—or is expected to have—a major impact on the incidence of slavery. Annual contributions have oscillated, since 2002, between just \$208,827 and \$886,482, and at present it is largely dependent on a small handful of donors, notably Germany. It has never reached its own estimates of the annual contributions required to "meet demand" —\$2 million. Its grant-making is not



driven solely by need, but must also factor in regional distribution and a self-imposed \$15,000 cap on grants. In 2015, the UN Slavery Fund is supporting 44 projects from 35 countries, with the average grant size being \$13,364. While this support is anticipated to reach 29,014 victims, that represents roughly 0.1 per cent of suspected global victims of slavery. And only around 70 per cent of donations are actually disbursed to grant recipients; the remaining 30 per cent covers Fund administration and support to the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery to allow her to perform her Human Rights Council mandate. Indeed, a recent report concluded that "after 20 years of operation, the Slavery Fund is not close to covering its management costs, relying on OHCHR regular budgetary support and cross-subsidisation by the Torture Fund."^{ccliv}

In 2015, the UN Slavery Fund is supporting 44 projects from 35 countries

Box 7 - Contributions to the UN trust funds since 2002 (in USD)



The second fund is the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Victims of Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN Human Trafficking Fund).

^{cclv} Although the UN Slavery Fund had been in place for some 20 years, in 2010 the General Assembly decided to establish a parallel trust fund focused on victims of trafficking in persons—this time administered not by OHCHR but by UNODC.^{cclvi} Like the UN Slavery Fund, it has a mandate to assist victims. It is also a similar size, rising from \$79,109 in its first (half) year to \$794,197 in 2013, from a total of 19 Member States to date. In contrast to the UN Slavery Fund, however, 30 private sector donors account for almost one third of the \$2.28 million in total income to date.^{cclvii} The five largest donors are Qatar, Australia, Orascom Telecom Holding, France and the UAE. In its first 3-year cycle, the UN Human Trafficking Fund awarded grants of almost \$750,000 to 11 projects from civil society organizations specialized in victim assistance, for an average of around \$68,000. In its second cycle it anticipates funding 19 projects at an average of around \$58,000 per grant. Around 2,000 victims per year receive assistance through these grants.^{cclviii} As with the UN Slavery Fund, significant questions arise as to whether the current scale of fundraising adequately covers grant administration costs; a recent independent evaluation commissioned by UNODC concluded that while fundraising had been innovative, “current funding falls considerably short of what is needed to allow Fund operational costs to be covered while simultaneously ensuring that the large proportion of funds continue to be allocated to direct assistance to victims.”^{cclix} The Trust Fund had survived, it suggested, only because UNODC had been subsidizing its operating costs.^{cclx}

A third trust fund operating in this area is the International Criminal Court’s Trust Fund for Victims. Under its General Assistance Mandate, the ICC Trust Fund is empowered to provide assistance to victims (as defined in Rule 85 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence) and their families who have suffered physical, psychological and/or material harm as result of crimes under the Rome Statute—even if those crimes have not been charged or proven in the ICC. Victims and their families are eligible for both monetary support and physical and psychological rehabilitation services. To date, more than 100,000 victims have received assistance from the Trust Fund, including in several situations such as Uganda and DRC where slavery

crimes are alleged.^{cclxi} It has a particular focus on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). With a resource base of \$10 million in July 2014, the Trust Fund has significant potential to not only highlight the plight of victims of slavery, but also assist them—whether or not prosecutions of slavery crimes move forward at the ICC.

The risks of duplication of work and transaction costs, and competition for scarce resources between these three trust funds, is obvious. Indeed, an independent evaluation of the UN Human Trafficking Fund in 2014 found that it had not clearly defined its comparative advantage or distinguishing features from other funds supporting victims of trafficking, particularly the UN Slavery Fund. The evaluation also noted that the UN Human Trafficking Fund “is not backed by either strong institutional expertise in the specific area of victim support, or by a strong on-the-ground presence, which would facilitate both the setting of priorities and the monitoring of activities”. As a result, it noted, it is unclear “why a donor should choose to support the [UN Human Trafficking Victims Fund] over other initiatives or over direct funding of NGOs”.^{cclxii} The evaluation also found that “the Trust Fund has not evolved in a manner that enables it to identify and share good practice, even among its grantees”. The UN Slavery Fund has not produced a similar independent evaluation, but it seems likely that it might generate a similar analysis. Only at its 18th session in 2014 did the Board of Trustees of the Slavery Fund instigate project impact assessment arrangements, and while there has long been talk in the Trust Fund of using its experience to identify good practice, this has yet to materialize.^{cclxiii}

There was, briefly, a two-person overlap in the Boards of Trustees of the two UN trust funds. This has now ended, and there has been no systematic effort to co-ordinate their work, share costs, or otherwise co-ordinate strategies. The UN Human Trafficking Fund evaluation noted that while there had been “attempts to liaise more closely” with the Slavery Fund in particular, the UN Human Trafficking Victims Fund “has missed opportunities to learn from the experiences of other programmes, notably in the area of grant selection, as well as sharing ideas and even resources on monitoring and resource mobilization”.^{cclxiv} And these three trust funds may soon be competing with two new trust funds under consideration—a possible trust fund for implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on

Business and Human Rights (administered by OHCHR)^{cclxv} and a trust fund for implementation of the SDGs (administered by UNDP).^{cclxvi}

All of these UN trust funds are, however, dwarfed by two new, privately-initiated grant-making initiatives. The first of these, The Freedom Fund, sponsor of this report, is a private donor fund that invests in best-of-class anti-slavery interventions, scaling those that succeed, and encouraging greater collaboration in the anti-slavery sector through knowledge development and dissemination. It aims to mobilize \$100 million for this effort, and since January 2014 has already mobilized more than \$50 million from Humanity United, the Legatum Foundation, the Minderoo Foundation, the Stardust Fund, C&A Foundation and the Children’s Investment Fund Foundation. Where the UN and ICC trust funds invest in victim support and assistance, the Freedom Fund focuses on investing in community-based organizations in slavery ‘hotspots’ to identify, and scale up, effective interventions; initiatives designed to tackle slavery in specific global business sectors; and collaboration and knowledge-sharing within the global anti-slavery community.^{cclxvii}

There are strong incentives for multilateral organizations to work with private and public-private partners

The new Global Fund to End Slavery (GFTES), by contrast, will focus specifically on engaging with governments, business, civil society and international organizations to drive country-wide transformations, reducing slavery in target countries by 50 per cent by 2022.^{cclxviii} GFTES is a public-private partnership developed with bipartisan support in the US Congress, backed by Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn.). His *End Modern Slavery Initiative Act of 2015* is currently before the US Senate, having been reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 2015 and having received the support of the Senate Appropriations Committee in July 2015.^{cclxix} GFTES is already registered as a non-profit organization in the US, but once the framework legislation is approved anticipates securing large Congressional appropriations—up to \$251 million over eight years—conditional upon securing a further \$500 million from other governments and \$750 million from private sector donors—a total of \$1.5 billion by 2022.^{cclxx}

GFTES plans to use these considerable resources to develop partnerships with governments to deliver “budgeted national plans” along lines similar to the implementation arrangements used by vertical funds in the global health sector over the last ten years (discussed further in Part 3).^{cclxxi} Its leadership seeks to align with the Freedom Fund, treating it as an innovation incubator, scaling up successes the Freedom Fund identifies, particularly in the areas of 1) rule of law reform; 2) supply chain transformation; and 3) replacement economies (new livelihoods for communities moving away from reliance on slavery). It has already identified a number of ‘pathway’ countries, and is working with industrial engineering companies to map “influencers, systems and leveraging opportunities”. GFTES plans to work closely with global business, not only to mobilize funding, but also as a source of business and economic transformation expertise (particularly in dealing with global supply chains), and to strengthen governance.^{cclxxii}

GFTES’ direct engagement with governments will put it in a similar space to the ILO, but it is not a multilateral organization; at the outset GFTES has significant U.S. support. GFTES will be, by statute, connected to, and backed by, US diplomatic and development assistance support, with the US Ambassador-at-Large and Director

of the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons anticipated to sit on an Advisory Board.^{cclxxiii} (The former deputy in that office is now GFTES Vice-President.) The CEO must be a US citizen.^{cclxxiv} And in choosing partner countries GFTES will be obliged to consult directly with the US State Department, Department of Justice, Department of Labour, USAID and other relevant US federal agencies, and make funding choices based in part on assessments made in the US State Department's Trafficking in Persons report.^{cclxxv} Other states may, of course, if and when they engage, impose similar consultation requirements.

GFTES' leaders indicate that they are already in discussion with several other countries to participate in the initiative, and that it aims to become a broader initiative in time, along the lines of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM, discussed in Part 3). Its strong ties to U.S. government could prove an asset in mobilizing global action against slavery, but could also, if other countries do not engage strongly, become a potential constraint. The End Modern Slavery Initiative Act of 2015 foresees this challenge by requiring the GFTES, no later than four years after its establishment, to begin to develop a broader global strategy.^{cclxxvi} The framework legislation underpinning GFTES sets an initial time horizon of 2022 for its efforts, but explicitly makes provision for development of a global strategy, to take it beyond that horizon. The initially short time-horizon creates a danger, at least in theory, that vested interests in target countries may simply out-wait GFTES' transformational efforts; here, the development of the broader-based, longer-term strategy, as required by the Act, becomes crucial. Radically short time-horizons may limit the prospects of building the trust and lasting relationships which research from Professor Richard Locke of the Watson Institute at Brown University suggests is essential for effective collaborative regulation in global supply chains.^{cclxxvii} Moreover, the framework legislation makes clear that projects (i.e. countries) that are not on track to meet the goal of 50 per cent reduction by 2022 risk being defunded, which may also incentivize spoiling behaviour.

All of this points to strong incentives for GFTES to work closely with international partners, including multilateral organizations with the legitimacy, permanence and universality of the United Nations, to broaden the base

and lengthen the time-horizon of political and business engagement with anti-slavery efforts. Equally, the UN and other international partners arguably have strong incentives to collaborate with the GFTES, the Freedom Fund, and other relevant stakeholders, to harness the political, business, and social capital they are mobilizing. What this points to, in short, is the need for a global partnership to end modern slavery.



Recognizing the limits of the current multilateral approach

This review of multilateral action against slavery reveals four major limits to the current approach.

1. Limited political leadership

The multilateral system is not well organized to provide political leadership to prevent erosion of anti-slavery norms and drive anti-slavery transformations. Anti-slavery efforts are receiving increased attention from consumers, religious leaders, private donors and even US Congress. Yet at the same time, anti-slavery norms risk being weakened by: 1) direct attack by groups such as ISIS and Boko Haram; 2) unscrupulous business actors; and 3) state indifference or, worse, acquiescence. The fragmented nature of existing UN action against slavery—particularly its separation into three distinct anti-slavery, anti-human trafficking, and anti-forced labour silos—works against effective political mobilization to resist these forces of erosion.

There has been significant political mobilization against human trafficking over the last decade, notably through the emergence of a UN-based Group of Friends United Against Human Trafficking^{ccclxxviii} and the formulation of a UN General Assembly Plan of Action on the issue. This action has focused especially on human trafficking as a criminal activity—rather than one requiring economic transformation or development initiatives—and is not yet matched by political mobilization on broader issues of modern slavery. There is, as yet, no ‘Group of Friends to End Modern Slavery’. The SRSVC and the SRSVC CAC

have provided important leadership on certain slavery crimes in conflict contexts, but are not mandated to address the broader phenomenon of modern slavery. The absence of a treaty or monitoring body for the 1926 Slavery Convention means there is no natural forum for Member State co-ordination and development of global policy and action. The Special Rapporteur for Contemporary Forms of Slavery has helped to mobilize action within the human rights pillar of the UN, but is under-resourced, and the Human Rights Council does not provide a forum for inter-disciplinary mobilization by Member States to address the development, humanitarian, trade regulation and peace and security aspects of the problem. The adoption of SDG 8.7 may, however, signal a sea-change, and certainly provides a unique opportunity for governments, the private sector, religious leaders, civil society and the knowledge sector to mobilize around these issues.

To be effective, such mobilization will need to be explicitly political—in the sense that the economic transformations required to address slavery will require sustained political pressure and engagement, to ensure they are not defeated by vested interests. At present, most anti-slavery work conducted within the UN system is organized as purely technical assistance programming. While the ILO, in particular, has experience with the political aspects of the long-term engagement required to address forced labour, the broader approach to multilateral action against slavery does not adequately acknowledge this political dimension. The Bangladesh Fire and Safety Accord, discussed in Box 5 in Part 1, demonstrates that multilateral organizations can play an important political role. And isolated actions by the UN Security Council, discussed



above, also point to a recognition of the importance of political leverage in achieving these transformations. But these are exceptions that prove the rule: in most cases, the UN system lacks a clear political focal-point, let alone leader, to sustain engagement and pressure on governments, rebel groups or private sector actors involved in modern slavery. The roles that do exist – such as the position of Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery – are trapped within individual silos, weakly resourced, and have little or no capacity to mobilize integrated action across the UN system – let alone beyond it.

Yet the UN has clear comparative advantages over—and could complement action by—some other actors, such as private business coalitions, or even public-private actors such as GFTES. The UN offers a uniquely legitimate global forum for discussing the role of states in not only preventing slavery, but also, unfortunately, promoting it—and for organizing the collective political pressure that may be required to change state and global business practice. Other actors and coalitions lack this legitimacy. The office of the Secretary-General, in particular, represents a uniquely authoritative voice to mobilize collective action on such complex normative issues, cutting across a range of geographical and thematic boundaries. The current, and incoming, UN Secretaries-General have a unique opportunity to provide political leadership and norm entrepreneurship on this set of issues and show that, as Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld put it, the UN can indeed help “save us from hell”.

The multilateral system is not well organized to provide political leadership to drive anti-slavery transformations

2. Unclear entry points and missing leverage

As things stand, however, Member States do not necessarily know to whom to turn for assistance to meet SDG 8.7. Many of the Member State representatives consulted in the preparation of this study indicated that UN efforts to fight modern slavery are so fragmented that they often do not know where to begin. Worse, some said, these efforts seem frequently to be competing for Member States' attention and resources, as the analysis of UN trust funds, above, seems to bear out. Efforts to improve strategic co-ordination have been sporadic and, even when more sustained, largely ineffective. The UN.GIFT process did encourage information-sharing, but did not seem to lead to different actors identifying comparative advantage and collaborating in ways that leveraged the synergies or complementarities between them. While the ICAT has a formal mandate from the General Assembly for co-ordination on human trafficking issues, it lacks resources and decision-making powers, and has had little demonstrated effect on its Members' anti-slavery strategies or programming. It has not been an engine of effective, system-wide action against modern slavery.

Member States that *do* wish to live up to their commitment in SDG 8.7 may struggle to find a coherent partner in the UN and multilateral system, and may become discouraged by the transaction costs involved in engagement. As one state official pointed out, states will be looking not just to build upon existing human trafficking action plans, but also to think in more depth about how a commitment to fight slavery, forced labour and trafficking may require adjustment in foreign, trade and development assistance policies and frameworks. That will require much improved strategic co-ordination within the UN, if it is to be seen as a helpful partner in this process, rather than a drain on scarce resources. And it will require it not only to integrate the action of its existing anti-slavery, human trafficking and forced labour mechanisms, but also to think about how to engage the missing leverage of the UN development system (including the World Bank), the peace and security architecture (including the UN Security Council), the trade regulation system (the World Trade Organization) and the international criminal justice system (discussed in the companion report to this one, *Fighting Modern Slavery: What role for international criminal justice?*).

3. Inefficient funding arrangements

The multilateral system has not succeeded to date in mobilizing predictable or significant funds for anti-slavery efforts. As discussed above, the ODA spend on anti-slavery work is around \$124 million, and the two UN trust funds each pull in less than \$1 million annually and reach only around 0.1 per cent of slavery victims annually. Their grant-making is not driven by—or set up to address—the most problematic cases or the most dire needs. They are not designed to drive innovation in the field, and in fact seem to struggle to incorporate good practice into their own work. Unsurprisingly, governments and private donors are increasingly looking to private mechanisms and public-private vehicles to organize funding mechanisms hundreds, if not thousands, of times larger. But it may be that actors such as the nascent Global Fund to End Slavery would benefit from additional multilateral political leverage to sustain the long-term transformations that will address modern slavery in a specific country, sector or supply-chain in a sustainable fashion. Indeed, the leadership of GFTES appears to have recognized the importance of working within a larger coalition of actors, including from the UN.^{ccclxxix} But the fragmentation of the UN system on these issues makes it unclear how that engagement can be effectively structured and overseen.

Member States indicated that UN efforts to fight modern slavery are so fragmented that they do not know where to turn for assistance

4. Missing opportunities on data and innovation?

As this review has shown, the multilateral system—including the League of Nations, the ILO and the UN Secretariat—has a long, unique and invaluable history of providing data on the incidence, nature and patterns of slavery in the world. In recent years, the UN system has been a thought-leader on measuring forced labour and human trafficking.^{cclxxx} The UN’s universality, its deep engagement with national statistical systems, and its reputation for high-standard statistical professionalism all put it in a unique position to develop robust, comparable, reliable and safe data upon which effective programming and strategic interventions can be based, as the IOM is showing with its pioneering work on global migration data.^{cclxxxii} But because of its fragmented organization on anti-slavery, the UN risks missing two important opportunities arising from its unique positioning.

First, it risks missing the opportunity to develop *better* data. Leading UN system officials and other experts involved in anti-slavery efforts openly recognize the patchiness of existing data, and the need for better data.^{cclxxxiii} The fragmented nature of UN anti-slavery efforts means, however, that UN actors risk failing to learn from each other, to harness the best data available within the system and—crucially—to learn from external actors about new data development and analysis innovations. The UN has not proven successful in mobilizing public funding for data collection and research; ministries often prefer to focus on ‘action’ interventions with more easily demonstrated and measurable impact.^{cclxxxiii} While private funds are being invested at significant scale in this area, there is a risk that the UN will get left behind, and that the synergies that could come from effective public-private action in this area could be lost.

Most interventions fail to tackle the global supply chains that underpin much contemporary slavery

Second, the UN system risks failing to harness that data effectively to drive innovation and strategic intervention. The review of multilateral action above suggests that the UN has not always been as successful as it might have been at connecting data to analysis and analysis to strategic interventions and programming. Recent evidence suggests that increased funding for anti-trafficking efforts in the last decade promoted research, awareness-raising and prevention efforts, but has not been successful in promoting intervention, enforcement and effective advocacy efforts.^{cclxxxiv} And because nearly all of its anti-slavery work occurs through engagement with specific countries, rather than global business sectors, most interventions are designed on a highly localized basis, failing to tackle the global supply chains, markets and incentive structures that underpin much contemporary slavery.



3. Towards a global partnership

“We are facing a global phenomenon which exceeds the competence of any one community or country. In order to eliminate it, we need a mobilization comparable in size to that of the phenomenon itself.”

Pope Francis^{cclxxxv}

Why a global partnership?

We have the keys to fight slavery and unlock the shackles on development. But we are not using them smartly, or getting them, at scale, to where they need to be. The challenge here is not to reinvent the wheel, but rather to multiply the wheels, and attach them to a new chassis or framework—a strategic steering mechanism that ensures the wheels all work together.

Many anti-slavery stakeholders recognize this. The UN General Assembly has recognized “the need to continue to foster a global partnership against trafficking in persons and the need to continue to work towards an enhanced comprehensive and co-ordinated approach”.^{cclxxxvi} The ILO recently began calling for the creation of a multi-stakeholder alliance (‘Alliance 8.7’) to play this strategic co-ordination, resource mobilization and policy innovation function. Its vision of this Alliance is that it would serve as a forum for: multi-stakeholder interaction; co-ordinated system-wide action to assist Member States (including through joint action at the country level); global awareness-raising and high-level political commitments; knowledge development, innovation and dissemination; and as the basis for a global financing facility.^{cclxxxvii}

Other global multi-stakeholder partnerships along these lines—such as the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), the Sustainable Energy For All (SE4All) initiative, or the new Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children (GPEVAC)—have demonstrated the feasibility of such an approach.^{cclxxxviii} (See Box 8 below.) They offer a framework for the development of dynamic global communities focused on measurable progress on a specific issue, fostering both innovation and accountability. A global partnership against slavery along these lines could help:

1. *Renew* the global commitment to anti-slavery, particularly by facilitating engagement at the highest levels of business and politics with anti-slavery efforts;
2. *Reframe* anti-slavery as smart development policy, requiring co-ordinated investment;
3. *Reorganize* our efforts, so that they are more strategically co-ordinated;
4. *Resource* them better, through helping to mobilize and leverage new funding sources; and
5. *Research* needs and use the resulting data, metrics and knowledge to drive smart policy and programming.

Box 8 - Global multi-stakeholder partnerships

Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI)

The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) was launched in 2000, following a UN General Assembly special session, as an independent international organization to bring together public and private sectors with the shared goal of creating equal access to new and underused vaccines for children living in the world's poorest countries. To date it has reached roughly 500 million children, disbursing \$2.2 billion between 2000 and 2009.

GAVI was pioneering in two ways. First, in its *business model*. By pooling the demand from developing countries for new vaccines and providing long-term, predictable financing to meet this demand GAVI influences the market for vaccines. Second, in its *partnership model*. It works as a partnership between UNICEF, WHO, the World Bank, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, governments, the vaccine industry, research institutes and other experts, with the aim of "merging" their comparative advantages. This is achieved through country-based delivery and co-ordination strategies. GAVI is not present on the ground, but instead leverages the different partners' capabilities. Local health ministries work with the WHO to identify vaccine needs and opportunities. GAVI funds their procurement, but UNICEF makes the purchase. The World Bank gives strategic advice on capital market dynamics and helps develop new financing methodologies, such as the International Finance Facility for Immunization. And civil society organizations and country health systems deliver the vaccines. Other partners contribute to the Vaccine Alliance through participation in strategy and policy-setting, advocacy, fundraising, vaccine development and country support.^{cc1xxxix}

Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM)

The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) was established in 2002, on similar lines to the GAVI. It is not a delivery mechanism, but a public-private financing facility, which raises and invests nearly \$4 billion annually to support country programmes. On-going funding depends on good performance. It has reduced AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria by around 33 per cent in countries in which it invests.^{ccxc}

Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All) partnership

The Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All) partnership was created by the UN Secretary-General in 2012 to set clear global goals for sustainable energy availability and use, convene leaders, mobilize and co-ordinate private sector investment, and monitor progress. Unlike GAVI and GFATM, however, it is not a funding facility per se. It is developing a formal Relationship Agreement with the UN system. Its Advisory Board is co-chaired by the UN Secretary-General and President of the World Bank, and the CEO of the Partnership is also hatted as the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Sustainable Energy for All.^{ccxci} As SE4All remains relatively new, the impact of this model remains to be seen.

Sanitation and Water for All Initiative

Like SE4All, the Sanitation and Water for All Initiative (SWA) is a high-level co-ordination mechanism intended to unblock bottlenecks in this sector. It is a global partnership designed to share information, facilitate strategic co-ordination, foster political leadership, improve accountability, and catalyze innovation. It brings together over 90 governments, external support agencies, civil society organizations and other development partners. Unlike SE4All, however, it has no formal relationship with the UN system, though its Secretariat is hosted by UNICEF and its 23-member Steering Committee includes representatives from several 'multilaterals', along with representatives from developing countries, donors, development banks, civil society, the 'research and learning' sector, 'sector partners' and other observers. The Steering Committee appoints its Executive Chair, who is currently the former, and first, UN Special Rapporteur on the right to safe drinking water and sanitation, Catarina de Albuquerque.

Global Partnership to End Violence against Children

The newest addition to the catalogue of global multi-stakeholder partnerships, and one with particular salience for action against modern slavery, the Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children (GPEVAC) is currently being developed by UNICEF with other partners. GPEVAC will serve as a multi-sectoral, multi-stakeholder platform to convene, support and coordinate efforts to implement action on SDG 16.2, and other violence-related targets. At the global level, the Partnership will focus on building political will to end violence against children and make violence prevention a priority. The Partnership also aims to promote change in the attitudes and social norms that tolerate violence. Nationally, the Partnership will support a small group of pathfinder countries, from all income levels and across the globe, that have demonstrated a strong commitment to accelerating efforts to make children safe. In-country partners will provide technical support through a whole-of-government approach involving a package of evidence-based solutions, a platform for knowledge-sharing across countries, and catalytic funding, where appropriate. The aim is to demonstrate that violence can be prevented with an emphasis on innovation, delivery at scale and learning. Interestingly, GPEVAC combines both the co-ordination-based approach of SE4All and the SWA initiative with the pooled financing approach of GAVI and GFATM, and has already received seed funds from the UK. In 2017 it will convene a 'Solutions Summit' on best practices, promising initiatives and proven strategies to address violence, and then move towards a regular forum convening a broad array of stakeholders working to end violence against children.

The business case

Perhaps the *key* question for those advocating a global partnership against modern slavery is how it would add value. As the discussions of UN.GIFT, ICAT and the UN trust funds in Part 2 showed, there is a constant danger of inefficiency for any coordination mechanism, partnership or pooled funding facility. What, then, is the business case for a global partnership? Is there a distinct business case that could compel co-ordinated action against modern slavery, to achieve economies of scale or unleash new demand, as was the case for GAVI?

Existing global multi-stakeholder partnerships (discussed in Box 8 above) seem to offer two distinct possible answers to this question. The first answer—modelled in SE4All and the SWA initiative—focuses on the role of a global partnership in a) reducing the transaction costs of information-sharing and co-ordination; b) mobilizing political leadership; and c) catalyzing and promoting innovation. The second answer—modelled in GAVI and GFATM—focuses more on the economic value that can be unlocked through pooling resources, notably financial resources. Either of these answers could form the basis for an effective global partnership to end modern slavery—and indeed they could be combined, as the new GPEVAC shows. Only careful consultation with a wide array of stakeholders will ascertain which model would receive the required support. That consultation has been beyond the scope of this study but is, as we return to below, an obvious next step in the development of a viable Global Partnership to End Modern Slavery. It is, however, worth considering what each model might look like in practice.

Global multi-stakeholder partnerships tend to operate according to a recurring theory of change, and face similar challenges.^{ccxciii} A recent review of governance of 11 recent multi-stakeholder global partnerships points to recurring pitfalls amongst such multi-stakeholder partnerships. The theory of change that underpins most of these partnerships can be summarized in roughly six steps, between which there are often multiple feedback loops. These steps are summarized in Box 9.

Box 9 – The global multi-stakeholder partnership theory of change

- 1 Shared goals and metrics.** Global multi-stakeholder partnerships often use a common goal to rally support and create a mutually accepted evidence base. In the anti-slavery field, SDG 8.7 arguably provides that shared goal, but significant investment is needed in common metrics if a new partnership is to move beyond the information-sharing role of ICAT.
- 2 Advocacy, policy and standards.** The shared goal and metrics process creates a forum for advocacy for action and development of agreed policies and programming standards, which can be implemented through decentralized or joint action by different stakeholders.
- 3 Strategic planning.** The community that emerges around this process can then engage in joint planning to identify the resources required to achieve measurable progress towards the goal.
- 4 Resource mobilization (including financing).** Once strategic plans are in place, the community mobilizes resources from amongst its membership or through engaging external actors. In the strategic co-ordination model, resource mobilization a decentralized process. In the pooled financing model, this involves the creation of a joint funding mechanism designed to raise and allocate funds in accordance with the joint strategic plan.
- 5 Delivery systems.** The strategic co-ordination model of global multi-stakeholder partnerships tends to leave delivery to members and local partners. The pooled financing model tends to use the availability of new resources through the partnership as leverage for creating new delivery systems at the national or sectoral level, and for unblocking existing bottlenecks.
- 6 Monitoring and evaluation.** Effective, rigorous and transparent monitoring has proven crucial to ensuring that the partnership sees—and agrees upon—measureable progress towards the goal. This ensures continued availability of resources and members’ trust in the partnership. In the pooled financing model, monitoring and evaluation of specific projects also often serves as the basis for continued investment, using a ratchet model of performance-based financing.^{ccxcv}



The strategic co-ordination model

Reviews of existing global multi-stakeholder partnerships point to a series of key insights and lessons about how strategic co-ordination works—and does not—in these contexts.^{ccxcvi}

First, if the *global* partnership offers access to new resources (financial or otherwise), it can also become an important vector for awareness raising, norm promotion and political engagement at the *national* level, as countries, business and civil society organize to interface with the global partnership.

Second, where global partnerships proactively engage with country delivery mechanisms, this can drive improved strategic co-ordination at the national level. For example, the advent of GFATM and GAVI led to improved interaction between health and finance ministries in many countries, which in turn removed major organizational and governance bottlenecks in the health sector.

Third, where such partnerships include business actors, they need to predicate continued business participation on a commitment to business demonstrating implementation of the agreed policies and standards in their own activities, or the partnership risks becoming an exercise in free-riding philanthropy. Private capital can certainly be a partner in producing public goods, but it also has a responsibility to do good in private. This principle is now baked into partnerships in which the UN participates, through recent *Revised Guidelines on a Principle-based Approach to the Cooperation between the United Nations and the Business Sector*, which make clear that business actors involved in such partnerships

are expected to meet the the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which “serve as the baseline reference point for expected business conduct, and as a benchmark for responsible business implementation”.^{ccxcvii}

These strategic co-ordination partnerships also, however, appear to face recurring governance challenges, such as a lack of clarity on the roles and responsibilities of trustees or host organizations; confusion between the roles of management and governance; and inadequate attention to resource mobilization, especially in the area of human resources for programme delivery.^{ccxcviii} Precisely because these nebulous partnerships do not depend on neatly legislated international regimes, but rather on discourse, networks and adaptive and flexible decision-making, governance may actually prove more complex than in traditional multilateral organizations.^{ccxcix} The danger is that governance becomes a rolling negotiation, and that the costs of continuous engagement with that negotiation overwhelm smaller actors. This can, ultimately, crowd out both trust in the partnership and resources for a professional, independent secretariat. Bezanson and Ilsenman conclude that this often leads partnership boards to usurp the management role of secretariats, and that effective partnership governance often requires difficult “trade-offs between inclusiveness and effectiveness”.^{ccc}

The pooled financing model

All of these challenges, plus arguably some more, apply in the context of the pooled financing model. But the pooled sectoral financing model—sometimes known as the ‘vertical fund’ model—has also proven uniquely effective in mobilizing co-ordinated multi-stakeholder action. As the discussion of UN.GIFT and ICAT in Part 2 shows, people

tend, unsurprisingly, to gravitate towards coordination mechanisms that provide them access to additional resources.

Several—but not all—of the leading global multi-stakeholder partnerships incorporate a pooled financing facility.^{ccci} Their experiences suggest that these additional resources often act as an engine to drive problem analysis, develop a common theory of change and ensure strategic co-ordination around action based on that theory. Pooled financing mechanisms can thus play an important role in translating global goals into effective investment strategies and partnerships.^{ccci} Mobilization for access to pooled funds creates a positive competitive dynamic, and, where access depends on international co-ordination at the national level, can also help to foster national ownership. Pooling funds reduces transaction costs, redundancies and duplication of programming.^{ccci} Pooled funds lower the costs of blending public and private finance, and can raise debt in private capital markets, extending their leverage. Evidence suggests that pooled funds are more efficient allocators of development assistance than bilateral partners, who are more likely to be affected by bilateral political considerations.^{ccci} For similar reasons, pooled global funds may be better at ensuring accountability of recipient governments—but are also better at providing the kind of predictable, multi-year financing required for the kinds of labour market interventions that may be needed to end modern slavery.

A pooled fund to end modern slavery could learn several lessons from the experiences of existing global funds. For example, clearly defined funding windows allow key constituencies to mobilize, reduce transaction costs, promote comparability of country proposals and can enhance learning. Proposal evaluation based on transparent technical criteria—rather than political considerations—encourages even those candidates who fail to secure assistance on their first attempt to try again. Some funds and other resources may need to be set aside to assist some potential grantees to prepare applications.

Does adopting a pooled fund model make sense in the fight against slavery? Once we recognize that anti-slavery is not just a humanitarian concern, but smart development policy, the business case for a pooled funding facility comes into focus. By pooling and co-ordinating capabilities (including, but not limited to finance), anti-

slavery stakeholders could, arguably, allow states and global business access to the resources they need to overcome resistance to anti-slavery transformations. In particular, a Global Partnership to End Modern Slavery would:

- Lower the transaction costs for communities, countries and companies looking for anti-slavery assistance;
- Facilitate co-ordinated efforts to reform global supply chains, creating roadmaps to help states and global brands and retailers undertake reforms – such as adopting new due diligence or reporting frameworks – without fear of losing market share; and
- Foster innovation through pooled investment in data, research, development, demonstration and dissemination.

By providing funding at scale with medium-term to long-term visibility, existing global pooled funding partnerships have helped drive business engagement. The harmonization of health sector planning in different countries driven by the global partnerships helped unlock economies of scale in the pharmaceutical sector. In the context of anti-slavery, it is conceivable that the harmonization of national anti-slavery programming and the development of global sectoral ‘anti-slavery roadmaps’ could, similarly, facilitate co-ordinated action across otherwise segmented global supply chains or recruitment markets.

Of course, the Global Fund to End Slavery currently under consideration by US Congress represents an important application of this pooled funding model to the global anti-slavery sector. It also seeks to apply many of the insights just described, for example through its use of country engagement plans and performance-based financing. But, as discussed in Part 2, GFTES’ strong ties to US government, as well as its initially short time horizon (to 2022) may prove both assets and constraints as it attempts to massively scale-up action against slavery in its partner countries. Nor, at the time of writing, has the touted Congressional funding been secured. It therefore seems worthwhile for other stakeholders to consider whether this pooled financing model – or even GFTES itself – might be usefully worked into a larger global partnership scheme.

The UN General Assembly has encouraged the idea of a “global partnership”, but a cautious approach is clearly called for

The need for caution and consultation

In their recent review of global multi-stakeholder partnerships, Bezanson and Ilsenman caution that stakeholders should “think twice” before assuming that strengthened global action will require a new partnership, institution or pooled fund: “The first task of governance is to be sure that a new organization is required before it is created”.^{cccvi} They suggest that a rigorous “landscape analysis” should be undertaken to understand where and how any new initiative might fit in.^{cccvii} This policy report serves, in a sense, as an initial landscape analysis—but it is more of a reconnoitre expedition than a detailed survey. Most importantly, the report has not been undertaken with a mandate—or a view—to prepare a detailed proposal for a global partnership or pooled funding mechanism. So how do we get there?

There is clear interest from the ILO, GFTES, Freedom Fund and other stakeholders in considering the possibility of a Global Partnership to End Modern Slavery, and the UN General Assembly has encouraged the idea of a “global partnership” on human trafficking. Both this report and reviews of other recent partnerships suggest both that a) the development of a viable proposal for a governance structure of an effective global partnership will take time, negotiation and leadership; and b) that the development of that proposal needs to closely involve—but not ultimately be led by—one of the major potential partners, such as ILO or UNODC. A neutral, honest broker is often needed to lead effective, legitimate and inclusive negotiation of such partnership arrangements.

A cautious approach is clearly called for. In the final section of this report, we offer recommendations on ten specific steps that Member States, UN actors, business and civil society can take to move from the current, fragmented system of multilateral action, to a more effective and strategic global partnership to end modern slavery.





4. Conclusion: How do we get there?

"The United Nations was not created to bring us to heaven, but in order to save us from hell."

Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld^{cccix}

In September 2015, states committed themselves in SDG 8.7 to “[t]ake immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking”. As we saw in Part 1 of this report, effective action against modern slavery will remove a drag on development that afflicts communities world-wide. Part 2 showed that the multilateral system has been involved in the fight against slavery, forced labour and human trafficking for many decades—but also that those efforts have become fragmented and poorly co-ordinated at the strategic level. Often, the different forms of leverage available to the multilateral system—in development, humanitarian affairs, peace and security, and trade regulation—are not brought to bear in a co-ordinated fashion on countries, sectors, or supply chains afflicted by slavery. How, then, can we hope to move towards a more effective and strategically co-ordinated system?

Political mobilization and leadership will be crucial. Civil society and private sector initiative is essential, but so too is multilateral action: multilateral institutions can provide a framework for norm promotion and protection, for strategic co-ordination of multiple forms of leverage, and for brokering effective multi-stakeholder solutions. The UN, clearly, has an important role to play. Some may argue that the UN system already has sufficient tools for tackling slavery, forced labour and human trafficking, in the form of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, the Human Rights Council in Geneva, the ILO, the UNODC in Vienna, and the SRSGs on SVC and CAC in the Security Council in New York, among the other mechanisms considered in Part 2 of this report. Some may also point to the ICAT as a suitable co-ordination framework. But, as we saw in Part 2, there is little evidence that in recent years the whole has offered more than the sum of its parts. Precisely because, in the UN system, slavery is treated largely as a human rights issue, forced labour as a technical issue for ILO, and trafficking as a criminal justice question to be tackled by UNODC, responses have become siloed and fragmented. The potential leverage of the multilateral system in the areas of development, trade regulation, and in some respects peace and security, has not been effectively brought to bear. The sustained, high-level, integrated engagement required to help governments and the private sector address modern slavery has not been attempted in any meaningful way, despite the major development gains that communities around the world seem poised to make if they slip the bonds of slavery.

How do we change that? How do we unshackle this constrained development potential? The first step is to make the effort to end modern slavery a central focus in multilateral action for the next few years, particularly in New York—for the UN Secretary-General, and for the UN’s intergovernmental organs, especially the General Assembly and ECOSOC. The recent statements and initiatives by Pope Francis to promote efforts against modern slavery make clear that both the current Secretary-General, and the next Secretary-General, have a huge opportunity to develop credibility with the global public through promoting action against modern slavery. The office of the Secretary-General is uniquely positioned to mobilize collective action on such complex normative issues, cutting across a range of geographical and thematic boundaries, and ensuring effective co-ordination across the UN’s human rights, criminal justice and labour protection mechanisms—as well as in the fields of development, humanitarian affairs, trade regulation, and peace and security. Few offices in the world have the same reach, legitimacy and scope to mobilize broad and diverse coalitions of stakeholders for change. The current, and incoming, UN Secretaries-General have a unique opportunity to provide political leadership and norm entrepreneurship on this set of issues, help develop roadmaps for sectoral and community transformations to disrupt and prevent slavery, and show that, as UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld put it, the UN can indeed help “save us from hell”.

The UN intergovernmental organs—especially the General Assembly and ECOSOC—also have crucial roles to play. In adopting the SDGs, Member States have pledged that “no one will be left behind”. Action against modern slavery will be essential to reach this objective. Member States will need to ensure that efforts against modern slavery are seen not as niche human rights, criminal justice or labour protection issues to be dealt with solely, and separately, in those silos, but as efforts requiring the co-ordination of complex forms of multilateral leverage and assistance, working across the UN’s silos. One way to signal their intent would be for the General Assembly to adopt a resolution on ending modern slavery, picking up on some of the recommendations below.

Recommendation 1 - Make modern slavery a focus of integrated multilateral action

The UN Secretary-General and the UN's intergovernmental organs should make integrated action against modern slavery a central focus of their work, to unshackle development and ensure that no one is left behind in implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The UN General Assembly should adopt a resolution on ending modern slavery, picking up on some of the recommendations below.

Of course, while these issues deserve the attention of the UN Secretary-General, effective forward movement on such a complex topic will require sustained time and attention, suggesting some kind of special envoy or representative may be needed. Again, some might suggest that there are already enough such figures in the UN system, and that appointing yet another would be a waste of time, money and effort. There are ways to avoid these pitfalls; moreover, a carefully tailored effort, led from New York, would deliver significant benefits:

- Having someone who speaks with the explicit authority of the Secretary-General. This will afford much stronger access to external partners (such as the World Bank, regional organizations and high-level business actors) than some UN actors (such as the human-rights-focused Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery) can muster;
- Having someone who can speak and work across the whole UN, or even broader multilateral system. This will especially be the case if the Secretary-General appoints this person after close consultation with the Director-General of the ILO, the President of the World Bank, and the other key figures represented in the UN CEB, and tasks them to co-ordinate and mainstream integrated action to end modern slavery. As we saw in Part 2, there are several prior examples of the UN Secretary-General working with other key leaders, such as the Director-General of the ILO, to take action in this area;

- Giving this person the role of chairing the existing ICAT structure, while repurposing it so that it deals not only with anti-trafficking, but also forced labour and modern slavery concerns, in line with SDG 8.7. Giving the chair to a high-level figure with direct access to the Secretary-General would help to ensure more effective use of ICAT. Since ICAT has a mandate from the General Assembly, this would require co-ordinated action between the General Assembly and the Secretary-General; and
- Having someone in an explicitly time-bound role, with the clearly delineated task of working with Member States, other international organizations, and business, to develop a longer-term strategy or partnership. Since the role would be time-bound, we suggest it be treated as a 'Special Envoy' role, rather than a more permanent Special Representative role.

This would not require significant new resources, especially if it were envisaged as a two- or three-year appointment. The appointed person could have a small core team financed through extra-budgetary resources, supplemented by staff seconded from relevant UN agencies. If the General Assembly adopted a resolution on ending modern slavery (as suggested in Recommendation 1), this could invite the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Envoy on Modern Slavery to play the roles outlined above, and to chair a system-wide taskforce on modern slavery building on the existing ICAT structure.

Recommendation 2 - UN Special Envoy and STOP-Slavery

The Secretary-General, possibly at the invitation of the General Assembly, and after co-ordination with the UN Chief Executives Board for Coordination, should appoint a UN Special Envoy on Modern Slavery. The Special Envoy should be tasked to work with Member States, mainstream UN system-wide action against modern slavery and chair a System-wide Taskforce on Programming Against Slavery (STOP-Slavery). STOP-Slavery should build on the existing Inter-agency Coordination Group Against Trafficking in Persons (ICAT).

Special envoys and representatives can, however, achieve more with partners than they can on their own. As the historical review in Part 2 showed, the most important progress against modern slavery, forced labour and human trafficking has occurred not just when there was action from leaders within the multilateral system, but when they were working in tandem with like-minded states, business and civil society actors. Recent examples such as the positions of SRSVC and CAC also show that the impact of special envoys and representatives can be significantly amplified if they work in close consultation with a group of Member States. Accordingly, Member States may wish to consider the formation of a Group of Friends to End Modern Slavery, aiming to promote effective, integrated action across the UN system to end modern slavery, and to fulfil Sustainable Development Goal 8.7. This could build upon the work of the existing Groups of Friends, and the the Group of Friends on Decent Work.^{cccx} This Group of Friends to End Modern Slavery should aim to mobilize not only in the UN General Assembly, but also, as appropriate, in ECOSOC, the Human Rights Council, the UN Security Council, the International Labour Conference, the UN Statistical Commission, and the ICC Assembly of States Parties. Alternatively, if this is seen as duplicative of the work of the existing Group of Friends United Against Human Trafficking, a group of like-minded states could initiate a time-bound High Level Review on Modern Slavery, along the lines of the recent Member-State-led High Level Review of UN Sanctions.^{cccxii}

Recommendation 3 – Member States’ Group of Friends or High Level Review

Member States should form an open-ended Group of Friends to End Modern Slavery, building on the work of the existing Group of Friends United Against Human Trafficking and the Group of Friends on Decent Work—or, alternatively, initiate a Member-State-led, but time-bound, High Level Review of Multilateral Action to End Modern Slavery.

The creation of both the Special Envoy position and the Group of Friends (or the High-Level Review) should not, however, be seen as an end in itself. Instead, it should be conceived as a means to mobilize the system to develop more effective, long-term solutions. Here the Special Envoy can play a crucial role, as an honest broker, working with all relevant stakeholders—both within and outside the UN system—to develop a proposal for a longer-term Global Partnership to End Modern Slavery, building upon the existing Global Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons, and picking up on the ILO proposal for an ‘Alliance 8.7’. One lesson from the historical experiences considered in Part 2, particularly relating to UN.GIFT and ICAT, is that the Special Envoy, as a temporary office-holder without a long-term interest in the field, would be better positioned than a concerned agency to serve as an honest, impartial broker of an effective partnership arrangement. The discussion in Part 3 of this report suggests some basic models that this Global Partnership proposal could adopt, including a more horizontal strategic co-ordination model, which would allow the UN system to engage for the long-term with business, civil society and other interested actors to fight modern slavery, like SE4All or the Sanitation and Water for All Initiative; or a more vertical pooled funding model, along the lines of GAVI or the GFATM.

If it incorporates a pooled funding component, the Global Partnership proposal could build upon existing multilateral trust funds such as the UN Slavery and Human Trafficking Victims’ Funds, or even the Global Fund to End Slavery (GFTES) currently being established by US Congress. Competition between funds should, if possible, be avoided; the Global Partnership should be designed precisely to overcome the fragmentation and competition of the past, and ensure more effective, strategically co-ordinated action. This proposal for a Global Partnership to End Modern Slavery could be endorsed by the General Assembly in September 2017.

Recommendation 4 - Global Partnership to End Modern Slavery

By 2017, the Special Envoy on Modern Slavery should, working closely with Member States and all other key stakeholders, develop a proposal for a Global Partnership to End Modern Slavery, possibly incorporating a pooled funding component.

The effort to develop a Global Partnership to End Modern Slavery will proceed much more effectively if the Special Envoy has clear and well co-ordinated interlocutors, not only amongst Member States, but also in the other sectors with a stake in the outcome. Private sector leaders, and civil society actors, including trade unions and knowledge sector actors, could form their own task forces to co-ordinate action to end modern slavery, and to serve as counterparts to STOP-Slavery. These could build on the networks established through the Global Alliance on Forced Labour pioneered by the ILO since 2005, and via the Global Compact.

Recommendation 5 - Private sector and civil society task forces

The private sector and civil society groups should form their own task forces to end modern slavery, to engage with the Special Envoy and the UN's STOP-Slavery, and to help facilitate negotiation of a Global Partnership to End Modern Slavery.

There is plenty that the Special Envoy could do in the short-term, however, in parallel to these broader negotiations on a long-term framework for effective multilateral action. In particular, the Secretary-General could task the Special Envoy to work with STOP-Slavery to develop a Secretary-General's Guidance Note on Effective UN Action Against Modern Slavery, for adoption by the end of 2016.^{cccxii} This guidance note could address the major mechanisms within the UN system for effective

action against slavery, including not only the work of ILO, UNODC and the human rights machinery, but also opportunities for anti-slavery efforts in the work of the UN development system, peace and security pillar, humanitarian action, work on refugees and migration, international criminal justice, trade regulation, and procurement. The note could identify opportunities for improved co-ordination of these efforts, especially through early warning, due diligence and co-ordinated field activities. If Member States choose to form a time-bound High Level Review, rather than an open-ended Group of Friends, that review could inform preparation of the thematic guidance note.

Recommendation 6 - Secretary-General's thematic guidance note

The Secretary-General should task the Special Envoy on Modern Slavery to work with STOP-Slavery to develop, by 2016, a UN system-wide thematic guidance note on effective UN action against modern slavery.

Meanwhile, effective mobilization will also require Member States to think about how to take effective action against slavery in the full range of intergovernmental bodies at the UN—not only the General Assembly, but also ECOSOC and the Security Council. ECOSOC could reactivate its existing, but dormant, mandate under the 1956 United Nations Supplementary Convention on Slavery (Article 8(3)). This allows it to consider state efforts to deal with slavery and make “recommendations for the abolition of slavery, the slave trade or [similar] institutions and practices”. It could use this mandate to invite the Secretary-General to report to it biennially on system-wide efforts against modern slavery, including efforts undertaken in the development, trade, and humanitarian context. This biennial report could be prepared by STOP-Slavery.

Recommendation 7 - Take action in ECOSOC

ECOSOC should use its dormant mandate under the 1956 United Nations Supplementary Convention on Slavery (Article 8(3)) to invite biennial reporting by the Secretary-General, with the support of STOP-Slavery, on system-wide efforts against modern slavery, including efforts undertaken in the development, trade, and humanitarian contexts.

The review of multilateral action in Part 2 also makes clear that there is much more that could be done in the Security Council to draw attention to—and take action against—the violations by ISIS and Boko Haram of the international legal prohibition on enslavement and sexual slavery. There are also important links between slavery crimes, conflict and other threats to international peace and security in other situations already on the agenda of the Security Council, including the DPRK. The Security Council could hold a thematic debate or, failing that, an Arria-

formula meeting, to consider modern slavery as a threat to international peace and security. This debate could consider: all the situations in which slavery-related crimes, including enslavement, sexual slavery, forced labour, child recruitment, and human trafficking, arise in the context of armed conflict and other threats to international peace and security; and the tools available to the Security Council—such as corporate due diligence guidelines, a group of experts or other monitoring mechanisms, and sanctions, that could be useful in preventing and addressing such threats.

Recommendation 8 - Take action in the Security Council

The Security Council should consider an open thematic debate, or an Arria-formula meeting, considering the links between modern slavery, enslavement, sexual slavery and threats to international peace and security.



Next, there is an important question to consider about how the multilateral system can help to mobilize and harness much better data on modern slavery. As we saw in Part 1, data will be crucial for developing cost-effective, co-ordinated action. In Part 2 we saw that the multilateral system has played an important leadership role in developing relevant data, particularly in the areas of forced (and child) labour, and in the context of anti-trafficking in persons initiatives. There are now important initiatives under way to improve statistics on modern slavery, particularly through the International Labour Conference. The most useful thing that the multilateral system could do on this front, in the short term, is to buttress those efforts—in particular by ensuring more robust indicators are included when the UN Statistical Commission adopts the indicator framework for measuring progress towards SDG 8.7 in March 2016.

Recommendation 9 - Develop more robust indicators for SDG 8.7

The Inter-Agency and Expert Group on the SDGs and the UN Statistical Commission should review and strengthen the proposed indicators for SDG 8.7 to ensure they extend beyond child labour, and that there is scope for them to be aligned with the new International Labour Conference official statistic on slavery and forced labour once it is approved in 2018.

Finally, it is important to recognize that there is significant scope for multilateral action against modern slavery, not only in the UN system, but also in other contexts—notably in trade-related contexts, such as the OECD, and at the regional level. Many regional organizations may, in fact, be better placed to develop legitimate and contextually sensitive efforts against slavery. As we saw in Part 2, organizations such as the AU, EU, OAS, OSCE and ECOWAS have each, in their own ways, already played important roles in promoting implementation of anti-slavery norms. The work of the OSCE, in particular, may provide a model for action by the UN. But there is also significant scope for further mobilization and action through—and with—regional organizations.

Recommendation 10 - Engage regional organizations

Member States and the Special Envoy should actively engage with regional organizations to explore co-ordinated action to end modern slavery.

Notes

ⁱ Jean Jacques Rousseau, *Social Contract & Discourses* (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1913), p.1.

ⁱⁱ The key cases clarifying this central aspect of contemporary slavery are discussed in the companion report: James Cockayne and Kari Panaccione, *Fighting Modern Slavery: What Role for International Criminal Justice?* (New York: United Nations University, 2015). The centrality of the powers of ownership in the concept of slavery was codified by the 1926 Slavery Convention – see League of Nations, *Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery*, 25 September 1926, 60 LNTS 253 No.1414 – and the 1956 ‘Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery’ which includes debt bondage, serfdom, servile marriage, and the exploitation of children – see United Nations (UN), *1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery*, 30 April 1956, 1957 UNTS 3, p. 40.

ⁱⁱⁱ See United States Department of Labor, “Democratic Republic of Congo”, in 2013 *Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, 2013); Free the Slaves, *Investigative Report June 2013: Congo’s Mining Slaves: Enslavement at South Kivu Mining Sites* (Washington D.C.: Free the Slaves, 2013); John Prendergast and Sasha Lezhnev, *From Mine to Mobile Phone: The Conflict Minerals Supply Chain* (Washington D.C.: Enough!, 2009).

^{iv} See Verité, “Sustainable Palm Oil? Promoting New Measures to Combat Risks of Forced Labor and Human Trafficking in Palm Oil Supply Chains”, White Paper, May 2013; and Huw Nesbitt, “Child labour: mineral make-up boom raises fears over ethical extraction”, *The Guardian* (U.K.), 10 March 2014, available from <http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/india-child-labour-mica-mineral-cosmetics>.

^v See International Labour Office, Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour, Sectoral Activities Department, *Caught at Sea: Forced Labour and Trafficking in Fisheries* (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2013); Camille Dumont, Sara Piazzano, Laura Romah (eds.), *Where is the Horizon? Trafficked on Fishing Vessels* (Phnom Penh: Counter Trafficking in Persons Project CTIP II, 2014); Kate Hodal, Chris Kelly, and Felicity Lawrence, “Revealed: Asian Slave Labour Producing Prawns for Supermarkets in US, UK,” *The Guardian* (U.K.), 10 June 2014; Felicity

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^{vii} See Verité, “Forced Labor Commodity Atlas”, available from <http://www.verite.org/Commodities>.

^{viii} See Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights, “Uzbek Government Continued Systematic Forced Labor to Weed the Cotton Fields in 2015: Report by the Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights”, (Berlin: August 2015), available from <http://uzbekgermanforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Weeding-Report-2015.pdf>; Patrícia Trindade Maranhão Costa, International Labour Office, Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour, *Fighting Forced Labor: The Example of Brazil* (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2009); André Campos, Mariëtte van Huijstee and Martje Theuws, *From moral responsibility to legal liability? Modern day slavery conditions in the global garment supply chain and the need to strengthen regulatory frameworks: The case of Inditex-Zara in Brazil*, (Amsterdam: SOMO and Repórter Brasil, May 2015); Martje Theuws and Pauline Overeem, and India Committee of the Netherlands, *Flawed Fabrics: The abuse of girls and women workers in the South Indian textile industry* (Amsterdam: SOMO – Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations and India Committee of the Netherlands, October 2014).

^{ix} United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2014* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.14.V.10), 2014.

^x Institute for Human Rights and Business, “Striving for Excellence: Mega-Sporting Events and Human Rights”, *Occasional Paper Series*, Paper Number 2 (October 2013).

^{xi} See e.g. International Labour Office Geneva, International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, *Helping hands or shackled lives? Understanding child domestic labour and responses to it* (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2004), available from http://www.unicef.org/violencestudy/pdf/2004_domestic_Helpinghands_en.pdf

^{xii} Emma Glanfield, “Bed maker that supplies retailers including John Lewis and Next ‘used Hungarians as slave labour paying them £2 a day and forcing them to live in

inhumane conditions”, *DailyMail online*, 9 October 2015; Freedom Network, “Human Trafficking and Farmworkers”, March 2013, <http://freedomnetworkusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Farmworkers-FINAL-1.pdf>.

^{xii} United Nations, General Assembly, “Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, UN Doc. A/RES/70/1, 25 September 2015.

^{xiii} The first international instrument to condemn slavery and call for its abolition was the 1815 Declaration Relative to the Universal Abolition of the Slave Trade: see Declaration Relative to the Universal Abolition of the Slave Trade, 8 February 1815, *Consolidated Treaty Series*, vol. 63, No. 47. It gave rise to the development and implementation of over 300 agreements between 1815 and 1957 designed to suppress slavery. See David Weissbrodt and Anti-Slavery International, *Abolishing Slavery and its Contemporary Forms*, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights HR/PUB/02/4, 2002, p.3.

^{xiv} Quoted in Frank Klingberg, *The Anti-Slavery Movement in England* (Hamden, Conn: Archon Books, 1968), p.11.

^{xv} Interview with Gulnara Shahinian, former UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Geneva, July 2015.

^{xvi} See Cockayne and Panaccione, *Fighting Modern Slavery: What Role for International Criminal Justice?*, op. cit.

^{xvii} Slavery usually includes violations of the freedom from slavery, the right to liberty and security of persons, of freedom of movement, the right to freely accept work, freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, access to courts and fair trial, and often also to freedom of association, expression, to own property and to family life. See Cockayne and Panaccione, *Fighting Modern Slavery: What Role for International Criminal Justice?* op. cit.

^{xviii} See International Labour Office (ILO), Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour (SAP-FL), 2012 *ILO Global Estimate of Forced Labour: Results and methodology* (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2012); and see The Walk Free Foundation, “Findings”, *The Global Slavery Index 2014*, available from <http://www.globalslaveryindex.org/findings/>.

^{xix} See UNODC, *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2014*.

^{xx} See Roger Plant, “Modern slavery: The concepts and their practical implications”, Working Paper (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2014); Lee Swepston, “Forced and compulsory labour in international human rights Law”, Working Paper (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2014), available from http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_342966.pdf; and Kevin Bales, *Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy*, revised edition (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 2012), p. 6.

^{xxi} See UN 1956 *Supplementary Convention*, op. cit.; United Nations (UN), *Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*, 15 November 2000, UN Doc. A/55/383 2237 UNTS 39574, p. 319; the International Labour Organization (ILO) *Forced Labour Convention*, C29, 28 June 1930, C29; and the International Labour Organization (ILO), *Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention*, C182, 17 June 1999, C182.

^{xxii} See Cockayne and Panaccione, *Fighting Modern Slavery: What Role for International Criminal Justice?*, op. cit.. See also: Nicola Piper, Marie Segrave and Rebecca Napier-Moore, “Editorial: What’s in a Name? Distinguishing forced labour, trafficking and slavery”, *Anti-Trafficking Review*, issue 5, 2015, pp. 1-9; Janie Chuang, “The Challenges and Perils of Reframing Trafficking as ‘Modern-Day Slavery’”, *Anti-Trafficking Review*, issue 5, 2015, pp. 146-149; Fiona David, “When it Comes to Modern Slavery, do Definitions Matter?”, *Anti-Trafficking Review*, issue 5, 2015, pp. 150-152; Roger Plant, “Forced Labour, Slavery and Human Trafficking: When do definitions matter?”, *Anti-Trafficking Review*, issue 5, 2015, pp. 153-157; and Marja Paavilainen, “Towards a Cohesive and Contextualised Response: When is it necessary to distinguish between forced labour, trafficking in persons and slavery?”, *Anti-Trafficking Review*, issue 5, 2015, pp. 158-161.

^{xxiii} See further Weissbrodt and Anti-Slavery International, *Abolishing Slavery, supra*. While SDG 8.7 also deals with child labour, this report treats the issue through the lens of slavery – i.e. considering how children are affected by the four legal prohibitions mentioned here (slavery, forced labour, human trafficking, and enslavement and Rome Statute crimes). Some of these refer specifically to children in their own terms.

^{xxiv} See Guidelines 2 and 3, Research Network on the Legal Parameters of Slavery, "The Bellagio - Harvard Guidelines on the Legal Parameters of Slavery", *Global Dialogue*, vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer/Autumn 2012 - Slavery Today), available from <http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=530>. See also Jean Allain, "The Definition of 'Slavery' in General International Law and the Crime of Enslavement within the Rome Statute", in Jean Allain, *The Law and Slavery: Prohibiting Human Exploitation* (Leiden, Belgium: Brill Nijhoff, 2015); and Weissbrodt and Anti-Slavery International, *Abolishing Slavery*, *supra*, p. 7.

^{xxv} See United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), *Report of the Secretary-General on Slavery, the Slave Trade, and other forms of Servitude*, UN Doc. E/2357, 27 January 1953, p. 28.

^{xxvi} The EC-ILO Indicators of Forced Labour are: abuse of vulnerability; deception; restriction of movement; isolation; physical and sexual violence; intimidation and threats; retention of identity documents; withholding of wages; debt bondage; abusive working and living conditions; excessive overtime.

^{xxvii} See The Anti-Slavery Think Tank, "From Experience: How to Combat Slavery in Our Generation", Discussion Paper (Hong Kong: Liberty Asia, 2014), p. 5; and Tom Brass, *Towards a comparative political economy of unfree labour* (London: Frank Cass, 1999).

^{xxviii} Weissbrodt and Anti-Slavery International, *Abolishing Slavery*, *supra*, p. 7.

^{xxix} See Jan Breman, *Outcast labour in Asia: Circulation and informalization of the workforce at the bottom of the economy* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press India, 2012); Bales, *Disposable People*, pp. 24-29.

^{xxx} See Patrick Belser and Michaëlle de Cock, "Improving Forced Labor Statistics", in Beate Andrees and Patrick Belser (eds.), *Forced labour: Coercion and exploitation in the private economy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009), pp. 173-194; and Dianne Scullion, "Assessing the Extent of Human Trafficking: Inherent Difficulties and Gradual Progress", *Social Inclusion*, vol. 3, iss. 1 (2015), pp. 22-34.

^{xxxi} See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Kristiina Kangaspunta (guest ed.), "Researching hidden populations: approaches to and methodologies for generating data on trafficking in persons", *Forum on Crime and Society*, Special Issue, vol. 8 (2015). Specifically, see Thomas M. Steinfatt, "Calculations versus counting

human trafficking numbers", pp. 63-84; and Kelle Barrick, Wayne J. Pitts, Joseph P. McMichael, William D. Wheaton and Brian M. Evans, "Developing a sampling frame of potential trafficking victims using geo-mapping techniques", pp. 95-108.

^{xxxii} See United States of America, Department of State, *Trafficking in Persons Report: July 2015*. pp. 45-48, available from <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245365.pdf>

^{xxxiii} For example, see Heather J. Clawson, Mary Layne and Kevonne Small, "Estimating Human Trafficking into the United States: Development of a Methodology", report submitted to the Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington D.C., December 2006.

^{xxxiv} Bernard Silverman, "Modern Slavery: an application of Multiple Systems Estimation", Paper prepared as part of International Crime and Policing Conference 2015, Home Office of the United Kingdom, 11 December 2014, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/386841/Modern_Slavery_an_application_of_MSE_revised.pdf

^{xxxv} ILO, *2012 ILO Global Estimate of Forced Labour: Results and methodology*. For a discussion, see Peter G.M. van der Heijden, Ieke de Vries, Dankmar Böhning and Maarten Cruyff, "Estimating the size of hard-to-reach populations using capture-recapture methodology, with a discussion of the International Labour Organization's global estimate of forced labour", *Forum on Crime and Society*, Special Issue, vol. 8 (2015), pp. 109-136.

^{xxxvi} See International Labour Office (ILO), Special Action Programme to combat Forced Labour, International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, *Hard to see, harder to count: survey guidelines to estimate forced labour of adults and children* (International Labour Organization: Geneva, 2012).

^{xxxvii} See Walk Free Foundation, "Findings", *The Global Slavery Index 2014*. Somewhat controversially, the methodology allows for the research team to adjust individual country estimates, based on input from government, civil society, geographic proximity to other countries, and other factors at the team's discretion.

^{xxxviii} See Monti Narayan Datta, "Using Big Data and Quantitative Methods to Estimate and Fight Modern Day Slavery", *SAIS Review of International Affairs*, vol. 34, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2014), pp. 21-33.

^{xxxix} International Labour Office, Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour, Programme for the Promotion of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, “ILO 2012 Global Estimate of Forced Labour Q&A”, Geneva, 1 June 2012.

^{xl} “Percentage and number of children aged 5-17 years engaged in child labour, per sex and age group (disaggregated by the worst forms of child labour)”.

^{xli} International Labour Organization, International Conference of Labour Statisticians, *Resolution I: Resolution concerning statistics of work, employment and labour underutilization, Adopted by the Nineteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians*, ICLS Resolution I, 11 October 2013.

^{xlii} Weissbrodt and Anti-Slavery International, *Abolishing Slavery*, p.3.

^{xliii} Rukmini Callimachi, “ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape”, *The New York Times*, 13 August 2015. See also Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: ISIS Escapees Describe Systematic Rape – Yezidi Survivors in Need of Urgent Care”, 14 April 2015; and Amnesty International, “Iraq: Yezidi women and girls face harrowing sexual violence”, 23 December 2014.

^{xliv} United Nations News Centre, “Senior UN official warns of ‘widespread and systematic’ sexual violence in Syria, Iraq”, *United Nations*, 7 May 2015; and see Rukmini Callimachi, “ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape”.

^{xlv} See Amnesty International, “‘Our Job is to Shoot, Slaughter and Kill’: Boko Haram’s Reign of Terror in North-East Nigeria”, London, 13 April 2015; Human Rights Watch, “‘Those terrible weeks in their Camp’: Boko Haram Violence against Women and Girls in Northeast Nigeria”, 27 October 2014.

^{xlvi} US Department of State, *Trafficking in Persons Report: June 2014*, p.297.

^{xlvii} Compare The Economist, “Islam and history - The persistence of history: Islamic State’s revival of slavery, extreme though it is, finds disquieting echoes across the Arab world”, *The Economist*, 22 August 2015.

^{xlviii} International Labour Organization (ILO), “Statistics and indicators on forced labour and trafficking”, available from <http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/policy-areas/statistics/lang--en/index.htm>.

^{xlix} See United Nations General Assembly, *Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of*

Korea, UN Doc. A/RES/69/188, 21 January 2015; and see *Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea*, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/63, 7 February 2014.

ⁱ See e.g. United Nations Human Rights Committee, *Concluding observations on the initial report of Mauritania*, UN Doc. CCPR/C/MRT/CO/1, 21 November 2013; see also the discussion in Judgment, *Hadijatou Mani Koroua v The Republic of Niger*, No. ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08, 27 October 2008, § 10 (*Mani Judgment*).

ⁱⁱ See Human Rights Watch, *Building a Better World Cup: Protecting Migrant Workers in Qatar Ahead of FIFA 2022*, June 2012.

ⁱⁱⁱ Human Rights Watch, “United Arab Emirates: Trapped, Exploited, Abused. Migrant Domestic Workers Get Scant Protection”, 22 October 2014.

ⁱⁱⁱⁱ See Walk Free Foundation, “Findings”, *The Global Slavery Index 2014*.

^{lv} See Glanfield, “Bed maker”.

^{lv} International Labour Office (ILO), Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour (SAP-FL), Fundamental Principles and Rights to Work Branch (FPRW), *Profits and Poverty: The Economics of Forced Labour* (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2014), p.13. This figure relates to forced labour outside domestic work, forced domestic work, and forced sexual exploitation.

^{lvi} ILO, *Profits and poverty: The economics of forced labour*; and Nicola Phillips and Leonardo Sakamoto, “Global production networks, chronic poverty and ‘slave labour’ in Brazil”, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 47, iss. 3, (April 2012), pp. 287-315; Walk Free Foundation, “Findings”, *The Global Slavery Index 2014*.; Seo-Young Cho, “Modeling for Determinants of Human Trafficking: An Empirical Analysis”, *Social Inclusion*, vol. 3, iss. 1 (2015), pp. 2-21; and see Kevin Bales, “What predicts human trafficking?” *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice*, vol. 31, (2007), pp. 269-279; Smriti Rao and Christina Presenti, “Understanding human trafficking origin: A cross-country empirical analysis”, *Feminist Economics*, Special Issue: Gender and International Migration vol. 18, iss. 2, (2012), pp. 231-263.

^{lvii} See UN General Assembly, *United Nations Global Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons*, UN Doc. A/RES/64/293, 12 August 2010, Preamble.

^{lviii} See ILO, *Profits and poverty: The economics of forced labour*; Mike Kaye and Aidan McQuade, "A discussion paper on Poverty, Development and the Elimination of Slavery", Anti-Slavery International, October 2007, p. 2. See also International Labour Office (ILO), "Report of the Director-General: Stopping forced labour. Global report under the follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work" (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2005); International Labour Office (ILO), "A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour: Global report under the follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 2005" (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2005); and International Labour Office (ILO), "Report of the Director-General: The cost of coercion: Global report under the follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work" (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2009).

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^{lx} See Amnesty International, *Deadly Journeys: The Refugee and Trafficking Crisis in Southeast Asia* (London: Amnesty International, 2015).

^{lxi} See Jean Allain, Andrew Crane, Genevieve LeBaron and Laya Behbahani, *Forced Labour's Business Models and Supply Chains* (Belfast: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, November 2013).

^{lxii} Alexandra Vinogradova, Michaëlle De Cock and Patrick Belser, "Measuring the Costs of Coercion to Workers in Forced Labour", 22 May 2009. For an econometric analysis, see Daron Acemoglu and Alexander Wolitzky, "The Economics of Labor Coercion", *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society*, Vol. 79, No. 2 (March, 2011), 555-600.

^{lxiii} ILO, *Profits and poverty: The economics of forced labour*.

^{lxiv} Richard M. Locke, *The Promise and Limits of Private Power: Promoting Labor Standards in a Global Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 156;

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^{lxv} Phillips and Mieres, "The Governance of Forced Labour", p. 251.

^{lxvi} See especially Beate Andrees and Patrick Belser, "Strengthening labour market governance against forced labour", in Beate Andrees and Patrick Belser, eds., *Forced labour: Coercion and exploitation in the private economy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009), pp. 109-128; Phillips and Mieres, "The Governance of Forced Labour", pp. 244-260; and see Allain, et al., *Forced Labour's Business Models*, *supra*.

^{lxvii} Plant, "Modern slavery: The concepts", pp. 2, 15-17.

^{lxviii} See Matt Davies and Magnus Ryner (eds.), *Poverty and the production of world politics: Unprotected workers in the global political economy* (Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave, 2006).

^{lxix} Kevin Hyland, "Putting slavery firmly on development agenda is just the beginning", *The Guardian*, 17 August 2015, available from <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/aug/17/modern-slavery-act-human-trafficking-development-agenda-just-beginning>.

^{lxx} Locke, *The Promise and Limits*, p. 156.

^{lxxi} UK *Modern Slavery Act 2015* (UK); Federal Acquisition Regulation; Ending Trafficking in Persons, 80 FR 4967, effective March 2 2015, available at <https://federalregister.gov/a/2015-01524>; Special Representative on Business and Human Rights, *United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect, and Remedy" Framework*, adopted by the United Nations Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/L.17/31, June 2011; UN Security Council, S/RES/1952 (2010), 29 November 2010, and S/RES/2023 (2011), 5 December 2011.

^{lxxii} The ILO estimates that 44 per cent of those in forced labour moved to work. For an example of efforts to reform recruiting practices, see ILO Fair Recruitment

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^{lxxiii} Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/63, 7 February 2014.

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^{lxxviii} See International Organization for Migration (IOM), "Human Trafficking: New Directions for Research", 2008, available from http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/microsites/IDM/workshops/ensuring_protection_070909/human_trafficking_new_directions_for_research.pdf.

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Saurabun carries bricks for two hours before and two hours after school. This load weighs around 48kg. [Image: Alice Carfrae \(c\) Legatum Limited 2015.](#)

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[Image: Pangea/Freedom Fund](#)

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Cases of slave labour have been found in the production of charcoal in Brazil. In some cases, workers toil in hot, smoky and dangerous conditions with no protective gear. [Image: Free the Slaves / Kay Chernush](#)

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An Amnesty International handout photo dated March 2013 shows migrant workers working at a construction site in Doha, Qatar. The human rights organization Amnesty International has found an 'alarming level of exploitation up to forced labour' in Qatar, the host country of the soccer World Cup in 2022. [Image: Amnesty International/dpa/Corbis](#)

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Two hundred and seventy Wellington school girls protest against the abduction of Nigerian schoolgirls as they march to Parliament grounds on 14 May 2014 in Wellington, New Zealand. Islamist militant group Boko Haram abducted around 200 schoolgirls as they sat for an exam near Cameroon in Nigeria, with reports suggesting the group will sell the girls. [Image: Marty Melville/Getty Images](#)

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Girls studying at a school in Rautahat, Nepal. [Image: Alice Carfrae \(c\) Legatum Limited 2015.](#)

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Myanmar workers on a fishing boat at a pier in Prachuabkhirikhan province, southern Thailand. [Image: AP Photo/Apichart Weerawong.](#)

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Yazidi sisters, who escaped from captivity by Islamic State (IS) militants, sit in a tent at Sharya refugee camp on the outskirts of Duhok province on 3 July 2015. [Image: Reuters](#)

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Bipana Tamang (4 years old) helps her dad turn bricks to dry in the sun. [Image: Alice Carfrae \(c\) Legatum Limited 2015.](#)

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Local villagers break and set rocks by hand to build an extra lane on the highway between Yangon and Patheingyi. Villagers are sometimes required to work without pay on such government projects in Myanmar. [Image: Jerry Redfern/LightRocket via Getty Images](#)

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Twelve brickyard bosses accused of murder and forced labour went on trial in China in the first prosecutions over a slavery scandal that outraged the country. Here, a Chinese brickyard worker makes bricks at a kiln in the suburb of southeast China's Fujian province 5 May 2007. [Image: Imaginechina/Corbis](#)

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Migrant domestic workers hold banners demanding basic labour rights as Lebanese workers, during a march at Beirut's seaside, Lebanon, Sunday, 28 April 2013. Arabic on the placard reads "migrant workers' rights are human rights" and "put an end today to modern slavery". [Image: Hussein Malla/AP/Corbis](#)

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Sharda Kumari, 10 years old, with her mother Ramkali Devi at her house in Koirgaon village in Bankatwa. NIRDESH workers rescued Sharda from a trafficker. [Image: Atul Loke \(c\) Legatum Limited 2015.](#)

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PRAYAS team member interviewing a child rescued from kidnap in a train station in Samastipur, India. [Image: Alice Smeets \(c\) Legatum Limited 2015.](#)

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A worker's back is seen while loading charcoal produced from illegally harvested Amazon rainforest wood on 8 June 2012 in Rondon do Para, Brazil. [Image: Mario Tama/Getty Images.](#)

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Rajesh is a child labourer at a brick factory. He told photographer Alice Carfrae "I like studying and my favourite subject is English. I also like football. I have a lot of friends. On Friday there is a half day class but on Friday my mum says don't go to school but I do go on the other days." [Image: Alice Carfrae \(c\) Legatum Limited 2015.](#)



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